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PAKISTAN

THE PROBLEM OF INDIA

by

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To
Those Indian Muslims who have
fought and suffered and are now
fighting for the unity and freedom
of India.

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INTRODUCTION

For the last four years a great deal of controversy has raged over the Pakistan issue. Conferences have been held in all parts of the country both in favour of and against the partition of India, and the people on both sides have been fully worked up. Several persons have written for and against Pakistan, but unhappily more as partisans than otherwise. Arguments on both sides have been more in the nature of assertions than logical reasons. In this atmosphere of strife and increasing bitterness it is of the utmost importance that the Muslims of India should dispassionately consider the merits and demerits of the Pakistan scheme and arrive at a well considered decision and abide by it. Just as some Muslims have come to passionately advocate Pakistan, and have made it an article of faith which cannot be questioned or criticised; in the same way some non-Muslims, as a matter of sentiment, have recoiled at the very suggestion of the partition of India, and refused to discuss the Pakistan Scheme as a possible solution of the minority problem in India. What is required is a full and free discussion, and a comprehensive statement of the case from both points of views. This pamphlet is an attempt to encourage discussion, dispassionately to examine the proposal for the partition of India and to place the issue before the Muslims of India in clear and comprehensive terms. It is proposed to examine first the reasons of the present state of antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims, and then to describe the genesis of the Pakistan Scheme before analysing the two-nation theory on which it is based. Thereafter, both the case for and against Pakistan would be stated as completely as possible within the scope of this pamphlet.

II

GENESIS OF PAKISTAN

The generally accepted view is that the theory of two nations and the demand for separate and independent Muslim States took birth in the philosophical speculations of Dr. Iqbal. It is said that he started with the premise that on account of their religion and culture Muslims were radically different from Hindus and they could not possibly co-operate with each other either politically or economically, and in view of this the only solution was the creation of a Muslim State as distinct from a Hindu State. Therefore, in 1930, Dr. Iqbal, while presiding over the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League, said : "I would like to see the Punjab, N.-W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appear to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of the North-West India."

The truth of the matter is that it is not correct to say that Dr. Iqbal either sponsored the idea of two nations or evolved what is now known as the Pakistan Scheme. It is clear from the rest of his speech that he was not contemplating a separate sovereign Muslim State, but was only referring to the consolidation of the Muslim North-West in one political unit of an all-India federation. With reference to the "Consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State," he added that "the proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy State." The Nehru Report refers to this proposal as the creation of a new 'province,' of course within India as is clear from Dr. Iqbal's own words when he said : "We have a duty towards India where

we are destined to live and die.....the Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem, *i.e.*, the communal problem.....thus possessing full opportunity of development within the body-politic of India ; the unity of the Indian nation must be sought not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many.....Communalism in its higher aspect then is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India." ¹

The fact is that Dr. Iqbal was not advocating partition and by autonomy he did not mean full independence. He was thinking primarily of Muslim consolidation. But he did not propose that the Muslim State should break away from the rest of India. It was to be one of several similarly constituted States which would be linked together in a loose all-India federation. Dr. Iqbal's proposal, therefore, did not amount to anything more than a general readjustment of provincial boundaries to consolidate provinces in the North-West to form a powerful unit of an Indian Federation and thereby safeguard Muslim rights. This view is confirmed by the fact that in 1931 at the Punjab Nationalist Muslim Conference held at Lahore, Malik Barkat Ali, Chairman of the Reception Committee, said : "The conception of a divided India, which Sir Mohammad Iqbal put forward recently in the course of his presidential utterance from the platform of the League, at a time when that body had virtually become extinct and ceased to represent free Islam—I am glad to be able to say that Sir Mohammad Iqbal has since recanted it—must not therefore delude anybody into thinking that is Islam's conception of the India to be. Even if Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal had not recanted it as something which could not be put forward by any sane person, I should have emphatically and unhesitatingly repudiated it as something foreign to the genius and the spirit of the rising generation of Islam, and I really deem it a proud duty to affirm to day that not only must there be no division of India into communal provinces but that both Islam and Hinduism must run coterminously with the boundaries of India and must not be cribbed,

¹ *The Indian Annual Register—1939 : Volume II, pages 387-46.*

cabined and confined within any shorter bounds.”¹ This statement is confirmed by the fact when Pakistan became the creed of the League and that later on when Edward Thompson attributed the genesis of Pakistan to Dr. Iqbal, the poet promptly corrected him. “Iqbal was a friend,” writes Edward Thompson, “and he set my misconception right. After speaking of his own despondency at the chaos he saw coming ‘on my vast, undisciplined and starving land,’ he went on to say that he thought the Pakistan plan would be disastrous to the British Government, disastrous to the Hindu community, disastrous to the Muslim community. But I am the President of the Muslim League and it is therefore my duty to support it.”² In 1930 the view put forward by Dr. Iqbal was regarded as the innocent fancy of a poet who had strayed into the political arena, so much so that the Subjects Committee of the League did not consider it worth while to adopt it in the form of a resolution, and for the time being it hardly made any impression on the public life of the country.³ Actually, hardly anyone took the Pakistan suggestion seriously in India until after Dr. Iqbal’s death. Those who attributed the scheme to him did so with the obvious intention of utilising his name, popularity and authority as the great poet of Islam, to bolster up their own views.

In 1930-31, the reforms were on the anvil and at the First and Second Round Table Conferences the Muslims appeared committed to the establishment of an Indian Federation. J. Coatman, C.I.E., writing in 1932 at the time of the Third Round Table Conference, said: “The creation of a strong, united India, including the whole of British India and the Indian States and the borderland in the North-West, whose inclusion in India is one of the first and most fundamental conditions of her nationhood, is, day by day, being made impossible, and in its place it seems that there may be brought into being a powerful Mohammadan State in the north and north-west, with its eyes definitely

¹ *The Indian Annual Register*—1931 : Volume II, pages 234-35.

² *Enlist India for Freedom*, Edward Thompson—1940 : page 58.

³ *Two Punjabee Musalmans*, Ahmad Shafi—August 1942 : *The Indian Review*.

turned away from India, towards the rest of the Moslem world of which it forms the fringe, whilst away to the south and east there will be what? A Hindu India, homogeneous and united? Perhaps! Or a vast area divided between warring princes and the fighting races of old Hindustan as it has been in the past, and may easily be so again in the future? Very likely!....."¹

The seed found a fertile soil in the minds of some young Muslims who were opposed to the All-India Federation and believed that the safeguards which were being provided in the Constitution were useless, and "our brave but voiceless nation is being crucified on the altar of Hindu nationalism." In 1933 for the first time the Muslims, hitherto called a minority community, were called "a nation."² by a Punjabi Muslim, Choudhary Rahmat Ali (an under-graduate of Cambridge), who gave the movement a shape and a form. He propounded the idea that the Punjab, N.-W.F.P., (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan should be formed into a separate Muslim State called Pakistan.³ This proposal was different from that of Dr. Iqbal in that while Dr. Iqbal proposed the amalgamation of those provinces into a single State forming a unit of an All-India Federation, Choudhary Rahmat Ali proposed that these provinces should have an independent federation of their own.⁴ Leaflets advocating

¹ *Years of Destiny*, 1932, pages 238-240.

² Khan A. Ahmad writing in *The Founder of Pakistan*, says: "This is amply borne out by their (Muslims') political literature published up to the year 1933, when the Pakistan National Movement was founded. If you examine the daily press, the periodicals and the books of the pre-Pakistan period, while you will find therein overwhelming evidence of the grip on Muslims, of Indian spirit, of Indian thought, and of Indian phraseology, you will hardly find in it a trace of Milli political philosophy, or Milli political ideology or Milli political language to inspire them as a people."

³ In an appeal "Now or Never", dated the 28th January 1933, Choudhary Rahmat Ali for the first time put forward his scheme of Pakistan.

⁴ "First, whereas Iqbal prefers to amalgamate four Muslim provinces into a single State, Ali plans to maintain the individuality of each of the five provinces covered by his scheme of Pakistan; secondly, whereas Iqbal keeps the amalgamated provinces within India and con-

Pakistan were distributed by Choudhary Rahmat Ali to Members of Parliament and the Members of the Round Table Conference, but no Indian, Hindu or Muslim, took any interest in them. Muslim witnesses described the Pakistan scheme in August 1933 to the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee as follows :—

A. Yusuf Ali : “ As far as I know it is only a student scheme ; no responsible people have put it forward.”

Ch. Zafrulla Khan : “ So far as we have considered it, we have considered it chimerical and impracticable.”

Dr. Khulifa Shuja-ud-Din : “ Perhaps it will be enough to say that no such scheme has been considered by any representative gentleman or association so far.”

It is significant that questions about Pakistan were asked at this Conference. It is still more significant that the initiative came from the British—they seem, from the record, to have pressed their questions while the Indian (Muslim) delegates seem uninterested and anxious to pass on to the next point.

At the time it was generally believed among Indian students at Cambridge that Choudhary Rahmat Ali, who was not pursuing any specific course of studies and had no ostensible means of support, but at the same time had ample

ceives a State within a State ; Ali condemns the existing inclusion of Muslim provinces into “ India ” and calls for their immediate separation from “ India “, christens the five provinces Pakistan, and demands its recognition as a new country and a sovereign State outside India ; thirdly, whereas, in face of the then contemplated All-India Federation, Iqbal reduced the number of Muslim majority lands from six to two and thereby, even for the purposes of the Federation, made the Muslim position worse than before ; Ali, in view of the dangers of the Federation, strengthened and saved the Muslim position by this scheme, first by the creation of a separate and sovereign Federation of Pakistan and then by the recognition of the independent nationhood of Bengal and of the sovereignty of Usmanistan ; and lastly, whereas, on second thoughts, Iqbal himself, describing his idea as dangerous to Muslims, recanted and withdrew it ; Ali, defining his scheme as the only means of political salvation of Muslims, defied all opposition—British, Hindu and Muslim—devoted himself to its propagation and succeeded in converting to it the whole Millat, including even Iqbal, in 1937, and the All-India Muslim League, in 1940.” *The Founder of Pakistan*, Khan A. Ahmad, 1942, page 29).

funds for his somewhat luxurious entertainment of celebrities and propagandist activities, derived his inspiration and funds from the India Office. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that although in India no one had heard of or talked of Pakistan and the Muslim Delegation showed no interest in it, yet the Diehard Press and the Churchill-Lord Lloyd group of the Conservative Party waxed eloquent over it and saw in it a suggestion of the gravest import with the result that questions were asked in the Houses of Parliament on several occasions after the circulation of a leaflet by Choudhary Rahmat Ali.

1916-24 was an era of close co-operation between the League and the Congress on the basis of the Lucknow Pact. While the Congress supported the Khilafat agitation, the League supported the Swaraj agitation. In 1927, as a challenge to the British Government, the Congress issued the Nehru Report, a liberal constitution for India of which it demanded acceptance within a year, under penalty of Civil Disobedience. The Nehru Report was the apple of discord between the Hindus and the Muslims and it clearly showed that a considerable number of Hindu communalists who happened to be members of the Congress now wielded greater influence than they had ever done before. The report required that safeguards, such as separate electorates and one-third of seats in the Central Legislature, both of which had been conceded by the Congress in accordance with the provisions of the Lucknow Pact of 1916, should be dispensed with. A section of the Muslims felt apprehensive about the future of the Muslims in a self-governing India and the Muslim League split into two on the issue of the acceptance of the Nehru Report and non-co-operation with the Simon Commission. The Leaguers led by Sir Mohammad Shafi repudiated both, but they were in a small minority as compared to those led by Mr. Jinnah who were prepared to co-operate with the Congress provided they were reassured by the acceptance of five amendments to the Nehru Report. Mahasabha elements in the Congress rejected all the five proposals to amend the Nehru Report and this began the alienation of a large number of Muslims from the Congress.

Between the years 1930 and 1935, the period of gestation of the Government of India Act, 1935, Muslim thought was guided by the All-India Muslim Conference, founded in January 1929, led and controlled by Mian Fazl-i-Husain. The policy of the Conference in the main was to ensure the provision of adequate safeguards for Muslims in the new constitution. The Congress opposed some of the safeguards proposed at the Round Table Conference. This intensified bitterness between the two communities. Further, the co-operation of a large number of Congressmen with the Mahasabhaites to agitate against the Communal Award confirmed doubts in the minds of the Muslims who had seceded from the Congress and they felt convinced that it was a vain hope to expect justice from the Congress. The Pakistan view of Muslim politics, however, remained confined to a handful of young Muslim students, and Chaudhary Rahmat Ali did nothing further except that in July 1935 he circulated a fresh four-page leaflet from another Cambridge address.

The Muslims managed to have most of their important demands incorporated as safeguards in the Government of India Act, 1935, and thereafter felt fairly secure to take part in democratic politics under the newly granted provincial autonomy. In February 1936, at a meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference, Mian Fazl-i-Husain inaugurated a non-communal economic programme for all communities including the Muslims and reorganized the National Unionist Party in the Punjab as a practical example of his policy. Mr. Jinnah, (newly elected President of the All-India Muslim League) who had hitherto co-operated with the Congress¹, now

¹ In 1906 Mr. Jinnah did not join the famous Muslim Deputation, and refused to be a member of the All-India Muslim League till 1913. In 1919 he gave evidence before the Joint Select Committee as a nationalist and opposed Muslim demands. He was a member of the Congress and resigned on the issue of non-co-operation, but did not attack the Congress as a Hindu body and in fact, on 3rd October 1925, he wrote to the *Times of India* publicly repudiating the misleading report that the Congress was a Hindu institution. In the two All-Parties Conferences, one held in 1925 and the other in 1928, he was prepared to settle the Hindu-Muslim question on the basis of joint electorates. In 1925, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, he said: "I am a nationalist

opposed co-operation with non-Muslims on an economic programme, and started reorganizing Muslims on purely communal lines on an inter-provincial scale as a distinct and separate entity, setting up committees throughout the country and intensifying League propaganda on an unprecedented scale. Mian Fazl-i-Husain and Mr. Jinnah, therefore, came into sharp conflict with each other, and the former successfully opposed the formation of a purely communal party in the Punjab¹ but when Mian Fazl-i-Husain suddenly died in July 1935 the field for the activities of Mr. Jinnah was clear.²

At the Lucknow Session (October 1937), the League attacked the Congress plan for attaining self-government (in which it was alleged Muslims would not have their due share), its demand for a Constituent Assembly (in which it was alleged no special provision was made for Muslims), its attempt at establishing contact with the Muslim masses (by which it was alleged it was intended to sabotage the League),

first, a nationalist second and a nationalist last. I once more appeal to this House, whether you are a Muslim or a Hindu, for God's sake do not import the discussion of communal matters into this House and degrade this Assembly which we desire should become a real national Parliament". In 1928, he joined the Congress in the boycott of the Simon Commission even at the cost of splitting the League.

¹ That on account of this opposition Mr. Jinnah failed to achieve his object is clear from the fact that in the general elections in 1937 Muslim League candidates were returned to the Provincial Assemblies in a microscopic minority. The League had no members in Bihar, C.P., N.-W.F.P., Orissa and Sind. While in all Muslim votes were 7,319,445 Muslim League got only 321,772 or 4.4 per cent of the total. In the Punjab in a House of 175 there was only one Muslim Leaguer.

² After the death of Mian Fazl-i-Husain there was no outstanding Muslim leader who could stand for his policy. There had been an epidemic of death among Muslim leaders of an All-India stature. The death of Hakim Ajmal Khan had been followed by that of Maulana Muhammad Ali; then came Dr. Asfari and the moderate Sir Muhammad Shafi. Those who remained could not assume All-India leadership. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was by nature a savant and a recluse, Sir Sikandar Hyat was a comparatively unknown factor incapable of rising to an All-India status, and Mr. Fazl-ul-Haq was much too preoccupied with local politics to think of All-India politics.

and consequently decided that "no settlement with the majority is possible." The elections of 1937 showed the strong hold the Congress had on the general public mind and it made Mr. Jinnah and other leaders of the Muslims realize that unless they reorganized and closed up their ranks still further and came under the banner of one political body and chalked out a programme that would make an appeal, not only to the educated few—aspirants after seats, jobs and ministerships—but also to the Muslim masses to whom franchise had been extended recently, the Congress might succeed in winning over the Muslim masses through its economic programme and the policy of mass contacts. The acceptance of office by the Congress where it wielded a majority deprived the Muslims in those provinces of the temporary advantages they had gained by the formation of interim ministries, in which Muslims occupied a most important position, as a matter of fact most of the interim Premiers were Muslims. The loss of office and power was felt all the more keenly on account of the understanding that the Governors would ordinarily refrain from exercising their special powers, because this was understood to mean the safeguards provided in the constitution for the protection of minority rights. Fairplay for the minorities, it was said, was more a matter of day-to-day administration than of 'major questions' or 'serious disagreements', and it was just those minor issues regarding which it seemed to be agreed that Governors and Ministers should not come to an open breach. The refusal of the Congress to form coalition ministries with the League and their insistence on signing the Congress pledge hurt them. This was aggravated by their failure to capture power in any of the four Muslim majority provinces and the formation in those provinces of non-communal parties and coalition ministries, which showed clearly that League Raj had no chance whatever except in a separate state. As it happened the Congress regime in various provinces and the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha provided sufficient material for propagandist activities against the majority community. The official celebration of Gandhi Jayanti and Tilak Day, the hoisting of the Congress Tri-

colour on public buildings and schools, the singing of Bande Mataram, the Vidya Mandir Scheme of C. P. Government, and the Wardha Scheme of education were said to be attacks on Muslim culture. The use of criminal law for the prevention of cow slaughter by a Congress Government could not be defended and the unsatisfactory attitude of the Congress Government against the Hindus who wanted to implicate innocent Muslims in the Chandur Biswa Murder case roused the indignation of Muslims all over the country. Last but not least the unitarian policy and the control exercised by the Congress High Command over the Congress Ministers and members of legislatures in all Congress Provinces, and the discipline enforced in non-Congress Provinces where Congressmen refused to join coalition Governments, and finally the possibility of the Congress obtaining control of the Centre, foreshadowed by the agitation for responsible government in the States, incited and supported by the Congress High Command, made the Muslims feel that when full self-government was established at the Centre and in so far as the Congress obtained control of it, Provincial Autonomy might be undermined by the Congress. A series of publications, such as the Pirpur Report, the Shareef Report, Fazl-ul-Huq's *Muslim Suffering under Congress Rule*, and Kamal Yar Jung Education Committee Report further roused the anger of the Muslims. This gave birth to uncompromising separatism, a separatism conceived in a spirit of anger, of fear and of revenge. Out of this defeatist mentality arose the theory of two nations and Paskistan as a cry of despair of a people retaliating with their back against the wall.

In October 1938, the Sind Provincial Muslim League, presided over by Mr. Jinnah, resolved : " It is absolutely essential in the interests of abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two federations, *viz.*, Federation of Muslim States and Federation of non-Muslim States." In September 1939, the Working Com-

mittee of the League explained the innovation of the two-nation theory and partition by saying: "The developments that have taken place, especially since the inauguration of the provincial constitution based on the so-called democratic parliamentary system of government and the recent experience of over two years, have established beyond any doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination by the Hindus over the Muslim minorities, whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger, and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress Governments in various provinces. While Muslim India stands against exploitation of the people of India and has repeatedly declared in favour of a 'free India', it is equally opposed to domination by the Hindu majority over the Musalmans and other minorities and vassalisation of Muslim India, and is irrevocably opposed to any federal objective which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the peoples of the country, which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state."

Hitherto the Muslim demand had always been for effective safeguards for the protection of the Muslim community's religious, cultural and other rights; now a section of the Muslims began to question the very basis of democracy and declared that Western democracy in the sense of rule by majority was unsuitable for India. This was developed in the summer of 1940 into a demand for partition on the ground that Muslims constituted an integral nation and not a minority of the Indian population. The Muslims, it was believed, were doomed to perpetual opposition and permanent denial of a share in all those provinces, and at the Centre, where they were in a minority. The only solution was partition, the formation of separate Muslim States in the West and East and no Government at the Centre at all. At Lahore the famous resolution of March 26, 1940, said: It is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim

League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, *viz.*, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the Constitution for them and other minorities, for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them. This session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a Scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary."

At the Annual Session of the League held in Madras in 1941, the Constitution of the League was altered to conform to the Lahore Resolution, referring to which Mr. Jinnah said: "We do not want under any circumstances a constitution of an All-India character with one Government at the Centre. The ideology of the League is based on the fundamental principle that the Muslims of India are an independent nationality and that any attempt to get them to merge their national and political identity and ideology will be resisted."

III

THE TWO-NATION THEORY

The theory that India is inhabited by two nations, Hindus and Muslims, may appear far-fetched but its far-reaching consequences should not be minimized, because the world of today is amazed how Nazi leaders built up within a very short time their power on an absurd theory of the superiority of the Aryan race and hatred of the Jews, and how one of the most advanced nations of Europe meekly accepted the leadership of Hitler and espoused ideas which educated persons thought ridiculous in 1923. Modern means of propaganda, unscrupulously applied, can produce extraordinary short-term results such as Nazi Germany has amply shown. But there are dangers, grave dangers, in making through propaganda unreal distinctions a reality and disrupting the whole life of a people. Nazi Germany is now faced with a catastrophic crisis, subordination of its people for generations to come and if the two-nation theory is allowed to develop in India, this country would be confronted very soon with a crisis of an equal gravity.

The basis of the Pakistan Scheme and indeed of all schemes for the partition of India is the notion that the Muslims are not a minority community in India but a nation, separate and distinct, and therefore they must have a national state of their own. Religion, it is said, is the only real basis of nationality and there is nothing which is of a greater cohesive force, and it is the difference of religion which makes Hindus and Muslims two different nations. Hitherto the Muslims were deluded because they always used the words "community" and "minority," while they should have used the word "nation." "The reference to minorities", said Mr. Jinnah, (in the Congress proposals), "is a pure deception. For one thing, they (the Congress) presume to speak of the 90,000,000 Muslims as a mere numerical minority like other small groups in the country ; whereas Muslims claim and

rightly claim to be a nation.”¹ For centuries Indian Muslims have shown no signs of nationhood, but now, for a variety of reasons, have developed national consciousness, which seeks to forthwith assert its separate sovereign self. The Muslims have developed the psychological inability of nations to coalesce which makes it necessary for them to lead a separate independent existence.

On the basis of deep historical, racial, linguistic, cultural, religious, social, economic, psychological and temperamental differences, which divide them from other peoples, especially the caste-Hindus, the Muslims feel themselves to be a separate social and political entity with a destiny of their own. The Hindus and the Muslims have never formed one nation and ‘never the twain shall meet.’ There is in India no ethnic unity, or linguistic unity, or religious unity, or unity of historical experience. The sacred places of some people are situated outside India, therefore the concept of India as a national state cannot be based upon any common sentiment of ‘Holy-land.’

“India is not one country, it is a sub-continent, its area exceeds 1,750,000 square miles, and its extremities are nearly 20,000 miles apart. It is larger than Europe without Russia and contains one-fifth of the human race.”² Today Europe shows great racial and linguistic diversity, but in India the diversity of race and language is far greater than it is, or at any time was, in Europe. Europe is twenty-five-nation States. Is India one nation? Like Europe India holds within its boundaries a number of distinct nation-states, the most important being Hindu and Muslim. The only thing which is common to the two communities is India, which by mistake is supposed to be one country and not a sub-continent containing many countries. On account of the fact that it is so vast and extensive, the mutual understanding which could develop among a people inhabiting a smaller country cannot develop here. Had the country been much smaller and less diversified all communities may have been united into one nation. The conception of India as one country is a fiction. The disunion

¹ *India's Problem of her Future Constitution*, M. H. Saiyid—1940.

² *Peoples and Problems of India*, Sir T. W. Holderness—1923.

of the Hindu Rajas of the past is notorious. Modern means of communications and consequent increased intercourse among various provinces have united the Hindus and Muslims not into one people but as separate nations. India never thought in terms of nationalism during pre British days. The Arya-Varta did not extend beyond the boundaries of the Punjab, Bharat-Varsha never crossed the barriers of the Vindhya-chela and Magadha Desha was not India. During the Muslim period, it was divided into Ind, Sind and Dakhan. India is a sub-continent and is inhabited by a congeries of nations. What is common between the Punjab and Bengal, Rajputana and Maharashtra, Dravid-Desha and Arya-Varta. Indian States and British India, Hindus and Muslims except the common administrative link of the British Government? The present-day political unity of India and the conception of geographical unity is entirely the creation of the British, who hold it as one administrative unit by a system of bureaucratic Government whose ultimate sanction is the sword and not the will or the sanction of the people behind the government so established. If Nepal, Bhutan, Ceylon and Burma can be separated, there is no reason why the predominant Muslim areas in the North-West and North-East which are self-sufficient and geographically well-defined should not be separated.

In the East religion is considered not merely religion in the strict sense as understood in the West, but a complete social order which affects all the activities of life. In Islam and Hinduism, religion is the motive spring of all actions in life. In countries where the allegiance of people is divided on the basis of religion, the idea of territorial nationalism has never succeeded, such as between Jews and Christians in Germany, Muslims and Christians in Spain, Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, etc. Islamic society and attitude to life is fundamentally different from those of Hindus. The conception of Indian Muslims as a nation may not be ethnically correct, but socially it is correct. The differences are not physical but cultural. It is the outcome of two sharply contrasted religious and social systems; and the ways of life and thought they have inspired. "Hinduism has

its primeval roots in a land of rivers and forests. Islam in the desert. Hindus worship many gods, Muslims only one; the temple, with its luxuriance of sculptured effigies, confronts the mosque, declaring by its bare simplicity that idolatry is sin. Hinduism maintains a rigid caste system; Islam proclaims the equal brotherhood of all believers. The classical language of Hindus is Sanskrit, of Muslims Arabic and Persian; the distinctive daily speech of the one is the Hindi, of the other the Urdu variant of Hindustani. The contrast lends itself to a wealth of illustration; but perhaps its most striking feature is the fact that, though Hindus and Muslims live side by side all over India, often in the same village, and though happily in normal times they are good enough neighbours, yet the natural ties of kinship are completely lacking, since both the Quran and the Hindu law of caste prohibit intermarriage; nor may an orthodox Hindu share his table with a Muslim."¹ The present President of the Central Assembly, Sir Abdur Rahim, once complained that, whereas Indian Muslims felt quite at home in the Muslim countries of Asia, "in India we find ourselves in all social matters total aliens when we cross the street and enter that part of the town where our Hindu fellow-townsmen live."² This schism is daily growing and not decreasing. For example, in matters of language in recent years there has been a strong tendency to make Hindi more Sanskritized and Urdu more Persianized while some time ago the two were not widely different except in script. As regards script the recognition by the Congress of both the scripts is a recognition of the existence of two nations.

At the annual session of All-India Muslim League in 1940, Mr. Jinnah said: "Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is only a dream that Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality. This misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions

¹ *The Indian Problem*, R. Coupland—1943: page 31.

² Quoted by Sir T. Morrison in *Political India*—1932: page 104.

in time." National feeling, says Dr. Ambedkar, is a double-edged feeling for one's own kith and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not one's own kith, and since Muslims have this feeling they are a separate nation. The two communities can never forget or obliterate their past, because their past is imbedded in their religion, for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. Bhai Permanand wrote in *The Hindu National Movement*: "In history the Hindus revere the memory of Prithvi Raj, Pratao, Shivaji and Baragi Bir, who fought for the honour and freedom of this land (against the Muslims), while Muhammadans look upon the invaders of India, like Muhammad bin Qasim and rulers like Aurangzeb as their national heroes." In the religious field the Hindus draw their inspiration from the Ramayana, Mahabharata and the Geeta. The Mussalmans, on the other hand, derive their inspiration from the Quran and Hadis. Thus, the things that divide are far more vital than the things which unite.

Had the Hindus and the Muslims not been two separate nations, after 200 years of rule by an outside power, they would not have stood further apart than they did when there was a Moghal Emperor on the throne of Delhi. The antagonism between the two nations is not merely the outcome of the British policy of 'divide and rule.' British economic and military pressure has not promoted unity, which would have been the case had Indians been one nation. At no stage of Indian history have the Hindus and Muslims become economically and politically one or developed a homogeneous society. Today after a century of political evolution on modern lines the Muslim and the non-Muslim interests are brought into sharp antagonism in every walk of life. In the spheres of public service, commerce and industry the two communities are practising increasing discrimination against each other. There has grown a desire for an exceedingly uneconomic "economic self-sufficiency." Hindus and Muslims cannot be called one nation because of certain similarities, which have not created in them a feeling of belonging to each other. The common features are not the result of a conscious attempt to adopt or adapt each other's

ways and manners to bring about social fusion. Common features are the result of incomplete conventions and common environment, and a period of religious amalgamation between Hindus and Muslims inaugurated by Akbar. Finally, it is said that for several years the Hindu Mahasabha has been propagating "Hinduttva," "Ram Raj", and "Hindu-Pad-Padshahi," and Savarkar claims that "a Hindu is a synonym for an Indian", while Dr. Moonje is of the view that "a nation must have only one religion, one language and one culture." As against this the Muslims have no alternative but to seek an escape from Hindu domination, political, cultural, religious and social, by raising the cry of a separate nation.

These, in short, are the main arguments put forward in support of the two-nation theory. There are equally strong, if not overwhelmingly strong, arguments against this theory. To take them in the same order as the arguments for it, it may be pointed out that the conception of Hindus and Muslims as two nations was never heard of in India before 1938 and till then the Muslims implicitly believed what Sir Syed Ahmad had always preached, namely : 'Those who live in any particular country constitute a nation,...Hindu and Muslim are religious terms. Hindus and Muslims and Christians who live in this country constitute one nation...the time has passed when inhabitants of a country professing different religions were considered separate nations.'¹ In fact till October 1937, Mr. Jinnah himself talked of Muslims as a minority community and not as 'a nation.' At the Lucknow Session of the League he said : "The All-India Muslim League certainly and definitely stands to safeguard the rights and interests of Mussalmans and *other minorities* effectively." And again : "In order to strengthen the solidarity of the Muslim *community* and to secure for the Muslims their proper and effective share in the Provincial Governments, it is essential that the Muslims should organize themselves as one party." This matter of terminology in English is largely academic because only one per cent. of the Muslim population speaks English. The word in Urdu which was

¹ *Collected Speeches*—page 167.

used by Sir Syed and has hitherto been current is قوم (nation), without the implications of what the word "nation" is supposed to convey now by the League. There is no suitable equivalent in Urdu of the word "community". The word ملت has been used but this has reference to all followers of Islam in all countries of the world, and is opposed to the idea of territorial nationalism implied in the word "nation". The two-nation theory is, therefore, only five years old and has arisen out of the peculiar mechanics of recent political conflict and turmoil and has no roots in the life of the people of this country and will disappear when the present political impasse is solved, and the only thing to do now is not to allow this theory to distort the vision of the masses of India and to increase bitterness among the Hindus and the Muslims.

It has been said that no matter what the arguments may be, it is a fact that the Muslims feel that they are a nation, different and distinct from non-Muslims inhabiting India, and this feeling is sufficient to entitle them to recognition as a separate entity. The fact is that the feeling in question is not the feeling of nationalism and the feeling which is noticeable is not shared by Muslims as a whole. In spite of intensive propaganda for the last five years and desperate attempts to inculcate hatred among the different communities, the feelings which have been awakened in a small section of the middle classes are no more than feelings of resentment and anger against a section of the Hindu middle classes who have till recently dominated public services, finance and industry etc. Nationalism cannot be founded on class differences and rivalries of the kind which exist among Hindus and Muslims. The psychology of the recent differences between the League and non-Muslim political organizations reveal that the differences are exaggerated by interested parties, are not irreconcilable and do not penetrate deep down into the life of the people. Mass propaganda has no doubt created a certain enthusiasm among a section of the middle classes, but to found the theory of two nations on that is to confuse political realities with political manoeuvring and to distort the life of a people and to give a wrong direction to their ultimate

destiny.

The two-nation theory cannot be sustained on grounds of race, language and homeland, and this has been admitted by most of the moderate advocates of the theory, and the only ostensibly valid argument is about religion and in matters of religion the differences are not so sharp and strong as they are generally made out to be. Even if they were, religion is not a decisive factor ; Englishmen who became converts to Islam do not change their nationality. The great diversity of geographical, climatic, religious, social, linguistic and racial feature of India has been a favourite theme of British politicians, administrators and writers. The emphasis on diversity of life and division between the various communities and even within each community has been motivated by the desire to pursue the policy of 'divide and rule.' Not only is diversity grossly exaggerated but the essential unity of Indian life is slurred over, minimized and even safely forgotten. Indian society is a complex of races, languages, creeds and customs more variegated than that of Europe, yet India has imposed a certain community of living on all her children and there are factors making for unity which are stronger in India than in Europe.

~ "Girt by the Himalayas and the sea the Indian sub-continent is a natural geographical unit. No real strategic frontiers cross it. It does not possess the broken coastline of those peninsulas and islands which have fostered the growth of separate nations in Europe. And there is a certain unity underlying all the diversities of Indian culture. The creeds and customs which age to age have been woven into that ancient civilization have acquired, so to speak, a local colour ; some of them superficially, others profoundly, they have all been "Indianized."¹

Racial differences can be a strong factor against the evolution of a common nationality, such as the incomplete amalgamation of the Jews with the local population of the countries of their adoption, but fortunately racial differences distinguishing Hindus and Muslims do not exist in India. In the north-west, it is true, there are Muslims who have descended

¹ *The Indian Problem*, R. Coupland—1943 : page v.

from the Arabs, Afghans, and Turks who invaded India centuries ago, but during all these centuries the commingling with the local population have eliminated all vestiges of a separate race, and elsewhere the vast majority of Muslims of India are converts from Hinduism and are of native Indian origin. Even a fanatic believer in the two-nation theory like "El Hamza," writing in *Pakistan : A Nation*, has had to admit : "There is an important Hindu minority in Pakistan. The Pakistani Hindus are true children of the soil and are of the same race as their Muslim fellow countrymen," and added that "Sikhs are typical Pakistanis." Again, "A Punjabee", an equally strong champion of the two-nation theory, writing in *The Confederacy of India*, has observed : "The foreign element amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out of it." In any case Islam, as a universal religion, does not admit racial differences. Thus, speaking in terms of racial differences it is admitted by everyone that no claim to separate nationality can be made in India on this ground. Inasmuch as racial differences exist in India, racially Hindus and Muslims of one province have greater affinity than Muslims of two provinces. For example, Hindus and Muslims of the Punjab are physically more akin to each other than Muslims of the Punjab and Muslims of Bengal or Madras or even the Frontier Province.

As regards linguistic differences emphasis has been laid on Urdu being the current and Persian and Arabic being the classical languages of Muslims while Hindi is the current and Sanskrit is the classical language of the Hindus. It is true that lately political repercussions have made the use of Urdu in certain circles more Persianized and Hindi more Sanskritized, but this distinction is more theoretical than practical. It is a recognized and an established fact that 90 per cent of the Indian population is illiterate and with regard to this population it is irrelevant to talk of differences of current or classical languages. They speak the local dialect wherever they happen to be living, irrespective of the fact whether they are Hindus or Muslims. In rural areas Hindus and Muslims of the Punjab speak Punjabi, of Madras speak Tamil or Telegu,

of Bengal speak Bengali, of Bihar speak Bihari, of N.-W.F.P. speak Pushto, of Kashmir speak Kashmiri, of Baluchistan speak Balochi, of Sindh speak Sindhi etc. Linguistically a Muslim Pathan is as alien to a Madrasi Muslim as he is to a Russian across the border of India. The linguistic problem concerns only the educated few living in towns, otherwise linguistic division cuts right across all religious divisions. There have been great Muslim writers and poets in Hindi, just as there have been great Hindu writers and poets in Urdu. All the Hindus of India do not speak one language only, and all the Muslims do not speak a language different from the Hindus. Each province has its own language and almost all the people of that province speak that language irrespective of caste or creed. The popular identification of Urdu with Muslims and Hindi with Hindus is unwarranted because linguistically India is definitely provincial and local. This identification derives its inspiration from political motives and is not real. Leaving aside the rural masses, who form the great majority; the educated classes among Hindus and Muslims, who are most vocal about linguistic differences, do have a common language and that is English. Very often people from different provinces (*i.e.*, Madras, Punjab and Bengal), irrespective of the fact whether they are Hindus or Muslims, have no medium for the exchange of ideas except English, and it is a notable fact that while educated classes among Muslims show an aversion towards Hindi like the educated classes among Hindus who dislike Urdu, yet both have no objection to learn the English language, and its totally alien background, idiom, and syntax often at the cost of learning their own mother-tongue. This shows the extent to which material advantages and political considerations affect cultural matters. In any case, linguistic differences alone do not create nationalities and at the same time do not stand in the way of the creation of a common nationality. In Canada French and English is spoken, just as in Switzerland German, Italian and French is spoken, yet no one can deny that the Canadians and the Swiss constitute separate nationalities.

Next, religion is said to be the major distinguishing feature

which makes Hindus and Muslims different nations. For this purpose the radically different principles of Islam and Hinduism are adduced to show the impossibility of reconciling the two to enable them to live side by side without being at war with each other. It is safely forgotten that the Islam of the seventh century A.D. is not the Islam of today and the Islam as practised today in India is not the Islam of Arabia and still less the Islam described in books. A Chinese Muslim is not the same as an Indian Muslim. In religion they are one, but an Indian Muslim is every inch an Indian and a Chinese Muslim a Chinese. It is the influence of Aryan culture that has made the Indian Muslim what he is. There are common features in the social and cultural life of Hindus and Muslims. (Social life of Muslims is honeycombed with Hindu customs) For example, the Meos and the Rajputs of the western districts of the United Provinces, though Muslims, retain Hindu names and keep their genealogies in the Brahmanic fashion. Common surnames are also found among Hindus and Muslims, i.e., Chaudhri, Mian, Malik, Sardar, etc. In matter of marriages certain Muslims follow Hindu customs and forms, and among some Muslims Hindu law of marriage, guardianship and inheritance is applied. In the religious sphere many Muslim Pirs had Hindu disciples and some Hindu *yogis* had Muslim *chelas*. At Giroh (Punjab) tombs of Jamali Sultan and Dayal Bhawan stand close to one another and are revered by Hindus and Muslims alike. Bawa Fathu, a Muslim saint, who lived about 1700 A.D., whose tomb is at Ranital (Kangra District) received the title of prophecy by the blessings of a Hindu saint Sodhi Guru Gulab Singh. Again, Baba Shahana, a Hindu saint, whose cult is observed in the Jhang District, is said to be the *chela* of a Muslim Pir who changed the original name, Mehra, of his Hindu follower, into Mir Shah. Similarly, Mueen-ud-Din Chishti of Ajmer, Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din of Delhi, Ghazi Syed Salar Masood of Bahraich, and Khusrô's Sada Sohag cult have their Hindu worshippers and followers. In Islam God sends prophets and does not Himself take any shape or form, whereas the reverse is the case in Hinduism. But in India the mystic theory of the Sufis is quite in consonance with

the Vedantic theory of the Sanatanist Hindus, therefore, Muslim masses in religious practices resemble Hindus. If Hindus bow down before an image of a deity, Muslims bow down before the graves of saints and Pirs. Music and dance are prohibited by Islam, but in some Khanqahs you hear sweet music, and see elegant dancing. You will also see religious leaders dancing in ecstasy. Mysticism or Vedantic theory has taken possession of the pulpits also, i.e., mosque of Shah Mohammad Ghaus outside Delhi Gate, Lahore. Islam in India is an Arabic version of Sanatana Dharma, just as Sikhism and Arya Samaj are more or less Gurmukhi and Hindi editions of Indian Islam. The impact of Islam on the Hindu mind and the close sympathetic associations of the two peoples gave birth to that remarkable spiritual phenomenon, the *Bhakti* Movement represented by Chaitanya, Dadu, Kabir, Nanak and others. Hindu-Muslim differences on the religious plane, therefore, are not as acute as they are made out by politicians. This is proved by the fact that religious organizations or organizations having a religious background are not opposed to the Hindus and the Congress. Aligarh students are pro-British and anti-Hindu, but Deoband scholars are anti-British and pro-Congress. Had the differences been religious the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Majlis-i-Ahrar would have been more vociferous than the League against the Congress and the Hindus.

Mr. Jinnah asserts that "Hindus and Muslims can never form one Indian nation because they neither intermarry nor dine together and have two different religious philosophies." Why, among the Hindus there are numerous different castes and they do not dine together and intermarry. Even among the depressed classes there are water-tight subdivisions who do not inter-dine and intermarry. The Jains, the Buddhists, the Itinagayats, the Tamils and Telugus have different religious philosophies and worship different gods. The Shias and Sunnis have acute religious differences, resulting in sanguinary riots. Are all these to be classed and treated as different nations? Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the forefathers of a very appreciable number of Muslims were Hindus who got converted to Islam. In Bombay province, the fore-

fathers of the present Khojas and Memons were Hindus (Lohanas and Bhatias), who embraced Islam 200 to 400 years ago. They have preserved to such an extent the customs and manners of their original community that till only three years ago, when legislation was passed to bring them fully under Muslim Law, the Khojas and Cutchi Memons were governed by the Hindu Law of property, inheritance and succession."¹

Minor differences among Hindus and Muslims have not made them different nations. Are the customs prevalent in Afghanistan, for example, the same as those in Turkey, Persia, or Egypt, not to speak of other distant countries? Are their modes of living the same? Is not a Punjabi Muslim or Sindhi Muslim or Frontier Muslim infinitely more different from his co-religionist of Turkey, Egypt, or Persia or even Bengal or Madras than from a Punjabi, Sindhi or Frontier Hindu in dress, language and customs, mode of living except in the matter of his belief and mode of worship? On point of language, culture and race one province differs from another and this is true of each one of the five northern provinces which are proposed to be included in Pakistan. If the French and the British, who are culturally, linguistically, religiously and racially different from each other, can live together in Canada and find a solution in federation in spite of their having been 'two nations warring in the bosom of a single State',² there is no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims cannot do the same in India. If the Boers and the British, who are culturally, linguistically, religiously and racially different from each other, can live together in South Africa, there is no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims cannot do the same in India. Again, if the Italians, Germans and the French, all recognized as belonging to different nations, can live together in Switzerland and form a new nation, there is no reason why Hindus and Muslims, even assuming their differences, cannot do the same. The true reason why Muslim countries could not retain their freedom for long is to be found in the policy of uniting religion and politics. As long as this idea was rooted in the minds of the Turks, they were

¹ *Pakistan*—Edited by Dr. K. M. Ashraf—1940 : page 61.

² *Durham Report* (Oxford 1912)—page ii.

puppets in the hands of European imperialism. It was only when Modern Turkey under Ataturk divorced religion from politics that Turkey became a full-fledged State strong enough to defend herself against any aggression. Pan-Islamism is dead and other Muslim countries have followed the example of Turkey in fostering territorial nationalism. Similarly, in Russia there are two hundred languages and besides Muslims, Christians and Jews, there are other religions fundamentally different from one another. The concept of a nation and nationalism is wider than the ideas of race, religion, language, culture and territorial ties taken individually. It means the corporate life of a people, derived from its customs, laws, and institutions taken together, therefore, no one particular item such as religion can be singled out as connoting a claim to separate nationhood. According to this definition Hindus and Muslims are not two nations but are constituent parts (even though at times not altogether harmonious) of one nation.

The crux of the problem is that the Hindus are small-minded in the social field, and that has touched the Muslims to the quick. Hindus have treated Muslims as untouchables. Muslims treated the Hindus as a subject race, they became acutely conscious of the "touch-me-not" attitude of Hindus. You may be a *pucca* nationalist and four square Gandhite, yet you will be treated as an untouchable as soon as you announce to a Hindu that you are a Muslim. Whatever reasons the Hindus may have, the Muslims cannot help being aggrieved by this attitude. The Muslims have felt that propaganda against untouchability is a political stunt, and does not indicate a change of heart and does not go beyond the top rank Congress leaders. The Muslim heartburning remains acute and engenders hate in the hearts of those who are humiliated by the Hindus. To this attitude of the Hindus is added the exclusiveness of the Hindus in the economic field. Muslims are shut out from business as well as social circles. As a counter move the Muslims cannot help developing the boycott spirit themselves. As a moneylender the Hindu treats his Muslim client harshly and as a countryman he considers him impure. The real problem is to have social unity as a

result of economic equality which will bring national harmony and national unity. (Mr. Jinnah is not a religious man nor are Muslims inspired by religion) The present strife is social and economic which is called religious for political reasons. Where the Hindus are landlords and the Muslims exploited masses or *vice versa*, where the Prince is a Muslim and his exploited subjects are Hindus or *vice versa*, where the mill-owners are Hindus and mill-hands Muslims or *vice versa*, Hindu and Muslim communalists often exploit the coincidence of economic or class divisions with communal divisions. In Muslim majority provinces the problem of Muslims is by no stretch of imagination a minority problem, it is an economic problem. Muslims feel they cannot withstand humiliating conditions and they would much rather live in the hell of Pakistan than serve in the heaven of Hindustan and its degrading social and economic treatment. The two-nation theory, therefore, is a myth—a camouflage to cover up humiliation in the social sphere and inequality in the economic sphere.

IV

THE CASE FOR PAKISTAN

It is difficult to state the case for Pakistan because Pakistan has never been defined in any specific terms. Mr. Jinnah, as the chief and the official spokesman of the All-India Muslim League, has refused to state concretely what he wants to be conceded to the Muslims of India. Several schemes for partitioning India have been put forward, some by the members of the All-India Muslim League and others by those opposed to the League. The oldest in point of time is the scheme of Choudhary Rahmat Ali for Pakistan. There are other schemes such as Dr. Latif's scheme of Muslim and Hindu culturally autonomous zones, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's scheme of seven zones, the Pakistan Caliphate scheme of Maulana Abdul Wadood, Sir Firoz Khan Noon's scheme of five Dominions, "A Punjabi's" scheme of a Confederacy of India and the Aligarh scheme of Dr. Zafar-ul-Hasan and Dr. M. A. H. Qadri. The principal feature of the first and the last of these schemes is stated in the so-called Pakistan resolution adopted by the All-India Muslim League in 1940. It envisages that "the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States', in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." In other words, the Punjab, N.-W.F. P., Baluchistan, Kashmir and Sind should constitute a federation of their own separate and distinct from the rest of India, and Eastern Bengal should likewise be an independent state. The former, generally known as Pakistan, may be with or without Ambala Division (of the Punjab), which is predominantly Hindu, just as Eastern Bengal may or may not have added to it Sylhet District (of Assam), which is predominantly Muslim. For purposes of stating the case for and against Pakistan, this

definition would be taken as a working definition. In order to arrive at a convincing conclusion it is essential that the case both for and against Pakistan should be stated as comprehensively and fairly as possible.

The contention of the advocates of Pakistan is that India is not one country but several countries with immense diversities of every kind. The Simon Commission put the premises concisely in their study of the communal problem when they said : "Differences of race, a different system of law, and the absence of intermarriage, constitute.....a basic opposition manifesting itself at every turn in social custom and economic competition. They (the Hindus and Muslims) may be said to represent two distinct and separate civilisations". Pakistan does not mean "vivisection of India", because India is already divided and partitioned by nature. "Muslim India and Hindu India exist on the physical map of India. Where is the country which is being divided ? Where is the nation which is denationalised ? India is composed of nationalities, to say nothing about the castes and sub-castes".¹ Pakistan possesses racial, religious, climatic and economic unity which makes it distinct from the rest of India. "The fact that the people of Pakistan eat wheat and the people of the South India eat rice is symbolic of the climatic, racial and cultural distinctions of the two region...Probably the individuality of the north-west is indicated by no other single fact in so striking a manner as by the distribution of camels over India."²

What the Muslims are asking for is the creation of administrative areas which are culturally more homogeneous in order to give them freedom for the growth of their own distinctive culture. And Pakistan would not be a small unit. It would have an area roughly 75 times the size of Ulster, and equal to Spain, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Albania, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Lithuania and Eire combined. It would contain as many people as Albania, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia Lithuania and Switzerland together. (And none of these countries is considered too small to deserve an independent

¹ *India : Problem of her Future Constitution*.—Edited by H. M. Saiyid—1940 : page 19.

² *Pakistan : A Nation*—"El Hamza"—1941 : pages 56, 70.

sovereignty).¹ The Hindus say that Pakistan would break up the unity of India. 762 years of incessant Muslim invasions of Northern India have profoundly altered the culture and character of Northern India, which has now no unity with the rest of India, and in fact there is antipathy between the two. The invasions broke up the unity between the two, and it was severed from and attached to India several times according to the circumstances of the moment, therefore, there is no historic sentiment which can go against separation. The methods adopted by the invaders have left behind bitterness between Hindus and Muslims which a century of political life has not succeeded in assuaging, nor have the people forgotten it. Northern India is like Alsace-Lorraine, politically detachable and spiritually alien so far as the rest of India is concerned. There is no spiritual unity between Hindustan and Pakistan, and in fact there was more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma, which were separated.

True nationalism should mean the promotion and development of divergent traditions of different nations because some special quality in every group of men leads to the ultimate good of humanity. When a nation wins back its political independence, its contribution to the progress of humanity becomes substantial and effective in proportion to its own importance. Thus the Muslims in their heyday of glory in Spain made important contributions in medicine, science, art and literature, but when they were driven out of Spain, they lost their zeal and energy for the pursuit of learning. The same is true of Muslims of India under the Sultanates of Delhi and the Moghul Emperors. The present deplorable condition of Muslims is due to the loss of their political power and slowness to adapt themselves to changed circumstances. If the Muslims of India are again to make any contribution to the civilization of the East they must have the fullest possible scope for their individual and national development and this would be possible only if Pakistan is established, and they are not placed in a united India in a position of subservience to the Hindus. The world will be poorer if Hindus and Muslims

¹ Today they are. The arguments from Europe are pretty weak these days !

are not permitted to promote and to develop their respective cultures, creeds and laws on the lines of their own historic traditions and are forcibly united to develop a new culture or sense of unity which will be a mere imitation of the West and will lead finally to the extinction of all that is best in Muslim and Hindu systems of religion and polity.

This being so, Muslims should be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination with regard to those areas which are predominantly Muslim and in which they wish to have their national home. There is no example in the world where a community as big as the entire population of Germany has ever been content with the status of a minority. There is further no example where a minority has such fundamental differences with the majority as Muslims have with the Hindus. National self-determination is the natural birth-right of all peoples of the world. The Hindu nationalists who rely on this principle, and ask how Britain can refuse India what the conscience of the world has conceded to the smallest nation of Europe, cannot in the same breath ask the British to deny it to the Muslims. It is a well established principle that nationalism is itself a sufficient justification for the creation of a national state and other people have no right to pass a judgment on the propriety or usefulness of it. It may not be possible for Britain, to prevent civil war after her withdrawal, but it is certainly not open to Britain, when retiring, to enforce a constitution on the basis of coercion of a large section of the population.

Muslims cannot and will not agree to a unitary or a federal Government for the whole of India. In any All-India Constitution Muslim majorities of five provinces out of eleven would be in the Centre a permanent minority. Whatever be the safeguards incorporated in the Constitution for the protection of the autonomy of the provinces, the encroachment of a powerful Centre, often imperceptible but none the less effective, cannot in the long run be resisted. The working of federal constitutions elsewhere, such as in the U.S.A. and Australia, where residuary powers were vested in the States rather than the Centre, have shown conclusively that the domination of the Centre cannot in the long run be prevented.

During the quarter of a century before the Government of India Act 1935, Muslims thought in terms of constitutional safeguards, but experience of the working of provincial autonomy in Congress Provinces has shown that constitutional guarantees are not sufficient, and independent Muslim States are the only solution. The Hindu-Muslim problem in India apart from being a religious and cultural problem, is a problem of political power, and Muslims fear that in a self-governing India, they will have to remain a permanent minority whereas in wide areas, before the British domination, they were the ruling class. For more than half the Indian Muslims, Pakistan eliminates the fear of Hindu *Raj* and all it might mean for them immediately and ultimately by cutting them clear out of its ambit. Moreover, it broadens their footing in the world. In an undivided India they belong to a country in which Hinduism predominates, but once separated, they would cultivate their co-religionists across the border and stand side by side with the Muslim states of the Middle East.

In a united India inter-provincial migration will be a Central subject and Muslims of the North-West will not be able to prevent Hindu immigrants from the U.P. and Rajputana from settling in their midst or acquiring lands in uninhabited parts. Once India is strong enough to pursue a policy of expansion and colonization abroad, all questions concerning foreign relations with Muslim countries or concerning emigration of Indians to the Muslim Islands of East Indies or Muslim parts of Africa will bring into conflict the interests of Hindus and Muslims in the Central Government but the Muslims would be helpless. Again, united India may enter into an alliance with Russia and China to offer a united front on the minority question and use all their resources to suppress the Muslim demands in their respective countries for independence.

"We in India," says Pirpur Report, "have been brought up in the traditions of the British parliamentary democracy and the constitution foisted on us is also modelled, more, or less, on the British pattern. There is, however, an essential difference between the body-politic of this country and that of Britain. The majority and minority parties in Britain are interchangeable : their complexion and strength

go on changing with the conditions of the country. To-day a National Government is in power, but the Conservative, Liberal and Labour parties have an equal chance of running the government of the country. Here, in India, we have a permanent Hindu majority and the other communities are condemned to the position of a perpetual minority. Thus it is easy for the majority to assume a non-communal label and do things communal under the cloak of nationalism. The Indian National Congress conception of nationalism is based on the establishment of a national state of the majority community in which other nationalities and communities have only secondary rights. The Muslims think that no tyranny can be as great as the tyranny of the majority and they believe that only that state can be stable which gives equal rights and equal opportunities to all communities no matter how small. They attach great importance to this principle, which alone can safeguard the rights of the Muslims and other minorities. The Muslims have made it clear more than once that besides the question of religion, culture, language and personal laws, there is another question equally important for their future. They must secure definitely their political rights and their due share in the national life, government and administration of the country.”¹

Everywhere in the world, where different national groups have failed to live together peacefully, separation was ultimately resorted to as the safest course. Ulster was separated from Ireland, and in the same way the British intended to divide Palestine to end the dispute between the Jews and the Arabs. History has shown many geographical tracts, much smaller than the sub-continent of India, which otherwise might be called one country, but which have been divided into as many States as there are nations inhabiting them. The Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as seven or eight sovereign States. The Dutch and the Belgians, the Swedes and the Norwegians have lived together respectively under united kingdoms in the past ; their countries are separated by no

¹ *Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of the All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces, 1938.*

real geographical frontiers and form a natural whole and the people are allied by religion, race and common outlook on life, yet they have chosen to have independent states. Likewise the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula. Hindus should learn a lesson from Europe. They should ask themselves that if the Czech, Slovak, Polish, Croat, Greek, and Arab nationalism has liquidated the Empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary and Turkey and if Slovak nationalism caused the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, what is there to prevent Muslim nationalism from disrupting the Indian State? Neither local autonomy nor the bond of religion is sufficient to withstand the forces of nationalism. Pakistan is an anomalous excrescence on Hindustan and Hindustan is an anomalous excrescence on Pakistan. Tied together they will make India the sickman of Asia, just as Turkey became the sickman of Europe. Severed into two, each becomes a more homogeneous unit. Each has a cultural unity. Each has a religious unity. Pakistan has also a linguistic unity. Separated, each can become a strong and well-knit State. So long a Pakistan remains a part of India there can be no strong Central Government and as envisaged in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Government would be an effete ramshackle authority with very little life in it. Pakistan scheme would enable stable Governments to be established in both areas without any fear by violent resistance of communally organized provinces. Divided India would be stronger than united India.

From 1930 onwards the Central Government was conceived in terms of a Federation of autonomous provinces, the advantages being that " (1) the Federation will give to the Muslims adequate guarantees and effective power in the provinces where they are in a majority, (2) that the States under the sovereignty of the Princes will have their autonomy guaranteed and protected, (3) that ample scope will exist within the Federal framework for the provinces to be governed on a full democratic basis, which because of the size, population and complexity of India, it will not be wise to experiment within the same measure in the Central Government,

and (4) a Federal system will enable a united India to be created by the association of the great States of India. Two dangers were not foreseen. It was then not realized that a Central Government for the whole of India, however constituted, would not be acceptable to the Muslims as it would reflect the will of a Hindu majority. Secondly, the consequences of a total war and total defence could not be foreseen.¹ The principle of residuary powers vesting in the provinces, for the express purpose of placating the Muslims, will weaken the Central Government and will lead to civil war and disruption, a repetition of the later days of the holy Roman Empire, with all powers vested in the periphery and little but name in the Centre. The provinces will fall apart and the Centre will be unable to shoulder the responsibilities for all-India policies. The weakness of provincial autonomy on a federal basis in this direction at times of crises has been amply proved by the extreme ineffectiveness of the policy of the Indian Government in the recent handling of the problem of the food shortage in India. The inadequate powers of the Central Government greatly handicapped the pursuit of a strong and consistent policy in the matter resulting in unimaginable misery for the people at large. From the point of view of defence, international obligations ; planned economic development, etc. a federation which will also be acceptable to the Muslims will be entirely inadequate. Objectively examined, it will be seen that Federation is a peace-time constitution. The experience of the present war has shown that both war and defence in the future are matters not for Governments but for nations as a whole. Without a Central Government capable of organizing the entire life of the nation, of mobilizing all its resources, of planning industrial development on the widest scale no effective defence will be possible in the future. The whole theory of federations is against this conception.

A case has also been made for Partition from the standpoint of Hindu interests. The excision of the Muslim-majority areas, it has been argued, would leave the rest of India more homogeneous. The Hindus might benefit from the loss of

¹ *The Future of South-East Asia*, K. M. Panikkar—1943, page 34.

them as the Turks have benefited from the loss of their one-time Arab Provinces. The minority problem would no longer obstruct the application of Congress ideology. The 'logic of democracy' could come into its own. Numbers could be given their due weight. A strong unitary Centre would at last become a practical proposition. Furthermore, Hindu India would be safer. With or without partition, the Moslem bloc in the North-West is a standing threat to Hindu India. 'Which then is better for the Hindus? Should these Musalmans be without and against or should they be within and against?' If within, their disproportionate strength in the Indian army could not be easily or quickly adjusted. They are already afraid of such a change and will bitterly oppose it; and it would take time to build up new regiments in those Hindu areas in which the habit of professional soldiering has long died out. The frontier between Pakistan and Hindustan, it is true, would not be easy to defend; but is it better for the Hindus, asks Dr. Ambedkar, to have a safe frontier or a safe army? ¹

In matters religious, cultural and economic it is impossible to reconcile Hindus and Muslims. For example, Lala Har-dayal advised Hindus: "If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and convert (them and) all the mountain tribes." At the Nagpur session in December, 1938, the Hindu Mahasabha declared that "Hindi (not Hindustani—but Sanskritnishta Hindi) based on and drawing its nourishment from Sanskrit vocabulary is and rightly deserves to be the national language and Devanagri the national script of Hindustan." The activities of Hindi Sahita Samelan are definitely aimed at forcing Hindi as *lingua franca* on the whole of India. The Hindu Mahasabha has repeatedly asked its followers to boycott Muslims economically and to patronize only Hindu business. In view of this attitude the only solution is segregation and separation. Hindus and Muslims are rivals for political power in an undivided India and the rivalry between them is bound to continue so long as one is not completely absorbed by the other. It is difficult to establish friendly relations between

¹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*, B. R. Ambedkar, 1941, page 93.

them and at the same time let them keep their identity as Hindus and Muslims. Their traditions have been built at each other's cost. The defeat of the one has been the victory of the other and their past, at least for the last one thousand years, is dotted with incidents which do not signify the same thing to them both. The Muslims cannot divorce their religion from their politics. In Islam, religious and political beliefs are not separated from each other. They cannot be first Indians and then Muslims or *vice versa*. Their religion includes their politics and their politics is a part of their religion. The mosque constitutes a place of worship and also the Assembly hall. The mosque forms the centre of all aspects of their public life, religious, social, economic and political. Consequently they are not in a position to separate religion from politics, or to prefer one to the other. Hindu-Muslim unity or nationalism, signifying homogeneity between them in all non-religious matters, is unimaginable. The Islamic polity in which religion and politics are inseparably united, requires perfect isolation for its development. The idea of a common state with heterogeneous membership is alien to Islam, and can never be fruitful. "Thus we see communalism is a natural heritage of the past and is not a new phase of political life. When the advocates of Hindu-Muslim unity say that the English are responsible for bringing into existence communalism, they only indulge in self-deception in order to retain their optimism about an impossible ideal of harmoniously fitting the communities into a single nation. Blaming the English for investing communalism as an instrument of division is denying the facts of history. The natural relationship between the Hindus and Muslims is communal, and not national."¹ Pakistan would remove the canker of communalism from the body politic of both Hindustan and Pakistan. Both Hindus and Muslims want a peaceful home in which the conflicts between a ruling and a subject race can find no place to plague their lives. The only way of stopping communal aggression is to have Pakistan. Muslim demands have been increasing and there can be no end to their increase. The policy

¹ *Confederacy of India*, "A Punjabee"—1939, page 54.

of appeasement, which the Congress has followed hitherto, can never solve the problem. The only solution is to have a settlement which means laying down the bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appeasement sets no limits to the demands and aspirations of the aggressor, settlement does.

Democracy can only be worked if there is agreement among political parties upon its fundamental objects. In India representative and responsible Government cannot be worked because it presupposes a people fundamentally as one which is not so. According to Islamic belief if a country is not under Muslim rule, in case of a conflict Muslims should obey Muslim law and defy the law of the land. They also believe that when the country is not under Muslim rule (*Dar-ul-Islam*) it is *Dar-ul-Harb* (abode of war). India, therefore, cannot be the land of Hindus and Muslims living as equals. Muslims must either perform Hijrat (as they attempted in the middle of the 19th century and again in 1920) or turn *Dar-ul-Harb* into *Dar-ul-Islam* by *Jihad* (as they attempted in 1857, or Afghanistan attempted in 1919). Finally, they believe that there is no such thing as territorial affinities, since affinities are really social and religious both of which are extra-territorial i.e., Pan-Islamism. Willingness to render obedience to the authority of the State is as essential for its stability agreement of political parties on the fundamentals of the State. A Muslim considers Hindus as Kafirs, who are not worthy of respect, therefore, Muslims will not obey a Hindu Government. The basic feelings of deference and sympathy which predispose persons to obey the authority of the state do not exist. Moreover, Hindus are caste-ridden and democracy cannot be worked in conjunction with them. Caste has proved to be the greatest fissiparous force known to politics, splitting politics into egocentric groups which find great difficulty in adjusting themselves to society. Caste contracts the sympathies of the people instead of expanding them and considerably circumscribes the social commerce between citizen and citizen.

Religious beliefs and social attitudes and views regarding ultimate destinies constitutes the motive force which determines lines of action, and in these Hindus and Muslims

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are irreconcilable, incompatible and incapable of forming one single nation or even two harmonious parts of one whole. These differences have the sure effect not only of keeping them asunder but also of keeping them at war with each other. The differences are fundamental and the Hindu-Muslim problem is eternal. The record of riots, and failure of unity talks and unity conferences is painful and heart-rending reading. It is really a record of civil war between Hindus and Muslims. All attempts to bring them together have failed. The concession of separate electorates in 1909 did not result in Hindu-Muslim unity. Lucknow Pact of 1916 did not bring about unity. The attempt made in 1923 by the Congress and the Muslims to arrive at a settlement (Solan Pact and Bengal Pact) failed. Again in 1928 the Nehru Report was not acceptable to a large section of the Muslim community. During the Round Table Conference the Minorities Committee failed. As regards social and religious questions such as cow-slaughter, music before mosques, and conversion attempts made to bring about unity have failed. Attempts at Hindu-Muslim unity are based on the wrong assumption that a Central Government can mould diverse sets of peoples into one nation, and the satisfaction of Muslim demands will be a sure means of achieving communal unity. Even if political unity could be achieved, which is impossible, social unity cannot be achieved, and the antagonism will not end and real unity will never come.

Hindus and Muslims both suffer from social stagnation. If the Muslims in other countries have undertaken the task of the reform of their society and the Muslims of India have refused to do so, it is because the former are free from the communal and political clashes with rival communities while the latter are not. Hindus and Muslims regard each other as a menace, and to meet this menace both have suspended internal social reform in order to present a common front to the principal enemy. The only way of bringing about progress is to remove this fear complex which can only be done by separation. Now they are constantly making "preparations" against each other, a sort of race in armaments between two hostile nations. If the Hindus have the

Benares University, the Muslim must have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start the Shuddi movement, the Muslims must have the Tabligh movement. If the Hindus start Sangathan, the Muslims must have Tanzim. If the Hindus have Rashtriya Swayam Sevaka Sangh, the Muslims must have the Khaksar movement. Pakistan is the only means whereby the energies now directed towards civil war could be diverted towards internal reform of both the Hindus and the Muslims.

The economic interests of the Muslims of the North-West Muslim Bloc are different from the Hindus of the Southern and South-Eastern Hindu provinces. Muslims are wage-earners and Hindus are capitalists, interests of Muslims are mostly agricultural and interests of Hindus are industrial and commercial, Muslims are debtors and Hindus are creditors, Muslims are consumers of foreign as well as Indian manufactures, and Hindus are either middlemen who sell foreign goods or millowners who market their products in the North-West Muslim Bloc. Certain occupations such as export and import, wholesale and retail selling, banking and money-lending and in fact the entire commercial life is controlled by the Hindus to the exclusion—often deliberate and planned—of the Muslims. In Bannu, for example, out of 2,000 odd shops in the city there are hardly a dozen Muslim shops. In a united India there is every danger that the Hindu industrialists and millowners of Bombay and elsewhere will exert their influence through the Central Government to enforce a policy of protection to shut out foreign goods from entering into competition with the products of their factories. This will leave the rural population at the mercy of Hindu India and deprive it of the right to exchange its raw materials direct with Europe and America on better terms. It may have to accept artificially reduced prices for its agriculture products and may be forced to buy the products of Hindu industry at high prices. Hence economic interests separate Hindus and Muslims. If India remains united, Muslims will never gain economic parity with the Hindus because of so many handicaps and disabilities from which they are at present suffering. The Muslims cannot trust that the very community

which is at present responsible for their economic enslavement will do justice to them, the moment it gains political power. The capitalists and industrialists of Hindu provinces would want to reserve the raw materials produced by the Muslim Bloc of the North-West and secure markets for their finished goods. By their supremacy in the money market and cut-throat competition Hindus will perpetuate the dependence of the present agricultural provinces on the industrial provinces and will prevent their industrialisation. The interests of agricultural and industrialized regions must clash in and the voice of big industrial magnates will prevail under a capitalistic democratic regime. In U.S.A. when similar differences arose between the Industrial North and the Agricultural West and South, they ultimately led to the civil war of 1861-64, which resulted in a victory for the North. Again, in 1901, after the formation of the federation of Australia, the Commonwealth used tariffs for the protection of Eastern Industries at the expense of agricultural Western Australia, which then wanted to secede just like the Agricultural States of U.S.A. These examples conclusively prove that the economic interests of the Agricultural North-West are different from those of the rest of India, and the only way for Muslims to become prosperous is through complete economic emancipation. Pakistan must be treated as an independent political unit, responsible for its ports, communications, and industrial policy.

It is impossible for Muslims to gain an interest in trade and industrial concerns without separation. At present their interests are nominal because non-Muslim trade and industrial concerns are so well-organized and run on communal lines that Muslims cannot withstand competition against them even if they try to start any trade or industry. All the trading and industrial concerns are owned by non-Muslims, who prefer to borrow capital for industrial and trade purposes from Hindu insurance companies and banks, which means that there is no chance for Muslim concerns even if they are started. On the other hand in the field of trade and industry where capital has often to be borrowed, the Muslims have little chance, the money-market being entirely

in the hands of the Hindus, who will not advance loans to them for any of these purposes. Even if they did, it would not help because wholesale and retail distribution is in the hands of non-Muslims and Muslim manufacturing companies would not be able to sell their goods. Once a community secures a position of economic vantage over another it becomes highly difficult to drive it out of it. Had it been so easy the Germans would not have resorted to the drastic step of expelling the Jews from their country to escape from the economic stranglehold which they had secured over them. The economic condition of the Muslims in the North-West can only be improved by partition. At present they are like Turks prior to the inauguration of Turkey as a Republic when all internal and foreign trade and all the learned professions such as medicine, teaching and banking were monopolised by non-Turkish races. The Turk, like Indian Muslim, was either a peasant sunk deep in debt or was content to work as a soldier or a Government servant. The political reorganisation of Turkey has enabled the Turks to eliminate the foreign control of their economic life. Here is a lesson for the Muslims of Pakistan. ✓

The argument that the Muslim States will require capital from Hindu India to be developed industrially and that Hindu capital will not find an easy access to them is wrong. A modern country, which can maintain peace and order within its bounds and can guarantee payment of debt, can invite capital from foreign countries. The example of Turkey can be easily followed. If the Government in Turkey can patronise and finance industries with the help of foreign capital, the Muslim States in India can adopt similar methods. The Muslims do not want that they should lose the major share of profits in business by leaving all initiative and control in industrial development to Hindu capitalists of Hindu India. They will rather prefer that the State should organise and promote industries and find work for a large number of unemployed people in cities and villages. Writing to Mr. Jinnah on the economic issue Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal said, "The question therefore is : how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty ? And the

whole future of the League depends on the League's ability to solve this question...After a long and careful study of Islamic law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India."¹

As regards the economic future of Pakistan it is argued that "though it (Pakistan) is poor in coal yet it has a number of snowfed rivers which descend from the mountains to the plains and form innumerable waterfalls which can be utilized in providing cheap Hydro-electric power. Mandi-Hydro-electric works, alone capable of generating more than 120,000 kilowatts of electric energy, are sufficient for the whole of the Punjab. With the development of such cheap electric power we shall be able to utilize the forest wealth and mineral resources of Pakistan which consist of iron, zinc, lead (Kulu hills), brauxite, Fuller's earth, kaolin, copper, talc, precious stones (Kashmir), chronite, limestone, tin, etc., (Baluchistan). Only recently oil has been discovered in Sind and Baluchistan and it is estimated that the new oil resources, if properly exploited, will be sufficient to meet the demand of the whole of present India, i.e., India proper and Pakistan. Baluchistan is also a well-known fruit-growing centre and its Mekran coast is also famous for fish, both in respect of quality and quantity. So far as the economic condition of Sind is concerned the Lloyd Barrage can stand its surety. It is estimated that within ten years of the commencement of the Barrage, Karachi will be able to export 1,133,000 tons of wheat, 500,000 bales of cotton, 4,477,000 tons of rice, 295,000 tons of Jowar-Bajra etc. 15,000 tons of pulses and 117,000 tons of oils seeds. These arresting figures speak volumes for the economic position of Sind. Pakistan, taken collectively, is in a position to develop to its great advantage herboriculture, floriculture and sericulture in the hilly

¹ *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah—1943*: Letter dated 28th May 1937.

districts. There is also a great scope for the development of new industries based on agriculture, such as the manufacture of strawboard from wheat stalks; paper from rice-stalks; alcohol from potatoes; cellular and artificial silk from maize-stalks and sugarcane refuse. It may be that an immense quantity of cotton stalks, unwanted in almost every district, may be treated so that they furnish the material for the popular dresses of Punjab women. If Japan with a total area of about 146,000 square miles, with 1/6th of land cultivable and having practically no mineral wealth can rise to the position of a great industrial power, surely Pakistan with about 450,000 square miles of area and with vast economic resources can stand on its own feet and compete favourably in the world market.”¹

The vast majority of the population of India must always get its living from the soil, and it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which the relentless pressure of that population's growth on the productive capacity of that soil can be tempered by industrial development. The balance of Indian economy, therefore, they maintain, should favour agrarian interests. Already before the war the peasant had to pay the price for the tariff needed to protect the growth of large scale industry, and the maintenance of the industrial expansion prompted by the war will require similar protection in future. When British control at the Centre is withdrawn, is not the balance likely to be still further weighted on the industrial side? That ought not to be, of course, a communal issue. The vast majority of the Hindus as well as of the Moslems are agriculturists and in their common interest, as in that of the growing ranks of labour, lies the best hope that the lines of communal division in Indian politics may be some day cut across. But those common interests are not yet consolidated and organized, and in the meantime agriculture versus industry must be largely a communal issue, because Indian industry is at present mainly Hindu. The North-West Muslim 'homeland' is overwhelmingly agrarian. Its population amounts to about 12·3 per cent, of the population of British India, but, so far as can be

¹ *The New Times*—Lahore, 27th November 1938.

estimated, the proportion of its industries is only 5·1 per cent. of those of British India and that of its mineral development only 5·4 per cent. Bengal as a whole is much more highly industrialised. It has 20 per cent of the population of British India and, to reckon by the number of workers employed in factories, 33 per cent. of its industry. But the industrial area is mainly that of predominantly Hindu Calcutta and its neighbourhood; apart from Calcutta the North-East Muslim 'homeland' is even more dominantly agricultural than the North-West. Indian industry, in fact, is located mainly in Hindu areas; it is financed and owned mainly by Hindus capitalists; it provides a livelihood mainly for Hindu labour. Thus, though the protected growth of Indian industry compels the Hindu peasant as much as the Muslim to pay more for his spade and his clothes and his household goods, the general balance is heavily against the Muslims. In an undivided India it might be redressed to some extent by a Centre which deliberately planned a more even distribution of industrial development. But is there any hope of that, the Muslims ask, under a Hindu *Raj*? Will not their interests be increasingly and permanently subjected to Hindu capitalism? And is there any way of escaping from that stranglehold except by way of Pakistan? Partition at least could control its own economy. In the North-West, at any rate, it could establish and protect its own industries. Instead of sending its raw cotton to the mills of Bombay, it could build mills of its own and protect their products with a tariff. And later on, if capital were available, it could apply its great reserves of water-power to further industrial development. Karachi, too, might be developed till it eclipsed Bombay as the port of entry for all north-west India. Imperial economists may deplore such a prospect. They may argue that the economic results of the political disruption of India are bound to be as bad for all concerned as the results of the disruption of the Hapsburg Empire proved to be in the interval between the wars. But what is the alternative Muslims will reply? It would not be a balanced system of economic co-operation and reciprocity settled on equal terms. It would be more like Hitler's 'new order', which sought to

concentrate the control and the profits of all industry in Central and Western Europe in German hands.

Whatever may be the economic difficulties of Pakistan it must not be forgotten that no state or nation was ever formed on economic basis, and no State on earth is economically completely self-sufficient. If they were, there would be no need or occasion for international co-operation. Nations grow and States are formed on other considerations, when they have been thus formed, they look around for means to satisfy their wants and create an administrative machinery corresponding to their means and their requirements.

Similarly, the minority problem may also exist in Pakistan in one form or another, but it is forgotten that the idea of Pakistan has not been conceived solely as a solution of the permanently recurring minority problem. The inspiration and the motivating force behind Pakistan is the consciousness and the irrepressible desire that the Muslim nation shall see its genius and its soul reflected in the glory of Government, all those institutions of social happiness which are a part and parcel of the machinery of a durable and lasting Government. The desire of the Indian Muslims to have a Muslim State of their own is a part of a movement for the unification of the Muslim World (Silsila-i-Jamia-Vahdat Umam Islam) started in Turkey during the life-time of late Ataturk under the patronage of the late Syed Jalil Ahmad Sinyusi. One of its aims is to create more Muslim republics in all those parts of the world which are predominantly Muslim, in addition to the Muslim States already functioning. Among the ten newly proposed republics one is to consist of Muslim Bengal, another is to be constituted by the Muslim North-West India and the third by the Hyderabad State.

In addition to the religious, racial, linguistic, and economic differences on account of which Burma was separated from India, other grounds also apply to Pakistan. They were that sufficient consideration was not given to the special circumstances and needs of the Province of Burma by the Indian Legislature and the Government of India, that the representation of Burma was too weak to exercise any influence in the

Legislative Assembly and that Burma could never have any effective voice in shaping the policy in the Indian Legislature ; that Burma's interests sometimes diverged considerably from those of India and protection of the Indian industry was often to the disadvantage of Burma; that caste is one vital structure of Hinduism and it is the negation of everything that constitutes a nation and the difficulties which caste system presents in India do not exist in Burma; that the Burmans in fact approximate far more closely to the ordinary conception of a nation than the Indians and the constitutional problem separated from India would at once reduce itself to manageable proportions and become far smaller ; that so long as Burma was tied to the apron strings of India, her material and administrative development was impossible ; that public opinion in Burma favoured separation and even those who believed that by maintaining the connection between India and Burma, Burma would get self-government more quickly than if it stood alone, desired merely to postpone the question of separation. All these arguments and many more apply to Pakistan and as Hindus did not oppose the separation of Burma, there is no reason why they should oppose the creation of Pakistan.

Pakistan has natural frontiers. High mountain ranges lie to the north and the west and have always sheltered Indian plains from the invaders from Central Asia and the cold winds of the North. The Thar desert in the South forms a formidable barrier between the Indus plain and the Deccan plateau, Pakistan will not weaken the defences of Hindustan because as a matter of history there has been no scientific boundary for India. There are three possible boundary lines to choose from : the Indus river, the present administrative boundary of the N.-W.F., and the Durand Line. Lord Lawrence was an advocate of the policy of "Back to the Indus", and in fact the present frontier was fixed not for any strategic reasons, but to give protection to the people who were brought under British rule. Pakistan will bring the boundary to the Sutlej or to Jumna as the case may be, but geographical conditions are not decisive in the world to-day and modern technique has robbed natural frontiers such as

mountain barriers and rivers of much of their former importance. Countries are not wanting which have no natural boundaries and create strong artificial fortifications as barriers. In modern warfare the foundations of a country's defence are truly laid in the hearts of its people. If, for instance, a federal government were established and a foreign people tried to invade India through the North-West, it is not inconceivable that the North-West would rise in revolt against the federal Centre and throw in its lot with the invaders. In fact partition will ease the problem of Defence for all India. Since the Japanese assault from the South and East, the North-West frontier can no longer be regarded as the only dangerous frontier. Besides, "the North-West Frontier", writes a Muslim publicist, "will lose all importance once a Muslim State is established in the North-West. The tribesmen and the people beyond the frontiers are all Muslims. They will lose all religious and political fervour for *Jehad* against non-Muslims, once they find that they have to reckon with their brothers in Islam. If the frontier between Afghanistan and Persia or that between Persia and Turkey can be easily defended by comparatively small armies, there is no reason why the same should not be possible in the case of the frontier between Afghanistan and the Muslim North-West State".¹ The position could be stabilised, moreover, by non-aggression treaties or full-scale alliance between Pakistan and her Muslim neighbours. Why should she not make a fifth subscriber to the Pact of Saadabad which bound together Turkey, Iraq, Persia and Afghanistan for mutual security in 1937? Is not that the natural focus of the international relations of Muslim India? Since it is only her unnatural marriage with Hindu India, that has hitherto compelled her to turn her back on it, should she not seek a divorce? It is said that the Muslim States will be helpless against Hindu India which will isolate them from each other, but it is forgotten that mere numbers do not count in the defence of a Modern State.² So far as

¹ *India's Problem of her Future Constitution*, edited by H. M. Saiyid, 1940, page 40.

² World War II has shown that numbers are not an inconsiderable factor.

military traditions go, Muslim areas, particularly the provinces of the North-West, are far stronger than Hindu India. Again, the resources of the new Muslim State in men and money will be far stronger than those of Afghanistan or independent tribes beyond the Frontier Province and hence it will experience no great difficulty in keeping peace and order on its side of the frontier.

It is true that in Sind and in the N.-W. F. P. the Hindu minority is 26·8 and 9·3% respectively and in the Punjab as high as 44%. In both the former provinces there is no district in which the Hindus predominate, but they are evenly spread all over the province. The position is further complicated by the fact that in Sind out of 28 towns the Hindus are in an overwhelming majority in 20 towns. In N.-W. F. P. out of 26 towns the Hindus predominate in 11 towns. Communal peace in these two provinces, therefore, cannot be established by merely altering their boundaries, and the only remedy is to shift the population. This is not difficult because Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria carried out an exchange of populations involving millions of people. Exchange of populations in India appals some people but desperate ills require desperate remedies. To save lives, serious surgical operations are necessary.

تجدید - باب
The argument that the non-Muslim minorities will be a source of constant danger to the stability of Muslim States will lose all importance in face of the preponderance of Muslim voice in the Government. In the North-West and the North-East, with adjustments in frontiers, the proportion of the Muslim population will be raised to 80% and the minorities will be reduced to 20%. These minorities will be given full protection in regard to their religion, language and culture like the Muslim minorities in Hindu India, and will no longer cause unnecessary annoyance to Muslim Governments for fear of provoking Muslim minorities in Hindu India to similar action. The Muslims outside Pakistan need not be apprehensive and in fact they say: "We are not weakened by the separation of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindustan. We are better protected by the existence of separate Islamic States on the Eastern and Western border of

Hindustan than we are by their submission in Hindustan. Who can say that they are wrong? Has it not been shown that Germany as an outside State was better able to protect the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia than the Sudetens were able to do themselves? Apart from the possibilities inherent in the 'hostage' principle, the existence of a strong and independent State not far away, wherein Islam is securely and permanently enthroned, would give them the requisite moral support to enable them to hold their own against the rising tide of Hinduism. Since Islam transcends frontiers, Pakistan would, so to speak, belong to them as much as to its own inhabitants."

In an undivided India, where military organization is mainly in Hindu hands, the proportion of Muslims in the Indian Army is bound to be reduced. There would be nothing to prevent the realisation of the principle, so vigorously upheld by the Mahasabha, that the composition of the Army should reflect the communal composition of the people. In that event the proportion of Muslim soldiers, which in 1939 was more than one third would fall to less than one quarter. This would not only affect the standard of living in the Punjab, which, as has often been pointed out, owes so much to the pay and pensions of Punjabi troops. It would give a Hindu Raj the ultimate guarantee of military power. It would strengthen the consciousness of inferiority in Muslim minds. It would make them less able to resist the moral pressure of Hindustan.¹

Whatever the reasons, there is a strong sentiment among Muslims for Pakistan and this has to be faced. "If we cannot", writes C Rajagopalacharia, "persuade one another to agree to a united Central Government of some kind, it is surely better for the growth of freedom and democracy in this vast country that those who insist on a separate existence should be allowed to try it out. Why, even if the six provinces of Madras, Bombay, Bihar, the U. P., the C. P., and Orissa decide to start together, it will not be an insignificant union and the law of political gravity must inevitably bring the others into its fold

¹ *The Future of India*, R. Coupland, 1943, page 77.

provided the union has patience and goodwill." On similar lines pleads "El-Hamza": "The Union of South Africa became possible since the people of the various South African States were allowed to try self-determination. After some time the pressure of common interests was sufficient to bring them together, and there were few rancorous memories to hinder the union. The South Africans learnt in their independent States to use and value their freedom and with that they also learnt to respect others' freedom and co-operate among themselves as equals. Had South Africans' wishes been disregarded and South Africa started as a political unit with a closely centralized Government, hatred would have hardened and the struggle would have continued till the different States ultimately separated probably never again to unite."¹

¹ *Pakistan : A Nation*, "El-Hamza"; 1941, page 180.

V

THE CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN

The case against Pakistan can be* argued from various points of view, Hindu, Sikh and Muslim. It is the last which is most important and which has hitherto received the least attention. From the purely Muslim viewpoint it has not been realized that the partition of India would be damaging to the whole of India and all its inhabitants but more damaging to Muslims themselves than to anyone else. It is extraordinary how propaganda war waged with modern weapons can, for a short period at any rate, make people believe in the incredible against their own interests and better judgment. Of this Nazi Germany is a thought-provoking example. Pakistan is a political slogan of great potency for the exploitation of the Muslim masses, and this makes it all the more imperative that its meaning, its significance and its implications are fully understood in order to lessen, as much as possible, its devastating effects.

It is wrong to say that India is not one country. Physically, naturally and geographically, India is one country. It is marked out and separated from other countries by unmistakable and almost unsurpassable natural boundaries on all sides. It is a peninsula and on three sides of it there is the sea, on the North are the mighty Himalayas—on the North-West and the North-East there is a natural fortification provided by hills which ought to prove to a great extent unsurmountable. It is true that within the country itself there is a variety of soil, climate, and natural scenery. These are found to a larger or smaller extent in every country. There were at one time, undoubtedly, kingdoms within the country more or less independent of each other. But the attempt of every great king was to extend his suzerainty over the whole

of India. This has been the case since the mythical days of Ram Chandra, all through the periods of Chandra Gupta, Asoka, the Gupta Emperors, the Pathan Kings, the Moghul Emperors, right down to the present day of the British Empire. No one has treated any part of geographical India as constituting a separate country. Occasionally and for short periods, the boundary line on the North-West has varied according to the strength of the rulers ; but at no time has it been accepted by anyone—Hindu, Muslim or the British that any part within the physical boundaries set by nature was a different country. The common interests of the people—economic, political and defence—demand that India should remain undivided and united. A united free India has been an inspiring ideal before the people for generations. The proposition that the natural boundary of India is up to the river Jumna or Sutlej is wrong and erroneous. Without the Punjab and the N.-W. F. P. the geography of India is incomplete and inconceivable. During the palmy days of the Aryan civilization, Kandhar and Afghanistan were included in India, and when Alexander the Great invaded, the Punjab was a part of India. The Pathans and the Moghuls also included the Frontier Province within their Empires.

The political and economic unity of India is natural because it is the natural response to its geography. The familiar contrast with Europe is as instructive on this point as it is on several others. For, whereas the physical configuration of Europe—its long indented coastline, its peninsulas and inland seas and islands, its mountain ranges—has fostered the growth of separate nations and their seclusion from one another in separate States, geography seems to have marked out India, though not much smaller than Europe, to become in due course a single political and economic unit. On two sides it has set the sea and on the third the greatest mountain-barrier in the world ; and while it has thus cut the peoples of India off from other peoples, it has not cut them off from one another. The only large island apart from Ceylon is Cutch, the only large peninsula is Kathiawar. Elsewhere the long seaboard is singu-

larly unbroken. And across the land there is only one substantial natural frontier, the Vindhya mountains and their offshoots, which though nowhere of any great height, interpose between the northern plains and the Deccan a stretch of rugged, rocky, inhospitable ground. In old days this was a sufficient obstacle to make it difficult for the masters of the North to extend their conquests southwards, but the Moghuls crossed it, and the Marathas also from the other side and for the British it soon ceased to be an obstacle at all. Mere distance in fact, not any natural frontier, was the chief impediment to the expansion of the British Raj all over India, and, long before the coming of the aeroplane, distance had been conquered by the railways, the telegraph, the telephone and the all-weather road. No soldier or administrator now-a-days would say that the physical character of India makes it hard to hold or to govern it.

The comparative ease and speed with which India was unified by the strength and science of a Western Power has obscured to some extent the magnitude of the change it brought about in India's life. When British rule was expanding over India, Madras had no more in common with the Punjab, Bengal no more with Bombay, than Germany had with Spain, or Italy with Poland, when Napoleon dominated Europe. As late as 1877 John Bright contemplated the "nations of India drawing together under British rule into a group of States which would be able to stand by themselves when British rule was finally withdrawn."¹ But in the course of another generation so profound was the effect of the British Raj that those who were acutely conscious of the diversity of India ceased to think of it as comparable with Europe. In addition to the unifying forces of British rule the unification of India took place as a result of the break-up of the old feudal system in the same way as in most European countries smaller units gave way to large organized States. By the end of the nineteenth century India had come to mean more than the name of a sub-continent. The differences of race and language

¹ *The Future of India*, R. Coupland, 1944, pages 50-51.

were still there. The communal divisions still cut deep—how deep we know today. Yet educated Indians, whatever their race or creed, had acquired a consciousness, such as they had never had before, that they were all Indians. One supreme government, the adoption of English as the *lingua franca* of the intelligentsia, the ease with which it was now possible to visit or correspond with any part of India, the growth of higher education and of common interests and collaboration in scientific and literary research, the spread of commerce and industry over a vast free-trade area, the linking of production in one part of the country with markets in another, the relief of famine by inter-Provincial co-operation—all these major factors were welding India together, aided by the forging of many administrative and economic links and the making of innumerable personal contacts and relationships. No one can travel through India today without becoming aware of the extent to which it has acquired a common life, a common society, in which its educated elements are freely commingled. He may share his carriage in the train with a Bombay merchant who had been visiting a branch of his business at Lahore, a lawyer from Bengal with a brief at Nagpur, a Madras scientist attending an academic conference at Calcutta, a Punjabi officer going to join his regiment at Bangalore. Such countless common social, economic and intellectual activities were enough in themselves to create a sense of community; and, when with the beginning of self-government Indians began to share in common political activities also, that sense of community was inevitably coloured by the idea or the ideal of nationhood. Thus the unifying process was accelerated by the growth of nationalism; and though nationalism itself, because its objective was the government of India by Indians, was bound sooner or later to precipitate a conflict between the forces in Indian life that made for unity and those that made for disruption, the unifying forces, at any rate up to 1937, had kept the upper hand. In 1937 it was still taken for granted that the free national status now coming into view could only be attained by one united

nation. So far had the India of Bright's day been transformed. If Indian society was not yet national, it had ceased to be merely continental. If India was not and never could be comparable with relatively homogeneous European countries like Germany or France, she was no longer comparable with Europe.

There is also the unity among Hindus and Muslims of India inspired by their present common enemy—British Imperialism. This fact has given rise to innumerable common interests among them, and these common interests and the need for a united front are the basis on which the concept of India as a nation must be based. Pakistan will diminish to a dangerous degree the strength of India to give a united fight to foreign powers present or potential. As separate nations it will be as difficult for them to maintain their independence as it will be to win it.

Apart from religion the basic idea of Pakistan is preservation of Muslim culture. If culture means the improvement achieved by training of intellectual development an average Indian at present cannot have any claim to culture. Nearly 90% of the Indian people are living from hand to mouth and are illiterate. Cultural and spiritual progress is impossible without leisure and material prosperity. What does Muslim culture mean to a Muslim peasant or a labourer? Is not his pressing need two square meals a day, clothing and housing? One of the most important items of cultural differences is the script question. It is hotly debated whether the Persian or the Devanagiri script should be used; a question relevant obviously only to the minority of Indians (less than 10% and among Muslims only 8%) who are literate. For the mass of the people of India the problem is not one of which script they shall use, but of building a society in which they and their class may read at all. India must first prosper materially and only then can it meditate upon holy things. The Hindus and the Muslims should first become an able nation by gaining physical and mental vigour through independence. Some people, however, argue that culture is generally an affair of the upper classes. Even accepting this the cultural protection of

Muslims cannot be secured by partition of India, or in other words, segregation of Muslims from other communities, it can only be secured by rehabilitation of Muslims through improving their economic condition vis-a-vis other communities. Constitutional safeguards and legislative measures may afford some protection but the real protection must come from the inherent strength of Muslims developed through better education and greater facilities for participating in the economic development of India. Parsis are an insignificant minority in India yet they do not need and have never demanded any protection for their cultural development. Muslims must, therefore, face rival communities and prove their worth rather than confess their weakness and look for an asylum behind the closed doors of Pakistan.

It has been repeated *ad nauseam* since 1937 that the All-India Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative political organization of the Musalmans of India who number 100 million strong. This has made some people identify the Pakistan demand of the All-India Muslim League with the Muslims of India, but the fact is that it is difficult to say that the League represents the Muslims of India and the demand for Pakistan is (apart from the fact that it should not be) the demand of the vast majority of the Muslims of India. There has no doubt been a phenomenal development in the strength and popularity of the League, and the League can now be said to be the largest single party of the Muslims, but older Muslim organizations have persisted and new ones have grown which do not agree with the demand for Pakistan and there is as yet nothing to show that they do not represent the majority of Muslim opinion. The assumption underlying the League attitude seems to be that all who belong to a religious group, whether by the accident of birth or by the fact of choice, must because of their common religious faith also hold the same political opinions about the form of government or structure of society they wish to have. This assumption is without any basis. Almost all the peoples of Europe are Christian by faith, but political and economic con-

licts there are perhaps more virulent than in any other continent. Arabs are Muslims like the Turks, but they did not hesitate to co-operate with Britishers who are Christians, to throw off the Turkish yoke. Religious conformity is one thing, identity of economic and political interests is another. The League has never had the courage to publish its membership figures, has always been opposed to the proposal of a Constituent Assembly, (elected by universal adult suffrage with separate electorates), because it has never been confident of winning a majority of Muslim votes. The present hesitation of the League to accept a plebiscite of the whole population in predominatingly Muslim areas shows its weakness, and lack of faith in the acceptance of its demand by the vast majority of Muslims.

It is a notable fact that the League is the weakest where the Muslims are in a majority and where Pakistan is to be founded. The Watan Party of Baluchistan has a majority of the people behind it as against the landlords who support the League. The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference led by Mohammad Abdullah has undoubtedly the support of the overwhelming majority of the population and is opposed to the League. The attempt made by Mr. Jinnah in 1944 to win over the Conference to the cause of the League was a failure. In N.W.F.P., in spite of the fact that Hindus are only 6½% of the total population, Khudai Khidmatgars, owing allegiance to the Congress, are the most powerful party. The League Ministry defeated in early 1945 was set up and assisted by Government, and made possible because a majority of the Khudai Khidmatgar members of the Assembly were detained under the Defence of India Rules. In Sind until recently, when the Governor unconstitutionally dismissed the Premier, the League had no chance of success against the Muslim Nationalist Party of the late Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh. The present so-called League Premier holds office with the support of the Congress, and his allegiance to the League is highly doubtful. In the Punjab the Unionist Party, which

is a non-communal party and is organised on an economic basis, has been supreme since 1937. Almost all the Muslim members of the Assembly were, until recently, members of the Unionist Party, and were only nominally members of the League under the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. The attempt of Mr. Jinnah in April 1944 to disrupt the Unionist Party and to form a Muslim League Coalition Ministry failed and resulted in placing the Muslim League in opposition with not more than twenty-two members out of a total of 89 Muslim members of the Assembly. It is an admitted fact that in the Punjab the League has never been a success, so much so that it has not even been able to curb the anti-League Ahrar party. In Bengal, until 1943 when the Governor unconstitutionally forced the Premier to resign, the League was in a hopeless minority against the Proja Party, a non-communal party with an economic programme. The League Ministry of Sir Nazim-ud-din was almost entirely dependent on the Governor and the European Bloc. In spite of this it has been defeated by a defection of its many erstwhile Muslim members.

Among all-India organizations the League has several rivals. The Congress still carries the allegiance of a considerable number of politically-conscious Muslims and before 1942, was also beginning to have an increasing influence among the peasants. Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind has little sympathy with the present programme of the League. The Shia Political Conference covers Shias almost all over India, estimated to be no less than 20% of the Muslim community. The Momin Ansar Conference claims to represent the 'Depressed Classes' of Muslim India, spinners and weavers, and artisans. The Azad Muslim Conference, founded in 1940, was a congregation of all Muslim organizations in India, except the League and the Khaksars, and since then even the Khaksars have decided to oppose the policy of the Muslim League. Finally, the recently founded All-India Muslim Majlis is an increasingly popular organization. There is, therefore, a substantial body of Muslim opinion outside the League.

The Pakistan demand is not the demand of the Muslim masses nor is it in their interest, and the power of the League is only directed towards the advancement of the interests of the Muslim aristocracy—the landlords and the middle classes, whom it represents and who look for their class aggrandizement and want a larger share than they have hitherto had in the administration of the country and the capitalistic ventures of the future. The Muslim capitalist is unable to flourish in competition with the more powerful Hindu capitalist, and in the name of religion wants to capture governmental machinery to further his own interests and to keep the masses in their present state of poverty and subjection. Middle class Muslims feel that their chances of success, on account of their having entered the capitalist game much later than the Hindus, are at present pitifully meagre and perhaps, as individuals, none too bright even in a free capitalist India, but they could be immensely increased if they would stand together as a united middle class and fight for power in the name of religion. If Pakistan were achieved, they would have an opportunity of investing their money, of dominating commerce, the professions and government service, and of raising tariffs to foster their own industries. That is why the League is most vocal and strongest in the provinces where Muslims are in a minority but economically fairly strong. Where the Muslims are in a majority and constitute the masses the League is not so strong because Muslims of those provinces are as a whole preoccupied with economic questions and the religious cry of the League does not appeal to them overmuch though they cannot help being impressed by its emotional appeal. In the Muslim majority provinces the majority of the Muslims belong to the rank of have-nots. Their only hope lies in a reconstruction of society which would secure to them a more human standard of life. This accounts for the strength in Bengal of the Proja Party which entered the legislature with a programme of the abolition of the permanent settlement and landlordism. This accounts for the strength in the Punjab of the Unionist Party which has a programme of helping backward areas and backward classes and reducing the burden of indebtedness. This accounts for

the strength in the N.-W.F.P. of Red Shirts who have a radical social and economic programme. This also accounts for the Congress and Allah Baksh combination against the League in Sind. The religious appeal of the League has been successful in preventing attention being directed to the specific demands and grievances of the proletariat and the peasantry but the demand for adult franchise might easily raise such issues and thus destroy the very basis of the power of the League and probably that is the reason why Mr. Jinnah has repeatedly said that India is unfit for democracy.

The acceptance of Pakistan as its goal destroys the very basis of the League. Hitherto the League stressed the identity of interests of all Muslims in India irrespective of their economic, political and geographical differences. Pakistan marks a belated recognition that such interests are in fact different. Programmes and policies for Muslims in areas where they are in a majority will be different from those in areas where they are in a minority. In the one case, they must undertake the responsibility of administration and offer safeguards and protection to the minorities in their charge. In the other, they must themselves seek safeguards against possible oppression by a hostile majority. The League has thus abjured by implication, if not directly, its accepted creed till now that Muslim interests are indivisible and identical for the whole of India. It follows that the League as at present constituted with a preponderance of Muslims from outside Pakistan should cease to exist. The Council of the All-India Muslim League consists of the following members: Delhi : 15, U. P. : 70, Punjab : 90, Bombay : 30, Sind : 25, Madras : 20, N.-W.F.P. : 20, Baluchistan : 65, Bengal : 100, Bihar : 30, Orissa : 10, Assam : 25, C. P. and Berar : 25, Ajmer : 5. In other words, out of a total of 465 members the North-West (Pakistan) has only 140 representatives or 30 per cent of the total, and the Eastern State has another 100 representatives or both together a little over half of the total. It is but logical that the All-India Muslim League largely represents minority Muslim provinces and has no right to exist as such and, indeed in 1940, Chaudhary Rahmat Ali rightly said : "We must scrap the All-India Muslim

League as such and create instead an alliance of the nations of Pakistan, Bengal and Usmanistan. For this alone would set the final seal on our separation from 'India', inspire the Millat, and impress the world as nothing else would."

Can it be said that the so-called constituent units of Pakistan really desire a union? The North-West region is, undoubtedly, an extensive tract, but apart from this and a common religion of a majority of the inhabitants there is nothing that is common. There are at least five distinct and separate languages spoken within this area; and historically it can hardly be claimed that as a territorial unit it has ever been one unit detached from the rest of India. Those who will constitute this State, the Sikhs, the Hindus, the Muslims, the Pathans, the Punjabees, the Baluchis, the Sindhis and the Kashmiris have bitter memories of each others' dealings in the not very distant past. More recently the spirit of provincialism has been significantly strong, as may be noticed from the resentment in Sind, Bahawalpur, Kashmir and N.-W.F.P. against the Punjab on account of its large representation in their services to the detriment of their own people, in the same way as at one time the Punjab resented the presence of the Bengalee element in their services. In the N.-W.F.P. the Khudai Khidmatgar movement is a strong Pathan nationalist movement which will militate against domination by the Punjab. Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh once remarked: "The N.-W.F.P., Baluchistan and Sind which now enjoy comfortable majorities in autonomous provinces helped by the Centre financially and on the matter of defence, would not care to exchange their present position for a minority in another unit, though overwhelmingly Muslim."¹ The Punjabees would, for somewhat different reasons, refuse to be included in Pakistan. The Punjabees would never agree to be financially bled white for feeding deficit provinces like N.-W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan. Further, at present the Punjab thrives on its vast share in the army, and if separation takes place, the rest of India would naturally not employ alien nationals (i.e., Pakistanis) to defend 'Hindustan'. In 1930 the Indian Infantry was

¹ *The Indian Annual Register*, Volume I, 1940, page 326.

drawn to the extent of 58·5 per cent. from the Punjab, and although the present figures have not been made available to the public, it is supposed to be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds the total strength. Pakistan will not only cease to have any share in the army budget of India, but would have to pay for their army themselves.

Irrespective of the fact whether the people of the North-West desire Pakistan, the next question is how to bring it into existence. Pakistan is not being demanded from the Hindus because they are not in a position to concede it, it is being demanded from the British, who are still the masters of India. Are the British going to be guided by considerations for the good of the Hindus or the Muslims? Would they not be interested more in preserving their own interests? Is it not a fact that the British have alternately talked of the unity and the disunity of India as it suited their own requirements from time to time? Is it not true that the attitude of the British Government has been vacillating from one position to the other according to the exigencies of the situations and imperial needs? When in October 1939 there were chances of Congress co-operation in the war effort, the Viceroy could "reaffirm his belief in the essential soundness of the 1935 Act", (which means a federation and a strong democratic Central Government), but on 8th August 1940 when the war had progressed unfavourably and the chances of Congress co-operation had receded he said that it "could no longer serve the purpose for which it was originally designed," and the next step did not exclude an examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it was based, and added that "it goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in Indian national life. Nor could they be parties to coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government." In order to postpone transfer of power (contemplated in the idea of federation and democratic parliamentary self-government) Mr. Amery in his speech on August 14, 1940, while approving of

the Pakistan resolution of the League said: "It may, indeed, prove to be the case, it is by entirely novel departures from the existing scheme that an agreement may be reached, which is unattainable within the framework of the existing Act." On 18th November, 1941, he said: "Rightly or wrongly, the experience of Provincial Self-Government on British parliamentary lines has convinced the Muslims and the States that they cannot submit to any Central Government for India in which the executive is directly dependent on a parliamentary majority, which if provincial experience is any guide would be an obedient mouthpiece of the Congress High Command." Finally, Cripps proposals conceded Pakistan in principle. The tide turned when C. Rajagopalachariar led a movement for settlement with the League on the basis of Pakistan. He met Mr. Jinnah and thought there were reasonable chances of settlement and wanted to interview Mahatma Gandhi, then in internment, but Government refused permission.

The speech of the Viceroy on December 17, 1942, to the Associated Chambers of Commerce, Calcutta, however, emphasized the need for maintaining the geographical unity of India and the necessity of a strong Central Government. He let it be understood that the British were unfavourable to separatism because if India spoke with two voices, she would not be able to play her part effectively at international discussions. Recently, British solicitude for the unity of India has increased in proportion to the prospects of a Hindu-Muslim settlement on the basis of partition. Lord Wavel in his speech to joint Legislatures in 1944 while recognising the existence of a separatist movement urged the continuance of a united India. "No man can change Geography," he said.

The motive behind the British support for Pakistan was tactical rather than genuine and was the same which inspired the partition of Bengal. It is most unrealistic for some Muslims to believe that the British would support Pakistan not for the advantages that would accrue to them (the British) but for the benefit of Muslims. The fact is that the Pakistan scheme has created and will further create a countrywide

agitation which would embitter the feelings of the people, and estrange a large number of Muslims from the struggle for freedom. It has frustrated the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly and has created anti-Congress feelings in the Muslim majority provinces where the League was the weakest and non-communal parties the strongest, *i.e.* Sind, N.-W.F. P., Punjab and Bengal. It has intensified internal quarrels and wounded non-Muslim feelings and made Hindus acutely antagonistic to Muslims. In the present struggle it needs to be recalled by Muslims that the annulment of the partition of Bengal clearly showed the result of the dependence of one community upon a foreign Government for support against sister communities. It also showed that the British are not genuinely interested in helping either one or the other community except in order to perpetuate the struggle between the two communities.

It has been repeated by Mr. Jinnah on several occasions that the British are not honest in their solicitude for the Muslims and whatever regard they show for Muslims is in the interest of their traditional policy of "divide and rule." In other words, the British do not desire a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem and if one became imminent by acceptance of partition as a solution they would try their best to prevent it. It follows that if Pakistan is a solution of the communal problem, the British in their own interest would not desire it, and they would join hands with the Hindus, who are opposed to it, thereby making it difficult for Muslims to fight on two fronts. If Muslims wish to achieve Pakistan it would be easier for them to wrest it from the Hindus alone than from the Hindus and the British combined. It is, therefore, inopportune for the Muslims to raise the cry of Pakistan at this stage. { They should first co-operate with the Hindus to expel the British and then demand Pakistan from their countrymen. The insistence at this stage on the acceptance of the principle of Pakistan as a condition precedent to any form of settlement is proving harmful both to the Muslims demand for Pakistan as well as to India as a whole. The absence of some form of national

government affords the fullest scope to British Imperialism economically to exploit the country in a most unscrupulous manner and if the Muslim League continues to persist in its present attitude till the end of the war, all possible chances of co-operation with non-Muslims on economic and other issues would be lost and the British would in the meantime not only cripple the movement for freedom but would also create economic fetters for the whole country which it would be difficult to break. It is, therefore, imperative that even if the Muslim League does not give up its ideal of Pakistan that ideal should not stand in the way of an interim war-time co-operation with other parties without prejudice to the ultimate partition of India. On the other hand, if Pakistan is not a solution of the communal problem, then it is a folly to demand it.

It is possible that considerations of foreign policy may ultimately cause the British Government to concede or as appears more likely since the termination of the war in the west and the aggrandisement of the U. S. S. R. to refuse partition. Whatever it may be, the British will certainly not incur the wrath of the three-fourths of India to please the Muslims of the North-West. If so, the demand for Pakistan is likely to raise false hopes which may never be fulfilled and instead only fill the country with religious fanaticism and bitterness which can easily be avoided. By raising the Pakistan issue, are Muslims not making a negative move, and weakening the existing offensive by diverting public interest from the main antagonism—"Britain *versus* India?" Apart from the fact that Pakistan would be harmful both to Muslims and Hindus, the demand for Pakistan postpones the day of India's political deliverance. The British are using and will continue to use the difference of opinion on the Pakistan issue to postpone transfer of power in the same way as differences of opinion on communal safeguards have enabled the British to withhold Reforms from time to time.

The British would let the threat of separation always hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of the Congress in order to restrain it from doing anything harmful to

Imperial interests in India. When the British find the threat unprofitable they would, in the last resort, carry out separation partly as a measure to save their interests, at least in as much of the country as may be possible by this method (*i.e.* North-West India), and partly as a further threat to the Congress in order to restrain it from breaking the British connection altogether. British commercial interests in the rest of India could be saved by threatening retaliation through the Muslim States in the North-West and North-East of India. The separation, as a weapon of coercion against the Congress, will create another Ulster, and the Muslims will not achieve independence. That the British want to use Hindu-Muslim antagonism for retaining a firm hold on a part of India and thereby keep it in partial subjection is clear from the Cripps proposals which said: "His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to the right of *any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position*, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so desires. With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution, giving them the same full status as the Indian Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down."

Considering the economic weakness and strategic vulnerability of Pakistan British domination in Pakistan would accordingly become more or less a permanent feature, and they might even use Pakistan as a spring-board to create trouble for the rest of India and thereby prevent India from achieving full independence. Pakistan would become another Egypt and whatever independence it would have, if even that, would be only in name. Pakistan will never be an *ex gratia* gift from the magnanimous British, but only the conditional transfer of limited power. Burma did not become free because it was separated from India. Aden did not become free because it was taken away from the control of the Government of India.

To believe that other Muslim countries will come to the aid of Pakistan to help them against the British is to ignore facts. Turkey is far off and has no desire to indulge in Pan-Islamic activities outside its borders. Egypt is equally far off, weak and impotent and dominated by the British. Persia is threatened by both Russia and Britain and is hard put to maintain its own independence. Afghanistan is weak, lacks resources in men and materials and is incapable of giving any effective help. If anything Afghanistan would like to have access to the sea through the port of Karachi by annexing the whole of Baluchistan and Sind. There is no Pan-Islamic sentiment left which would urge Muslim countries to come to the aid of Pakistan. Afghanistan is going to go the path of secularisation as Iran and Turkey have done and all of them have enough to do within their own territories to have any extra-territorial ambitions. Indian Muslims have only to recall the horrors of the Hijrat Movement during the Khilafat agitation to realize how empty Pan-Islamism proved and how unwelcome they were to the Afghans. Some fervent advocates of the partition of India believe that the Pakistan solution has made an irresistible appeal to the Pan-Islamic feelings of the Indian Musalmans and the establishment of Pakistan would bring their dream of a Muslim Confederacy of the Islamic countries in the Near East within the range of practical politics. The truth of the matter is that the *Weltanschauung* (world vision) of Pakistan is antiquated and out of date. The Ottoman Empire which combined in the Khalif, the Emperor and the High Priest foundered on the rock of nationalism. Even after the rebirth of Turkey under Ataturk no attempt was made to unite the Arab States. Ataturk said: "Islam is not only a religion but also a fatherland."

The rivalry of the Middle Eastern States and their inability to come together even in the face of danger proves that to the Muslims of the Near and Middle East their separate political identity as Turks or Persians, Afghans or Egyptians, Arabs or Syrians is more important than their

community of faith. This fact is even more pronounced in China and Russia. The accent has shifted from religion to territorial nationalism. The days of theocratic states are gone. In the modern world of nation-states, a theocratic state will always be at a disadvantage. And today in a world governed by "Real Politik" where and how can any Islamic State find that "perfect isolation" needed "for its development"? The existence of a theocratic state postulates a world revolution on Islamic lines which is now an impossibility.¹ In the context of the military and political forces of today, Pakistan is an impossible adventure. To refuse to learn from the fate of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan is to mortgage the future of 90,000,000 men so that a few may get the chance of playing with politics. Far from sounding the tocsin of Islamic imperium, Pakistan, once

¹ "There is another point," says Professor Coupland, "on which the ideology of Partition seems out of date. The nationalism it preaches is based on religion. It is because they are Moslems that the Moslems of India are entitled to political independence. It is because they are Moslems that the trend of their future international associations should be turned away from India and towards the Middle East. Such ideas are the natural outcome of the old Islamic philosophy of life in which Church and State were indivisible. Not long ago they were a commonplace of the Moslem world. But one of the most remarkable results of the war of 1914-18 was the change it brought about in Moslem political thought. For the new tide of nationalism which it set running through all the Moslem countries from Morocco to Afghanistan was not dominated by religious fanaticism. If it was directed against Christian Governments it was not primarily associated with the notion of a 'holy war'. How far the Moslems in their desire to be free from European domination had adopted the European conception of the national State was finally demonstrated by events in Turkey. The dramatic recovery of the Turks from the disaster and humiliations of the war was followed by the fall of the Ottoman Sultanate, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, and the complete secularisation of the Turkish State. Thus political Pan-Islamism was deprived at a stroke of its main foundations. In other Moslem countries—in Egypt, Persia, Iraq, Syria—nationalism, though nowhere so secularist as in Turkey, assumed a similar Western complexion. Observers in the West began to ask if the words 'Islamic World' had not lost their political meaning, if the role of Islam in

separated from the rest of India will become a pawn in the struggle of the Great Powers. The Versailles Treaty formed petty "nation states" and now all of them were wiped off the map of Europe. Independently of Hitler's ambitions Austria could not exist as a separate economic unit, and in any case would have had to be united with Germany. Some small European States have found it impossible to develop their resources without financial help from other countries, e.g., U.S.A. The present age is not the age of small nationalities, it is the age of Great Powers. Pakistan in the stress of the modern world will not meet an imperial destiny but a vassal's fate. Some Muslims are thinking of bringing back the conditions which existed before sea-power (wielded by the British) changed them, when India was dependant on Central Asia (Afghanistan and Turkestan), from which raiding armies and conquerors swept down. This is obviously impossible and completely disregards modern political, economic, technical and military developments.

Moslem countries was not destined sooner or later to be assimilated to that of the Churches in Christian countries.

Indian Moslems can scarcely have forgotten the reaction of those developments on Indian politics. The Caliphate movement, in which the left-wing Moslems combined with Mr. Gandhi, and the Congress against the British Government, was completely exploded by the abolition of the Caliphate. Yet in inverting the dictum of *Cujus regio, ejus religio*, in looking forward to creating a political nexus between Pakistan and the Moslem countries of the Middle East, still more in extending the idea of a consolidated Moslem zone to embrace the Dutch East Indies, are not the partitionists inviting a repetition of what happened twenty years ago? If Pan-Islamism was dead then, can it be resuscitated now? Can the philosophy of the Caliphate movement be revived without a Caliph? Are Moslems at Ankara or Cairo or Bagdad likely to feel that their political interests are closely linked with the prospects of Pakistan? The members of the Turkish Press Mission which visited India early in 1943 were reported to have shown scant interest in or sympathy with the Pan-Islamic aspirations of the Indian Moslem League, thinking these to be anachronistic."

—(*The Future of India*, 1944.)

The chief *raison d'être* of the Pakistan scheme is that it solves the communal problem, and yet it has been admitted by Mr. Jinnah himself that this would not be so. That the so-called two nations will continue to plague India even after partition is evident from the following conversation with Mr. Jinnah reported by Edward Thompson: "Two nations, Mr. Jinnah! confronting each other in every Province? Every town? Every village?"

"Two nations confronting each other in every province. Every town. Every village. That is the only solution."

"That is a very terrible solution, Mr. Jinnah!"

"It is a terrible solution. But it is the only one."¹

Pakistan would not put an end to the Hindu-Muslim problem, or the problem of safeguarding the rights and interests of Muslims and other minorities. Partition, far from solving them, would complicate them and bring no balm for the sores of the body politic but pour upon them acids of disintegration and strife. The example of Ulster, the often quoted precedent, must not be forgotten. "The partition did not solve the minority problem, since while the Protestant minority of 6 per cent in Eire may acquiesce in the regime, the same cannot be said of the Catholic minority of 33 per cent in Northern Ireland."² Pakistan far from clearing the inter-communal atmosphere will thicken the miasma of misunderstandings, open a prospective of hate and fear, and intensify her political and social malaise. "If a federal State cannot solve the problem of minority safeguards within its component autonomous units, what guarantee is there that two independent federations will succeed any better in solving them?"³ On the contrary, with

¹ *Enlist India for Freedom*, page 52, 1941.

² *The Future of India*, R. Coupland, 1943, page 15.

³ On the other hand, Dr. Latif's recognition (as also the recognition implied in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940) of the principle of safeguards to be religiously followed both in Hindu and Muslim zones cuts at the root of his argument about its inapplicability to the "cultural safeguards"

powerful minorities in each, the risk of constant friction between the two federations cannot be ruled out. This is bound not only to lead to undesirable repercussions within each of the two federations but also to provide cause to powerful foreign States for intervention in the internal affairs of the federations as well as their component units.”¹

Pakistan would merely reproduce on a smaller scale the very problem which it claims to set out to solve. The scheme that does most for reducing the total figure of communal minorities is “A Punjabi’s” *Confederacy of India*; it would leave as minorities 58·6 millions, of whom 29 millions would be Muslims. The Aligarh Scheme (of Zafar-ul-Hasan and Qadri) would leave about 70 millions, whom 28·1 would be Muslims. In an undivided India, there are 79·3 millions in the communal minority of Muslims. What these proposals would achieve, therefore, is not the partition of India along communal lines, but the distribution of communal minorities and majorities. The *Confederacy of India* Scheme would create a separate Muslim Bengal Federation with a Muslim population of 66·4 per cent. and the Aligarh Scheme visualizes Pakistan with 60·3 per cent. Muslims, and “Bengal” with 57 per cent. Muslims. In short, Muslim federations will have 40 per cent or more of non-Muslim populations. According to the much vaunted principle of self-determination, how can one visualize a Pakistan with non-Muslim minorities of 40 per cent. or more? Surely, the Pakistanis ought to be the first to let these minorities secede back to ‘Hindu’ India.’

If the principle of separation is logically pursued then promised in the Congress resolution on Fundamental Rights adopted at Karachi in 1931. If an individual or group or groups of individuals can be guaranteed safety of cultural individuality in the future Federation of India as adumbrated in Dr. Latif’s pamphlet, *The Cultural Future of India*, it is difficult to understand why the 60 or 70 lakhs of Muslims at present living in the U. P. cannot live securely under the same or identical guarantees, and the one crore and more of Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab. If the principle is valid in the case of a few, it can be or ought to be valid in the case of millions.

¹*Muslim Politics*—Humayun Kabir—1943, pages 24-25.

predominating Sikh areas should be excluded from the Punjab. This is almost impossible. Of the six million Sikhs in all India, 3·8 million are domiciled in the Punjab and 1·4 million in the Punjab States. The geographical situation of the Sikh area in the Punjab is such that they cannot be easily excluded from it in the same way as Ambala Division. Their exclusion cannot be effected without sacrificing a large number of Muslims because the Sikhs are dispersed all over the province and there is not a single district where they are in a clear majority, but in some districts Sikhs, although small in number as against the Muslims, compared to their own population in other districts, are sufficiently strong. The important shrines of the Sikhs are in the Central Punjab and if this was to be excluded, it would mean the exclusion also of the Muslim intelligentsia, which incidentally is concentrated in this area, the best soil in the entire Indus regions. After their exclusion, a federation of the remaining Muslim tracts will be a federation of the sandy tracts of Bahawalpur and Khairpur States, barren and rocky soil of Rawalpindi Division, sandy stretch and colony areas of the Multan Division, which are already becoming water logged, poor soil of N.-W. F. P., and the sand dunes of Baluchistan and Sind. The Sikh-Muslim question will, therefore, remain and in fact will become more acute because the exclusion of Eastern Hindu tracts of Ambala Division will raise the percentage of Sikhs (in the Punjab excluding the States) from 12·9 per cent. to 15 per cent. The Sikh-Muslim problem will be an acute problem. The typical Sikh is reputed for his energy, toughness, courage, and great fighting qualities. The Sikh community is well organized and rich and since the British seized the Punjab from them less than a hundred years ago, they still have memories and hopes of Sikh rule in the Punjab. The relations of the Sikhs and Muslims, before the annexation, were embittered and there was strong distrust on both sides, and eventually the Muslims welcomed the British as liberators from the tyranny of *Sikhashahi* rule.

The Sikhs are opposed to partition. The advocates of Pakistan say that the rights and interests of Muslims of Pakistan cannot be allowed to be trampled underfoot in a federation which is bound to be dominated by the non-Muslims, merely because a minority take it into their head to oppose it. This argument is fallacious because the Hindus can say that the rights and interests of 75 per cent population of India cannot be allowed to be disregarded for the sake of a minority of 25 per cent. or even less because the Muslims of Pakistan (N.-W. F P., Sind, the Punjab, Baluchistan) are only $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. or including Bengal are only $11\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total population of India. Sikhs demand from Muslims what Muslims demand from Hindus.

Mr. Jinnah, of course, has been well aware from the outset of his campaign that of the many problems raised by Partition the Sikh problem is one of the most thorny ; and a few days after the passing of the Lahore resolution he made a public statement expressing his respect for the Sikh community and his conviction that it had nothing to fear from Pakistan, and added : "It is obvious that, whereas in a United India they would be mere nobodies, in the Muslim homeland...the Sikhs would always occupy an honoured place and would play an effective and influential role." But the Sikhs are more concerned with their position in North-West India than in India as a whole, and it is the prospect of a Muslim, not of a Hindu, Raj that alarms them. Their reaction to Pakistan as conceived by the Muslim League is the exact counterpart of the Muslim's reaction to a Union of India as conceived by the Congress. Just as the Muslims, remembering the Moghul Empire, refuse to be subjected to a permanent Hindu majority at an all-India Centre, so the Sikhs remembering that only a century ago they ruled the Punjab, refuse to become a permanent minority in Pakistan. Thus, when Sir Stafford Cripps submitted the British Government's proposals in 1942 to various party leaders, the Sikh All-Parties Committee was the first to reject them, on the ground that the option of non-adherence to an all-India

constitution was to be exercised only by majorities in the Provinces. 'Our position in the Punjab', they declared, 'has been finally liquidated... Why should not the population of any area be given the right to record its verdict and to form an autonomous unit? We shall resist by all possible means separation of the Punjab from All-India Union.'

It seems probable, that rather than allow themselves to become a minority in an independent Muslim State, the Sikhs would insist on their own right of self-determination, and would demand that the area in which they are mainly settled, including the Sikh States, should be separated from the Punjab and become—since it could scarcely form an independent State by itself—a province of the neighbouring Hindu State. Is that a practicable proposition? At first sight such a bisection of the Punjab seems natural enough. The two Western Divisions (Rawalpindi and Multan) are overwhelmingly Muslim. The two Eastern Divisions (Ambala and Jullundur) are substantially non-Muslim. The Central Division (Lahore) is mixed: its three western districts (Sialkot, Gujranwala and Sheikhupura) have a Muslim majority; in the three eastern districts (Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Lahore) Muslims and non-Muslims are roughly equal. It would seem, therefore, to meet the needs of the case the Province might be divided into two roughly equal parts by a line drawn from north to south through the Central Division. But to determine exactly where that line should run is far from easy. The two principal cities of the Punjab, Lahore, the administrative capital, and Amritsar, the commercial capital and sacred city of the Sikhs, are both situated in the middle of the Province between the rivers Ravi and Beas and only thirty-five miles distant from each other. To fix the boundary at either of the rivers is plainly impossible: it would mean the inclusion of both cities in either the Muslim or the Hindu State. Between the two cities there is no natural dividing line of any kind. Any boundary set between them would be wholly artificial, geographically, ethnographically and economically. *Inter alia* it would cut in two the system of canals

on which the productive capacity of the whole area largely depends. It would also leave the capital city of each province exposed and defenceless, right up against the frontier. Such an artificial dividing line, despite its obvious disadvantages, might serve, if it were to be merely the boundary between two provinces in a single federal State. Administrative difficulties, such as that of the canals, might in that case be overcome. But it is no mere inter-provincial boundary that is contemplated. It is to be a regular international frontier between two separate independent national States.

The exclusion of the Sikh areas from Pakistan thus appears so difficult as to be well-nigh impossible. And the Sikhs seem determined to fight, if need be, rather than stay as a minority in a Punjab that would be a province of Pakistan. The Muslim partitionists for their part have continued to assume that no more than the Ambala Division would be cut away and that somehow or other the Sikhs might be persuaded to acquiesce; and Mr. Jinnah still maintains that an understanding can be reached provided that the problem is treated as a local problem for Muslims and Sikhs and not complicated by the intervention of all-India influence from outside. On what lines he hopes to base such an understanding is not known. It seems at present as if the attitude of the Sikhs is a major obstacle to the realisation of Pakistan. That they could be coerced into it seems unthinkable. To attempt coercion would mean a civil war, and a war which, once it had broken out, could certainly not be confined to North-West India.

"As regards North-East India," says Professor Coupland, "the partitionists assume that Assam, which was linked with Eastern Bengal when the old Province was divided between 1905 and 1911, will similarly form part of the Muslim State, and that Western Bengal (*i.e.*, the Burdwan Division) will be excluded from it. The population figures in 1941 were as

follows :—

		<i>Total</i> (000)	<i>Muslims</i> (000)	<i>Muslim</i> <i>percentages</i>
Bengal	...	60,037	33,005	54·72
Eastern Bengal	...	50,020	31,575	63·12
Western Bengal	...	10,287	1,430	13·9
Assam	...	10,205	3,442	33·72

“It will be observed that only about one third of the population of Assam is Muslim. Only in the district of Sylhet, where the Muslim percentage is 61, is there a Muslim majority. If Partition were voted on by Provinces and if it were carried by a majority in Bengal, the position of Assam would be very difficult. If its geographical situation were different, its Hindu majority would presumably choose to adhere to the Hindu State. But the geography being what it is, would such a division be practicable? Could Assam exist as a detached Province of the Hindu State, completely cut off from it by Moslem Bengal, with no access of its own to the sea, and with a frontier of which the danger has been revealed in the present war?

“The exclusion of Western Bengal raises again the question of self-determination for a provincial minority; for Bengal has long acquired a kind of nationality of its own, based on the Bengali language and an old and rich literary and artistic tradition, and centred both culturally and economically on Calcutta. The Hindu agitation against the partition of the Province in 1905 was so violent that, despite the assurance that had been given to the Moslems, the Province was reunited in 1911. Can it be assumed, then, that the eight million Hindus of Western Bengal would choose, if they had the choice, to be severed from their motherland? *Bande Mataram* was a Bengali patriotic song before the Congress adopted it as an all-India ‘national anthem’—and grouped in a separate Hindu state with the Hindi or Bihari-speaking people of Bihar and the Oriya-speaking people of Orissa? Above all, is it to be supposed that they would willingly be cut off from Calcutta?

"Just as the Sikhs are the crux of Pakistan, so Calcutta is the crux of North-East India. In both cases the Partitionists apparently take inclusion in the Moslem State for granted. Yet the population of Calcutta and its neighbourhood is predominantly Hindu. The city itself contains 1,531,512 Hindus, 79,844 other non-Muslims, and 497,535 Moslems. It lies in the Twenty-four Parganahs District, which, excluding the city, contains 2,309,996 Hindus, 78,210 other non-Moslems, and 1,143,180 Moslems. Thus both in the city and in the district, the proportion is over two to one in favour of non-Moslems. And this balance is reflected in the city's cultural and commercial life. All Bengalis, whether Moslem or Hindu, may well be proud of the fact that Calcutta both in culture and commerce is the queen of Indian cities, but in both, apart from the great contribution of British enterprise to the latter, the Hindu share predominates. Moslems have substantial business interests in the area, but the Hindu interests are unquestionably greater. There is a Moslem College in the huge University of Calcutta, but the great majority of the 37,000 students in University as a whole are Hindus. Communal discord has long been provoked by the fact that a Hindu-majority city is the capital of a Moslem-majority Province. Would it not be greatly aggravated and exacerbated if it became the capital of a Moslem State cut away from Western Bengal and the rest of Hindu India? Would not such an arrangement beget at least as much bitterness and friction as any article of the Treaty of Versailles has begotten in Europe? The trouble at Danzig, Vilna and Lvov was caused in each case by the association of the majority of their local populations with a foreign State. Yet, deprived of Calcutta, North-East India would become a rather dubious proposition. For economic reasons, it could not maintain itself as a separate independent State. It could only exist as a detached and backward Province of Pakistan, separated from it since a corridor across the breadth of Hindu India is plainly impracticable—by more than 800 miles of land and air and more than 2,500 miles

of sea.”¹

In order to make populations more homogeneous, territorial adjustments have been suggested. The exclusion of Ambala Division from the Punjab means the exclusion of 3,099,000 Hindus, 240,000 Sikhs and 1,138,000 Muslims, thereby raising the Muslim majority from 57.1% to 62.7%. North-East India is to comprise most of Bengal and Assam, the territorial adjustment in this case being the exclusion of the Hindu-majority districts which constitute the Burdwan Division in Western Bengal. This Division contains 8,125,185 Hindus and 1,429,500 Muslims. By their exclusion the present Muslim majority of 54.7% in Bengal would be raised to 65%. The proposed exclusion, to begin with, of those Hindu-majority districts from the Muslim State would seem to deny them the right of self-determination enjoyed by their neighbours. Can it be taken for granted, for example, that the people of Ambala Division would prefer to belong to the U. P. rather than remain within the Punjab?

It is arguable if the increase of Muslim majority is the best way of dealing with the communal problem. Until quite recently its Moslem leaders have maintained that the fact that the balance is not too uneven has made for communal harmony rather than against it. The majority report of the Punjab Provincial Committee, which was appointed in 1928 to co-operate with the Simon Commission, affirmed that any large disparity between the communities in the present circumstances is undesirable in the interests of the province and good government. “As the communities are at present balanced,” it went on, “there is not even a remote chance for any one community to form a cabinet on communal lines.”²

¹ It has been suggested that in the event of Partition, Calcutta should be given a separate autonomous status akin to that of Delhi Province. This would doubtless ease the communal position—though Danzig is again a discouraging precedent—and such a compromise would be clearly better for North-East India than the inclusion of Calcutta in the Hindu State; but it would still inflict on North-East India an irreparable economic loss.

² *Indian Statutory Commission* Vol. III, pages 410-411.

Partition, whatever its frontier lines, will not abolish the communal problem. With Ambala gone there would still be 8·8 million non-Muslims in the Punjab. It is natural enough that the Muslims should welcome the idea of increasing their majority in the Province, but would they find it easier to deal with the minorities if their traditional policy was abandoned and the existing balance of communities upset?

According to the scheme prepared by the Foreign Sub-Committee of the All-India Muslim League in 1940 to implement the League Resolution, the Northern Muslim zone was to consist of the Punjab, Sind, N.-W.F.P., Baluchistan and Delhi province which arrangement would give the Muslims a majority of 63%, and with States federating or confederating only 61·54% majority. The North-Eastern State consisting of Assam and Bengal (excluding Bankura and Midnapur Districts) and the district of Purnea from Bihar would give a majority of 54% which with the Bengal States would be reduced to 53·15%. By this arrangement two Muslim zones would give protection to 74·07% of the Muslim population of India. This naturally raises the question if Pakistan will be able to protect Muslim minorities from the "oppression" of accentuated "Hindu India"? Ultimately they will have to fall back either on the Hindus or on an alien power. What special safeguards and special protection can you give them? If the protection and safeguards under the Communal Award are not sufficient, then what more assurances and safeguards can you give these Muslim minorities? Would not the Hindus insist that they would agree to Pakistan on condition that in 'Hindustan' the duality of culture and nationality are given up in order to enable Hindus to enjoy fully the right of self-expression in the Hindu State? Thus the brunt of the separation will fall on the Muslims outside Pakistan. It is safely forgotten that the communal problem does not concern so much the Muslims of those parts where they form a majority (and on account can look after themselves).¹

¹ At present 74% of the Muslim population is under "Muslim Government," and 26% under "Hindu Government." The corresponding figures for Hindus are 19% and 81%. Also, 22% of the Hindu voters are under "Muslim Government"; and 23·6% Muslim voters are under "Hindu Government."

as it concerns the Muslim minorities from Delhi, Lucknow, Patna downwards to Cape Comorin, who would be rendered eternal orphans under Mr. Jinnah's plans. Besides, Hyderabad, the stronghold of Muslim culture and rallying point for the Indian Muslims, will be permanently segregated from the current of Muslim life in India, and, who knows eventually smothered for ever. A solution of the minority problem has been suggested by Mr. Jinnah, who says: "The non-Muslim minorities will be given full protection with regard to their religion, language and culture like Muslim minorities in Hindu India, and will no longer cause unnecessary annoyance to Muslim Government for fear of provoking Muslim minorities in Hindu India to similar action." Obviously the implication is that the hostage principle can be brought into play more effectively between independent States than between federated Provinces. In reply Savarkar is reported to have said that "when we will be in a position to retaliate and do retaliate the Muslims will come to their senses in a day. We shall not only save Hindu rights and honour in Hindu provinces but in provinces where we Hindus are in a minority, knowing that every attempt to tyrannize the Hindu is sure to recoil on themselves and react for the worse on Muslim interests in all India—the Muslims will learn to behave as good boys." This argument is fallacious. Even today there are four Muslim majority provinces, yet if the story of oppression broadcast by the Muslim League in minority provinces is partially true, what protection have the minorities received on account of their co-religionists being in a majority in other provinces? The whole theory of retaliation has a wrong psychological basis. And even if it was correct the idea of treating minorities as hostages for the fair treatment of one's co-religionists in another State implies clear shift of the basis of politics from civilization to barbarism.

The crux of the matter is that whatever the demarcation of boundaries there would be a substantial Hindu minority in predominantly Muslim areas and an appreciable Muslim minority in predominantly Hindu areas. In order to make populations religiously more homogeneous, exchange of

populations has been suggested on the analogy of exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece at the end of the last Great War. While the precedent is frequently quoted, it is safely forgotten that it concerned Greeks (orthodox church) who went and settled in Anatolia, and Turks (Muslims) who had gone and settled in Greece, while Hindus and Muslims are racially in no way different to each other and both have lived together in this country for about a thousand years, the conversions from one religion to another taking place from time to time during their common history. It is also forgotten that the exchange concerned only 1,300,000 Greeks and 400,000 Turks, and no less than £10,000,000 were spent by Greece alone in settling their repatriates, and their country was underpopulated and possessed the potentially rich territories of Western Thrace and Macedonia.¹ Pakistan, on the other hand, can in no way be said to be underpopulated, nor has it the financial resources for meeting the cost of an exchange of population. An added difficulty would be that the Hindus of Ambala Division who are mostly Jat agriculturists will have to be replaced by Muslims from minority provinces who are engaged in commercial and industrial occupations, which have no counterparts in the Punjab, and would find it extremely difficult to adjust themselves to an agricultural economy. It should be remembered that Indians, largely Muslims, have preferred to continue to live in South Africa under the most humiliating conditions rather than return to India and be economically badly off. The exchange of populations has never been officially emphasized by the All-India Muslim League but some writers have advocated it with misgivings while others have advocated it with the greatest possible boldness. Dr. Latif in *Muslim Problems in India* wanted an exchange of populations involving nearly two-thirds of the total population of India, uprooting humanity on a scale unattempted in history which would cause popular opposition and tremendous misery.² Even if a Pharaonic *tour de force* was not contemplated, the diversity

¹ *Survey of International Affairs—1925—Volume II*, page 259.

² He has since recanted and now recognizes that under Indian conditions an exchange of populations is unthinkable.

between the people of various parts of India is so great, that an exchange of population on even a smaller scale would not be acceptable to the people concerned. People of different provinces have their own language, dress, culture, and social usage, and live in the climate and under economic conditions peculiar to their respective provinces. They would strongly object to going to a different province even if it meant going to a province with a preponderance of their co-religionists. Both Hindus and Muslims in rural areas cling to and are deeply attached to their land, neighbours and local shrines and temples and would be loath to migrate to a different territory. On the other hand, some of the most important Muslim shrines such as those of Mueen-ud-Din Chishti and Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din are situated in Hindu India and the Muslims would not like to be deprived of free access to them. In U. P. alone the Aligarh Muslim University, Deoband, Azamgarh and many other places are the centres of Muslim religion and culture while Roorki, Banda and other places are sacred to Muslim memory. The Indian peasants like peasants anywhere are reputed to be thoroughly conservative in such matters even to the extent of foregoing better economic prospects. The socio-religious life in rural areas is deeply rooted in their environment. This being so an exchange of population on any large scale in India is unthinkable. Numbers and distance alike forbid it. Mass-transfer would involve not hundreds of thousands but millions or tens of millions, and in many cases it would mean an unbearable change of climate and of all the ways of life which climate has dictated. Nor would it bring about in India, as it could in the Balkans, the union of homogeneous folk. The transferred multitudes would find themselves among peoples of different stock, speaking a language they would not be able to understand. It would be like a wholesale migration of French Protestants to Norway. During the stormy days of the 17th and 18th century when the Central power was shaken to the bottom, there grew up several independent petty States, some of which were ruled by Hindu princes and some by Muslim princes. Just as there were many Muslim subjects in Hindu States, so also there were many

Hindu subjects in Muslim States. And the subjects stood faithfully and loyally by their rulers and fought against the rulers of their co-religionists. But the idea of interchange of populations on religious lines never occurred to them. Mr. Jinnah perhaps realizes all this or at least realizes that for whatever reasons Muslims would strongly resent any large scale exchange of population and therefore in a statement to the press on 1st April 1940 said : " A wrong idea and false propaganda appear to be set in motion, in order to frighten the Muslim minorities, that they would have to migrate *en bloc* and wholesale. I wish to assure my Muslim brethren that there is no justification for this insidious misrepresentation. Exchange of population, however, on the physical division of India, so far as practicable, will have to be considered." The fact is that by now Muslims all over India have expressed themselves so strongly against the idea that it has ceased to be mentioned by the League as a solution of the lack of homogeneity of the population of India. F. K. Khan Durrani, an ardent advocate of Pakistan, says : " The continued residence of these Muslims in Hindustan, even if they are exposed there to undue hardships, is indispensable for the security and well-being of Pakistan, and exchange of populations will be harmful not only to Pakistan, but also to the ultimate purpose of Islam."¹

The exchange of populations, however, does not exclude a large non-Muslim element in Pakistan. Since the League demands statutory minority rights and mandatory safeguards for Muslims in Hindu India, it follows that similar rights and safeguards will have to be conceded to Hindus in Pakistan. In other words, the existing minority problem in India would continue to hamper the evolution of an Islamic polity. It follows that if Pakistan is to miss that final consummation why vivisect India? On account of the impossibility of making any sharp division between Hindu India and Muslim India, although religion is the basic idea of the two-nation theory and Pakistan, yet it is not considered of any vital importance within Pakistan itself. "El-Hamza", for example, says : "The Pakistani Hindus are true children of the soil

¹ *The Meaning of Pakistan—1944*, page viii.

and are of the same race as their Muslim fellow-countrymen. They have a fine and liberal religion, and practise very little of the caste exclusionism and untouchability of the orthodox Aryo-Dravidian Hindu." And again, "Sikhs are typical Pakistanis. They are of pure Indo-Aryan race...the Pakistani Muslims look to their Sikh brethren for co-operation in their efforts for liberation of the fatherland."¹ Thus on this occasion racial doctrines and territorial nationalism are brought in to bolster up the idea of segregation of people belonging to two different religions and on other occasions these very principles are rejected to support the two nations theory.

Before the demand for Pakistan can be accepted or supported by the future Pakistanis, they have a perfect right to know, what Mr. Jinnah consistently refuses to tell them, namely, what Pakistan has in store for them. Geographically, what will Pakistan consist of? Will Ambala Division be excluded? Will Sikh areas be retained? Will Calcutta be included in the Eastern State? Will Pakistan be democratic (Mr. Jinnah has repeatedly said India is unfit for democracy), autocratic, socialistic, feudal or fascist? Will it be riddled with native States or would those States be liquidated? What will be the rights of a citizen of Pakistan?²

¹ *Pakistan : A Nation*—1941, page 52.

² When, in 1942, Dr. Khan Sahib's daughter married a Christian officer of the Indian Air Force, the following comments appeared in the Pakistani Press : "If the criminal law of Islam be established in India, such sensualists who, for the gratification of their own carnal appetites, trample on the law of God and Islamic honour, will be, as a warning to others, publicly stoned to death and their dead bodies will be thrown in the field to feed the kites and crows. But now, when we are ruled by an infidel Government, everybody has "freedom," to do and say as he pleases, and our helplessness is so extreme that we cannot even turn out these hypocrites and vipers from Islam and Muslim society." الفرقان Bareilly, Volume 9, triple No. 3-4-5 (Rabi-ul-Awwal to Jumadi-ul-Ula—1361 A. H.) page 16. Quoted by W. C. Smith—*Modern Islam in India*—1943, page 308. Similarly, the pamphlet, *The Present Crisis in Islam and Our Future Educational Programme*, by Muhammad Fazlur Rahman [1944] elaborates an educational programme for Pakistan which is thoroughly reactionary in its tendencies and shows that in view of some of its advocates there would be no liberal education in Pakistan for Muslims nor any education for non-Muslims.

What will be the duties of a citizen of Pakistan ? Will Pakistan be theocratic or temporal ? What is meant by "Hakumat-i-Ilahia" ? Since religion is the main reason for demanding Pakistan, presumably Pakistan, will be a theocratic State. It is for the Muslims of the North-West to ask if they would like to live in a theocratic State. Would they be prepared to be ruled by Islamic law ? Would they be ready to be purged of un-Islamic influences ? Would they be prepared to give up all the influences they have developed by centuries of contact with non-Muslims ? Would they be prepared to give up customary law ? Would they be prepared to establish *Bait-ul-Mal* and regularly pay *Zakaat* ? Would the Muslims of Sind, *i.e.*, Khojas and Kuchi Memons give up Hindu law ? Would the Punjab Muslims give up the protection of the Land Alienation Act ? Would the Muslim landlords of the Punjab follow Shariah and share inheritance with their sisters rather than follow the existing infidels' system ? Would the landlords be willing to apply Shariah to agricultural land ? Has not Chaudhry Rahmat Ali warned : "Bi-nationalism is only the first half of the movement's Fundamental Creed ; they must, if they are in earnest, adopt also the other half—the de-Indianization of the Millat's territories. For only by its full adoption can the Millat be saved." In absence of answers to these questions, every person paints the future in colours most attractive to himself, and draws from the resultant picture the enthusiasm of the converts. In 1943 at the Delhi Session of the League when some members of the League Council attempted to formulate an economic programme for Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah rebuked them as Saboteurs of Pakistan and refused to allow the discussion of such resolutions. As it stands, Pakistan is negative, based on hate and fear rather than any constructive and positive ideal or programme. Once Pakistan cease to be a roseate and undefined ideal, it would at once lose its attraction for the millions who would then be obviously left out of its benefits or would not like to enjoy its benefits !

The whole history of Muslims has been a story of expansion and colonizations, physical as well as cultural. There is a fine poem of Iqbal in which Târiq, the Conqueror

of Spain, rebukes worldly-wise councillors, who plead for retreat from a foreign land on account of their numerical weakness. "Foreign land"? retorts Tariq, "where can we find a land that is foreign to God, whom as Muslims we must serve?" The contrast of this attitude with that of Mr. Jinnah and his League is too glaring to require comment. Pakistan, which is today declared to be the goal of the Muslim League, is thus against the teachings of Muslim history. It is in fact against the teaching of history in every land. No race or people have ever prospered by seeking to conserve itself. Nations as well as individuals have triumphed only when they have sought to expand themselves in all directions. Cultures live by expansion. The attempt to withdraw within narrow shelters and maintain purity or integrity has invariably resulted in decay and death. Indian Muslims can also survive only by a spirit of expansion and growth."¹

It is said by ardent advocates of Pakistan that Hindu-Muslim differences can never be resolved and the struggle for power would never cease till one party completely dominates the other or partition delimits spheres of domination. That the Hindu Mahasabha has been carrying on a virulent campaign against the Muslims is true enough but demonstrations of this character, and this applies equally to the League, arise out of the hopes which are inspired by a third dominant power interested in keeping the two apart. As long as the two communities do not exactly know what measure of authority needs to be divided between themselves they would go on clamouring for a larger share than they deserve or would accept for fear that they may not be disregarded when the time comes for their failure to pursue their claims. The art of British political manoeuvring consists in keeping the goal at a sufficient distance and thereby encourage claims and counter-claims. Hindu-Muslim settlement, therefore, will not be difficult when the British Government declares or is forced to declare the extent to which they are prepared to withdraw their authority from India. Similarly, social stagnation, which is said to be the result of perpetual civil war between the two communities,

¹ *Muslim Politics—1906-42*, Humayun Kabir—1943, pages 44-45.

would give way to internal reform as soon as the present atmosphere of antagonism disappears. It is a recognised fact that the British Government in India has since the Mutiny been opposed to social reform with the excuse that they do not wish to interfere in religious matters. In fact Government has thereby encouraged reactionary forces in each community and prevented social reform. The refusal of the Viceroy in 1933 to permit the removal of untouchability by legislation in Madras is an excellent example of how reformist elements have been defeated by Government. Another aspect of social stagnation is that the fear of denationalization on account of an alien Government prevents reforms which would otherwise have come rapidly in free India.

In the world of today economic and financial considerations are vital. Professor Behre has made a careful study of India's mineral wealth, and has come to the conclusion that "India's mineral deposits will determine in considerable measure her place in the world ; and the way in which that wealth is distributed will affect the relationship not only of each part of the country to the other parts but also of the country as a whole to the world outside. Moreover, it seems to have been demonstrated by history that any general rise in a country's standard of living affects favourably the relations between the various peoples inhabiting its component parts. As they become better fed and better housed they also become better educated, better informed and more understanding and more tolerant towards each other in spite of racial or religious or other cleavages...India, exclusive of Burma, now is or promises soon to be important in world trade as a source of coal and petroleum, iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gold, bauxite, salt magnesite, mica, gypsum, various gemstones, monazite and certain refractory materials... Industrial power in the modern world is based on the trinity of coal, iron and oil. Together coal and iron are the foundations of industrialization in our present steel age... Oil, though also valuable, is far less essential ; in times of peace, a state rich in coal can do entirely without oil deposits if exchange in mineral commodities is free. Even if it has no oil, it may convert its coal to liquid fuel, as Germany

does. Oil is of little direct value in the making of steel, and cannot as yet be substituted for coal in the steel industry. Coal remains essential. Both in aggregate value and in distribution the most important single industrial resource in India is coal...More than 98 per cent has been and will be taken from the moderately old (Ternian) rock found chiefly in three provinces: Bengal, Bihar and Orissa...That fact in turn affords a glimpse into the future of India and makes possible a reasonably safe forecast as to the foci of industrialization. The economist would say that India is fortunate because her vast coal deposits are in close proximity to her great iron deposits. The iron production of India comes likewise chiefly from the deposits of Bihar and Orissa, again running northward into Bengal...It will be seen that all of India's leading iron districts are in Hindustan. There are many small iron deposits in the western part of Pakistan but none that would sustain a large steel industry. It is apparent that India's minerals are so distributed between the parts of India in which Hindu and Muslim people preponderate that if India were divided on the basis of religious population the Hindu State would be rich and the Muslim State would be conspicuously poor. This disproportion is sufficiently great so that, speaking generally, it does not even seem to be cancelled out by differences in population density. Not only is this fact of Hindustan's relatively greater mineral wealth true for the present, as judged from a comparison of the minerals now produced ; it will doubtless be an even more striking fact of the future, as the industrialization of India advances.¹ The significant conclusion as to the question of Pakistan and Hindustan is corollary to this fact. Hindustan has great resources of coal and iron ; it has excellent reserves of the more important ferro-alloy metals and of the non-metallic minerals and gold ; it has considerable reserves of bauxite and some copper. Pakistan has a small amount of coal and iron ; few ferro-alloys ; and little bauxite. But

¹ The Statistical Abstract for British India from 1930-31 to 1939-40 states that the total value of the chief minerals produced in 1938 (including Petroleum) was Rs. 1238·54 lakhs for British India and 67·17 lakhs for Pakistan. On the production basis Pakistan supplies only 5·4% of the mineral wealth of India.

Pakistan has as much of the ferro-alloys, other than manganese and chromium, as has Hindustan; it has adequate reserves of the other subsidiary minerals, except magnesite; and it has most of the oil. The leading feature of the complicated picture is, that Muslim Bengal is geologically a continuation of Hindu Bihar and Orissa. Speaking very generally, about 90% of India's coal and 92% of her iron would be in Hindustan; the remainder would be in Pakistan, but the grade (and rank) of the latter is relatively poor. Hindustan would have most of the important ferro-alloy and subsidiary minerals which complete the requirements of a relatively autonomous industrial realm; yet Pakistan would have some of them. Under conditions of moderate industrialization and with fairly high living standards, India as a whole would have less oil than she needed for her internal combustion engines; most of what she had would be in Pakistan. The Hindu and Muslim areas of India are interdependent. Not only would Hindustan need some of the resources of Pakistan; for industrial life, Pakistan would desperately need great quantities of the resources of Hindustan. In a closed trade system the Pakistan State of Bengal would, industrially speaking, die. In such a situation one would expect violence. And it is permissible to note that the Muslim State which would thus be strangled would contain the people who are considered more aggressive and warlike than their richer neighbours. The economic position of the Muslim State of Assam, adjoining Bengal on the east, would be also unfavourable. It has no outstanding mineral wealth; petroleum and chrome ore are its only noteworthy mineral resources. In a divided India, then, it would seem to be even more hopelessly situated, economically speaking, than Bengal. Division or no division, there would be little need for change in the economy of the Punjab, Kashmir and the Muslim States to the west. They would remain as they are now, pastoral and agricultural, economically tributary to Hindustan. A division of India strictly on religious lines would seem to destine all of Pakistan for such a status."¹

¹*Indian Mineral Wealth and Political Future*—C. H. Behre: *Foreign Affairs*—October 1943-

In short, economically both the States will be worse off because of separation and more particularly Muslim areas. India's economy is a composite one. The resources of one state (Western Bengal), e.g., coal, will be needed to utilize fully the resources of the other (Eastern Bengal) e.g., jute. Only by combining all the resources of India can the problem of poverty be solved. India is so rich in economic diversities that there is no need either of conquest or of *lebensraum*. But that need will arise the moment India is split into a number of small states and the satisfaction of that need will not be realized except in terms of war. At present the North-Western zone possesses 15% of the seasonal and only 9.7% of the perennial industries. Of these the former employ 15% of the workers engaged in seasonal factories and the latter only 4% of those engaged in perennial factories all over India. The Statistical Abstract for British India from 1930-31 to 1939-40 shows that the average daily numbers of workers employed by different industries in Pakistan are only 6% of those employed in British India, although Pakistan has 12.3% of the population of British India. The Eastern zone too, after the predominantly Hindu Calcutta area is removed from it, will be no better situated than the North-Western State. In agriculture, the area under cultivation per head in "Hindustan" will be one acre, while in Pakistan it will be three-fourths of an acre, While Pakistan is very deficient in oil seeds, Hindustan has substantial advantage in sugar, cotton and food grains. Thus Pakistan would be poor industrially as well as agriculturally.

Professor Behre concludes: "The pressure of industrialization is a pressure for unity, in India as elsewhere. But does India want industrialism?...Among the things in the Indian village which it would seem difficult for anyone to overlook from any angle is poverty...A possible form of amelioration is certainly the manufacture on a grand scale of consumer goods, whereby prices may be lowered and purchasing power increased. Industrialization, if not the trigger by which this happy result can be assured, is at least one means that may be used, once the desirability of it is recognized. The war has given a tremendous impetus to the

process of industrialisation of India, and, although the history of industrialism is still in its early chapters, there is nothing in the record of man's experience with this unruly genie—to suggest that once unloosed it can ever be bottled again. India not only has coal and iron for the machine. She has a superabundance of the final resource on which the machine is based—manpower. And the distinguishing characteristic of India's immense manpower is its low per capita consumption, in a word, again, its poverty. Given the natural resources, given the manpower, given the need for an increase in the standard of living of the people of India, an increasing degree of industrialization of India would seem inevitable. India's decision as to the terms of her political future will determine whether that advance towards industrialism is relatively easy or difficult. The experience of "new" and financially weak South American States bears on India's problem. "New" nations, in the process of industrial development, have customarily paid stiff prices in terms of concessions and franchises, for needed capital, when they have been forced to seek that capital from private entrepreneurs. A united India would be in a position to command the sympathy and confidence of other governments, and to ask for loans under international auspices on some such terms as those for which China will ask. But an India, and yet more two Indias, using newly-won sovereignty to erect tariff walls around the national borders, would be a poor economic risk. Possible investors would demand the gambler's percentage. Once committed to a programme of industrialization, India would rapidly find herself confronted with the problem of controlling the programme in the interest of all her people rather than of a few—the familiar task which has agonized Western nations for a century and which, of course, is already a present component of the Indian situation. Divided into economic fragments, India would find this unavoidable issue doubly painful of solution. In a united India, the problem would seem to present the spur urging the country to the higher degree of social consciousness which her friends within and outside would wish. With her coal, her iron, her manpower, India would share

Asiatic leadership with China or perhaps assume the outstanding role in the industrial development of Asia. External factors press her toward unity no less than does the logic of her economic resources. Buddhist Burma, on her eastern frontier, aspires toward nationhood. From Burma, India must have nickel, tin, tungsten, lead, zinc and probably petroleum. Economic relations with Burma would be more fruitful for a united India than for a fragmented one. As China develops her own heavy metal industries in association with her coal deposits in the north-east near the coast, India's iron ore, travelling by water, will be her most easily transported and least expensive source of supply. The present restrictions of British imperial policy would, however, have to be removed before this inter-development of Chinese and Indian resources could progress...Chinese leaders have shown statesmanship in recognizing that it is to the advantage of China that her great neighbour on the south be a strong and unified nation. It is likewise to the advantage of Hindus and Muslims within India."¹

It is often alleged by supporters of Pakistan that the economic interests of Muslims and Hindus are different, that Hindus are capitalists and Muslim wage-earners, and that the interests of Muslims are mostly agricultural and interests of Hindus industrial and commercial. This facile classification is unwarranted because the vast masses of both communities are the exploited workers, whether industrial or agricultural, and both communities have a small section of capitalists, landlords, industrialists, etc., and the most that could be said is that the Hindus have a comparatively larger percentage of capitalists, but that does not alter the problem for 90% of the population of India. In fact Muslims are now rapidly turning towards capitalistic ventures and industry is developing more rapidly in predominantly Muslim areas than in the rest of India. As far as capitalists are concerned there is nothing to choose between Hindu capitalists and Muslim capitalists, they both join hands wherever there is scope for exploitation. Birla, one of the biggest Hindu industrialists,

¹ *India's Mineral Wealth and Political Future*—C. H. Behre : *Foreign Affairs*—October 1943.

is Chairman of the United Commercial Bank, and Ispahani, one of the biggest Muslim capitalists is Vice-Chairman of the same Bank. All that can be said is that Hindu capitalist would like to have the whole of India as his field for exploitation while the Muslim capitalist would like to carve out the North-West and the North-East as his special preserves for his adventures. There is no doubt that in order to acquire power both would do exactly the same under the cloak of religion. The danger that in a united India Hindu industrialists are likely, by virtue of having stolen a march over the Muslim industrialists, to be a dominant factor more than their numerical superiority would justify, is a real one, but it presumes that the present economic system would continue and that the future Government would be in no way different from the existing regime which is the creation of British imperialism and does not aim to promote the good of the people of this country. If the future Government of India is a National Government and promotes the greatest good of the greatest number it is bound to curb unrestricted capitalism by one form or another of state control under which the Muslims will not need to fear the economic domination by non-Muslim communities. Any attempt at solving the problem of poverty of the masses must inevitably strike at the very roots of Hindu capitalism and thereby remove the menace of which the Muslims have a justifiable fear. The truth of the matter is that if poverty is to be removed and the standard of life of the masses is to be raised India must move towards industrialisation, increased production and better distribution, both of which would become difficult in case of partition because the intensification of the communal issue would impede the organisation of peasants and labourers on a purely economic basis. The only hope, therefore, lies in shifting the plane of politics from communal to economic.

The financial implications of partition also deserve consideration. The majority of the constituent units of Pakistan—Sind, N.-W. F. P. and Baluchistan are deficit areas, and the others, the Punjab and Bengal are not surplus provinces. The Eastern State with its teeming population and slender

resources has been described by Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh as "an isolation quarantine". The financial stability of the deficit provinces depends on the subvention from the Centre, and after partition, the Pakistan Centre, the Punjab, will have to bear the whole of the burden. Sind gets a cash subvention of Rs. 105 lakhs and N.-W. F. P. gets Rs. 100 lakhs and the entire cost of the administration of Baluchistan is borne by the Central Government. According to liberal calculations Sind will not be self-sufficient till 1984. At present Pakistan contributes Rs. 7,13,76,594 to the Central Revenues, while Hindustan contributes Rs. 51,91,27,729 with which the Government of India is carried on, but after separation Pakistan will have to do without the help of financial contribution from the rest of India. Any fresh taxation not for the nation-building departments of the provinces, but to supply the deficit amount to other provinces, seems suicidal. The most significant fact is that the Government of India spends nearly Rs. 52 crores out of its total revenue of Rs. 121 crores on defence, one half to two-thirds the army being drawn from Pakistan, (the Punjab provided nearly 58% of the fighting men of the Indian Army before the war) and a large portion of this expenditure shall have to be borne by the Punjab. It is still more significant to note that per capita burden of taxation in Pakistan is already higher than the corresponding figure for 'Hindustan'. Rs. 7.5 as against Rs. 5.3 and the trappings of statehood will greatly enhance this burden.¹

With the separation of the predominantly Hindu areas from the Punjab and Bengal, the position of Pakistan will be worsened. According to Dr. Ambedkar's calculations, their revenues will be halved.² To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues of Pakistan and the Eastern Muslim State will be Rs. 60 crores minus Rs. 24 crores (revenues of predominantly Hindu areas, i.e., Rs. 36 crores), the revenues of 'Hindustan' will be Rs. 96 crores plus Rs. 24 crores, i.e., Rs. 120 crores. Not only will the revenues of Pakistan be

¹ *The Communal Triangle in India*, Ashoka Mehta and Achyut Patwardhan—1942, pages 215-20.

² *Thoughts on Pakistan*, B. R. Ambedkar, page 65, 1941.

limited, but their main sources will be inelastic, like land revenue, while elastic and expanding sources, like customs, and income-tax will be meagre.

Bengal, as it is now, with 2% of the population of British India, possesses 33% of its industry. In Eastern Bengal without Calcutta, the percentage of British-Indian industry falls to 2.7%. Assam has valuable tea-gardens and is one of India's two sources of petroleum, but has virtually no industrial development. Thus North-East India without Calcutta would be an almost wholly agrarian appendage, served by the one minor port of Chittagong. If Calcutta were given an autonomous status, it could doubtless be arranged that the customs duties on goods imported *en route* to North-East India or the Hindu State would be credited to the State to which the goods were consigned; and if Calcutta were included in North-East India, a similar arrangement would presumably be made, since otherwise it would be open to the Hindu State to import goods through Bombay. In either case the share of North-East India would be relatively small, for the bulk of the goods would continue to go, as they go now, not eastwards, but westwards, to western Bengal, Orissa, Bihar and the eastern areas of Central and United Provinces. Customs-barriers inevitably restrict freedom of trade, and it seems not improbable that some Hindu firms would evade the barrier and also perhaps the difficulties of double income-tax by shifting their quarters to the Hindu State.

The cultivation of jute has been the mainstay of Bengal's revenue. Under the Act of 1935 the export duty on jute is at present appropriated by the Central Government, which distributes 62½% of it to those provinces in which jute is grown. In 1938-39 Bengal's share was 130 lakhs, but North-East India would presumably levy its own duty and take the whole of it. Most of the jute is grown in eastern Bengal, and North-East India without Calcutta, would be able to levy duty on raw jute exported from Chittagong, but its diversion thither from Calcutta with the existing

system of communications would not be easy. Moreover three-fifths of the duty in 1938-39 was levied on jute manufactures, and this industry is located in Calcutta. For North-East India to levy export duty on raw jute crossing the frontier to Calcutta would be dangerous for two reasons. First, the Hindu State would probably levy an export duty on its jute manufactures and since the price in the world market would have to compete with that of substitutes, this second charge would inevitably reduce the cultivators' profits almost, if not quite, to nil. Secondly, a duty on raw jute at the frontier would be a direct invitation to the Hindu State to extend its own area of jute cultivation and so threaten North-East India with the loss of its nearest and largest market.

All these economic and financial difficulties, however, do not seem either to concern or to deter the advocates of Pakistan. They do not ask if the north-western and the north-eastern States will attain self-sufficiency and develop enough military, economic and political power to enable them to resist the pressure of external aggression. They do not ask how they will fare in the competitive world in the matter of international trade and protection of the rights of their nationals. They do not ask if they will or will not be able to alleviate the grovelling poverty of the masses of their population. Their attitude seems to be typified by the answer which Mr. Jinnah gave in an interview to Herbert L. Mathews, appearing in the *New York Times* of September 21, 1942, to the effect: "Afghanistan is a poor country, but it gets along, so does Iraq and that has only a small fraction of the 70 million inhabitants we would have. If we are willing to live sensibly and poorly so long as we have freedom, why should the Hindus object?...The economy will take care of itself in time." It seems, therefore, that Pakistan having no other sources of revenue, and being deprived of the help of the rest of India will have to depend on contributions from the British Exchequer at London. In other words, Pakistan will have

to be subservient to Britain like Egypt, Iraq, etc., enjoying independence only in name and not in reality.

In discussing the consequences of Pakistan we enter the penumbra of both Muslim and Hindu irrationalism. In the heat of partition no side may be expected to maintain a sense of proportion. In the dust of violent controversy raised by claims and counter-claims, by threats and warnings, reason will be dumb. The fate of the country will not be decided by sober statesmen but by extremists on both sides, intoxicated with one idea. The faith of the Muslims in a separate sovereign state will be countered by an equally strong faith of the Hindus in the essential unity of India. Such faiths cannot be reduced to the test of cold reason and logic. At innumerable points it touches the irrational fringe of human consciousness and it is quite possible that once the irrational gets control of their thoughts men will rather agree to suffer the shame and misery of foreign rule than compose their differences and derive strength from unity. That is a prospect which no Indian worthy of his salt can contemplate without being deeply moved by what this great country is, has been and ever more will be.

There is yet another complicating factor. In the Muslim zones capital is concentrated mostly with the Hindus. The Hindus of N.-W.F.P., for instance, contribute 80% of the income-tax. In Bengal, nearly three-fourths of the revenue comes from them, while approximately 87 per cent of the legal, 80 per cent of the medical and 83 per cent of the banking, insurance and exchange business is in Hindu hands. The predominance of Hindus in the major cities of the proposed state or Pakistan has its own significance.¹ The pivotal position of Hindu moneylenders in the villages of the Punjab has been noted and deplored for over half a century.² Of

¹ The percentage of non-Muslim population is 70·8 in Hyderabad (Sind), 53·1 in Karachi, 60·1 in Sukkur, 66·7 in Bannu, and 45 in Dehra Ismail Khan.

² Cf. S. S. Thorburn : *Mussalmans and Money-lenders in the Punjab* (1882).

'course, it can be said that these Hindu moneylenders and capital holders will be expropriated, although that would be contrary to the basic tenants of Islam. But any move for expropriation will bring Pakistan into conflict with 'Hindustan' which will be anxious to guard the interests of the Hindu minority in the Muslim State. Limited resources, lack of capital, and shrinkage of credit caused by the break-up of India as a whole, will make it well-nigh impossible for Pakistan to start an industrial programme or to so reorganize its economy that it would be able to combat and overcome the challenge of corrosive poverty. It will create a legacy of bickering and estrangement between the two communities. It will plunge the two States into a sea of hatred and fear from which they will find it difficult to emerge. The determination of new boundaries will create a crop of difficulties. Vital differences will arise on which both sides are likely to be adamant. Will Calcutta, with the industrial ring around it, be included in the Hindu State or the Muslim State? It was in the Hindu zone in the last partition (1905) of Bengal. Or take the question of Hyderabad. Will the Hindus ever agree to the League's demand of setting it up as a Muslim State? There is no hope of solving these questions amicably. Each community will consider the demands of the other as extravagant and impossible and each will be astonished at the wilful denseness of the other in not appreciating its most reasonable demands. This will lead to repeated crises. Moderates in both the camps will yield place to extremists. Even after partition, enclaves of the other community will remain in both the Hindu and the Muslim States, whose peace and safety will be jeopardized by the ever-present danger of irredentism. Fear and distrust, with their child, terror, will rule the land. The strain of irredentism will be inescapable because even after partition, the League hopes to organize and lead the Muslims left in Hindustan. The Hindus are sure to counter this demand with a similar claim. Both States will thus be cursed with a well-knit minority of doubtful loyalty to the

State. It will need more than human wisdom to resist the temptation of using this weapon to undermine the strength and cohesion of one State by the other. Both the States will try to foist the responsibility of every failure on the alien group within the State. It will inevitably become the personification of the demoniac forces of all the ills that the State will be unable to cure. Every estrangement between the State and the minority will have unfortunate repercussions on the relations between the two States. The new States, Hindu and Muslim, born in conflict, living in a climate of hostility and cursed with dangerous Fifth Columns will have to spend their substance on military preparations. Partition will destroy the natural and scientific frontiers of India and substitute instead highly vulnerable frontiers which history has testified to have constantly shifted. The open frontiers, in a climate of hostility, will be a source of fear and a temptation to aggressive action. War will be Nature's revenge on man for breaking up an organic whole. Partition cannot be carried out without conflict, separation cannot be maintained without friction, and in such an atmosphere no state can hope to achieve the ends it seeks to realize. To cure a wind we are calling a whirlwind.¹

"It is not only in the claims and the character of its nationalism," observes Professor Coupland, "that the doctrine of Partition seem reactionary. The cause of international unity in the world at large is necessarily linked with the cause of democracy—necessarily because without a sufficient measure of international unity it is difficult under modern conditions for any nation to maintain a democratic system. The greatest enemy of civic freedom is insecurity. How the growth of liberty in England was fostered by her insular safety, how Prussian militarism was the natural offspring of the open plains of Central Europe, all that is a familiar story of the past, and present experience has underlined its lesson for the future. Modern warfare is so 'totalitarian,' so elaborate

¹ *The Communal Triangle in India—1942*, Ashoka Mehta and Achut Patwardhan, pages 215-20.

and so costly that, unless some effective means can be devised for preventing its frequent recurrence, the free civilisation which goes by the name of democracy is evidently doomed. Too much time and money and wealth will have to be given to preparations for defence, and too little to the solving of social problems, the raising of the standard of living, the extension of social services, especially of education—to those things, in short, without which democracy can never come into its own. Nor will it only be impossible to realise its ideals. The ideals themselves will wither in the perpetual shadows of war. Given time, democracies can organise for war and fight it through at least as well as military dictatorships. But in modern war, as the world nearly learned to its cost in 1940, time may not always be given ; and it is obvious enough that those temporary sacrifices of freedom which war forces on democracies are likely to become permanent unless some security can be provided against its constant repetition. Militarism, not democracy, is the natural costume of a war-ridden world. That is plain enough to the free peoples of the Western world today. Is it so plain in India ? Is it realised that to press too far the claims of nationalism is to darken the prospects of democracy ? Insecurity in the west means that democracy may die. Insecurity in India means that it may never come to life. A vast amount needs to be done before Indian society can be called democratic in the same sense as the free societies of the West. A great effort must be made to increase the productive capacity of the country and to improve the livelihood of its innumerable poor. Huge sums must be spent on health and education. A united India, with such internal security as only union in some form can provide, could hope to make at least some progress in achieving those essential tasks, in bringing about the social conditions in which alone democracy can thrive. For a disunited India would it be even possible ? The loss of security involved in partition would be at least as serious as that involved in a breakdown of international co-operation

in the West, and the burden of armaments which it would impose on the independent States would be relatively heavier."

It is generally not realised that partition would bring the same fate to India from which Europe has suffered, and from which India has been completely free since 1358. Since 1848 Europe has been stricken by upward of ten wars ; and the intervals of peace have been haunted by the fear that they could not last for long. Social progress, the possibilities of which have been enlarged by modern science far beyond the dreams of any previous age, was greatly impeded by the cost of preparing for war and brought to a stop, if not reverted, by the coming of it. From that terrible experience India has been saved. She has been brought within the scope of the last two wars, but had they been fought within India and between Indian peoples the sacrifices and devastation would have been infinitely greater. The cost of defence against danger from without has weighed heavily on India, but it would have been infinitely greater had Indians been divided, like Europe, and compelled to set up their defences not only against the outer world but also against each other. It is true likewise that industrial development has been held up by foreign competition, but the whole economic life of India would have suffered more if, like Europe, her territory had been criss-crossed by the fiscal frontiers of jealously competing and potentially hostile States. India unlike Europe, has not had to pay the disastrous price of economic nationalism. Between the independent states of disunited India, unable to dispense with revenue from customs-duties or forced into protection by industrial competition with each other, customs barriers would inevitably have been built up with the inevitable injury to the economic welfare of India as a whole.

Partition would throw India back to something like the state she was in after the Mogul Empire had collapsed and before the British Raj replaced it. For, once the frame of unity was broken, once the process of disruption had begun, it would not be likely to stop at the separation of

a Moslem State or States from Hindu India. Already there is a talk of a Dravidian State, a Maratha State, a Rajput State, a Sikh State etc. Many Indians may think it inconceivable that after so long a period of peaceful progress India could relapse into the bloodshed and barbarism of a half-forgotten past, but that is what most civilised Europeans thought about Europe a few years ago. It is indeed ironical that Indian separatists should be seeking to tread the road that Europe has trodden at the very moment when the end to which it has brought Europe and might so easily bring India is plain for all to see. All thoughtful Europeans are now aware that the principle of unrestricted or at least of uncoordinated national sovereignty is dead and that without the widest practicable measure of inter-European combination the prospects of the new post-war Europe will be darker in the long run than were those of the old. It is impossible now to conceive of the future without some sort of close economic collaboration and unity between contiguous states to the detriment of unrestricted sovereignty and self-sufficiency in economic matters. The 19th century economic individualism and nationalism has no future. Yet India is now threatened with a repetition of the same sombre story as if it had never been told, and Mr. Jinnah wants the creation of independent states on the analogy of states in the Balkan peninsula.

As calculated by Professor Coupland in *The Future of India* the financial position of Pakistan (N.-W.F.P., the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan) after receiving its share of revenue and expenditure from Hindustan would be as follows :—

Revenue (in thousands of rupees)

			<i>Centre</i> 1938-39	<i>Pakistan</i>
			Rs.	Rs.
Customs	405,053	44,806
Excise	86,573	10,092
Corporation Tax	20,372	1,528
Other income-tax	137,444	12,110
Salt	81,204	7,665
Opium	5,085	...
Railways	13,732	15,000
Posts and Telegraphs	1,899	237
Currency and Mint	2,242	280
Other heads	10,320	1,887
Total			763,927	93,650

Expenditure (in thousands of rupees)

			<i>Centre</i> 1938-39	<i>Pakistan</i>
			Rs.	Rs.
Direct Demands on Revenue	42,360	5,149
Irrigation	924	702
Services (less interest receipts)	133,854	18,600
Civil Administration	98,469	14,556
Civil Works	21,958	1,083
Miscellaneous	20,432	3,313
Defence	461,800	...
Contributions and adjustments	30,632	20,500
Total ...			810,419	63,903

Excluding defence, Pakistan emerges with a credit balance of about 297 lakhs of rupees. If every possible economy is exercised a saving of 37 lakhs could be made thereby reducing the expenditure to 602 lakhs. Raising more money by increased taxation would be no easier or less unpopular than saving it by economies. However, increasing the taxes

in force in 1938-39 by 25% could yield 169 lakhs ; maintaining increased freight charges at $12\frac{1}{4}\%$ on commercial railways could give 113 lakhs ; profits on Posts and Telegraphs could be increased by 24 lakhs ; new inland customs could give 150 lakhs, thus in all raising the credit balance at the very outset to 790 lakhs. This amount would obviously be insufficient for purposes of defence. It is generally believed that, when the Axis Powers have been defeated and disarmed, the United Nations will succeed in establishing some system of collective security for maintaining peace and preventing aggression. How strong and coherent that system will be remains to be seen, but no one supposes that mankind will have reached a stage of civilization in which peace can be regarded as unbreakable and nations can safely turn their swords into ploughshares. Nor does the argument that the North-West frontier of India will be more secure if a Moslem State occupies the South-East side of it seem incontestable. Moslem States have been known to fight each other, and a sense of Islamic solidarity is no more likely to induce the hungry Pathans to abandon their ancestral custom of raiding the rich plains than to prevent the pursuit of the blood-feud among themselves. Nor is the frontier exposed to attack from Moslems only. It must be remembered that North-West India is barely separated from interested countries. In short, it must be assumed that the problem of financing the defence of India will be at least of the same extent as in 1938-39. It was at that time 4,618 lakhs. Even assuming that the Indian Army will no longer be required to maintain internal security in the sense of repressing attempts to subvert British rule, and that the re-enlisted and re-modelled Army will be less expensive than under British management, even then Pakistan would not have sufficient funds to keep even a small army. It has been suggested that since an invasion of the Punjab would open the way to the conquest of the whole sub-continent, after Partition the security of the North-West will be regarded as a common interest of the separated

States and defensive alliance will be concluded to jointly finance a single policy in foreign affairs and defence. This harmonious outcome is a big presumption, because Hindus are bitterly opposed to Partition, and the relations between the Hindu and Moslem States would be anything but cordial. In any case, the separated States would have their separate forces ; for it is inconceivable that the Hindus would pay the Moslems to defend them. Dr. Ambedkar says that Partition would give Hindu India more security because it would enable her to have a wholly Hindu Army, but the fact is that Partition would be brought about by the conviction that Hindus and Muslims cannot live at peace in one state, and it would offer no guarantee whatever that they would be able to live at peace in two or more states. There will be chances enough of friction. Without large-scale exchanges of population the claim that Partition would solve the minority problem cannot be sustained ; and the fate of Europe shows that, if a minority problem can be difficult enough within one State, it is far more difficult when it is shared by neighbouring States. Nor, if Partition comes, is the old gulf likely to be narrowed by a common economic interest and policy. On the contrary any attempt of Pakistan to attain economic self-sufficiency would be at the cost of Hindu industrial India. If war is possible anywhere in the world, it would be in partitioned India. The defence of Pakistan, therefore, would be greater and the gravest difficulty. It would have to face the prospect of defending the North-West frontier without the help of Hindu India, and to do that on anything like the same scale as it was done before the war, even without considering the increased cost of modern armaments (and this war has made modern armaments an absolute necessity) would be impossible. Even to raise a substantial fraction of the money needed would require such extra taxation on the one hand and such drastic cutting down of administrative costs and social services on the other as would greatly lower the general standard of living and not only render the backward masses of the

people still more backward but doom them to that state for generations to come. And that might not be all. Might there not be some anxiety as to the safety of Pakistan's eastern frontier too?

"Pakistan would face the rest of India across an indefensible frontier that for the most part runs over flat levels. Can any sound state be created except along the line of strong natural boundaries? Look at what happens to Belgium continually. Consider how much mischief has followed from the fact that 'Prussia' slopped all over the map, with no strong natural borders and with possessions in other parts of Germany."¹ On the other hand, "it is well known that all the strategic positions for the defence of India lie in these five North-West provinces. Once an enemy crosses the hills near Lalamusa, he has no natural obstacles to face him right up to Calcutta. We know that the Muslims took more than 300 years to conquer the Punjab, but once they had become masters of the land of five rivers, the conquest of the rest of India was an easy job. Within ten years after the defeat of Prithviraj at Taraori, the whole Northern India north of the Vindhya-chal was subdued, and became a part of the Muslim Empire. If a Muslim federation for the five North-Western provinces is established as is demanded by some Muslims, the federal Government for the rest of India would not be worth the paper on which its constitution may be drawn."²

The position of the Eastern Muslim State would be no better. The present war has shown how serious the problem of defending India on the North-East may become. The new State like Pakistan would be open to attack on two sides, and though it seems unlikely that the hillmen of the Chinese and Burman frontiers would prove as dangerous in peace time as the Pathans the resources of the North-East India, even if it included Calcutta, would not be able

¹ *Enlist India for Freedom!*—Edward Thompson, 1941, page 58.

² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 19th August 1934—Professor Gulshan Rai.

to safeguard its frontiers. Without Calcutta, North East India would be desperately weak and could expect no help from Pakistan. Pakistan and North-East India, while able to support themselves from their own resources for other purposes, would find it impossible to maintain the security they enjoy at present. The provision of minimum needs of peacetime defence would be impossible without a fall in their standard of living and a substantial sacrifice of social advancement.

Hostile India on one side and Japan or Afghanistan on the other, the separated Pakistan is no match for any foreign invasion. It is bound to become a subject province of an Asiatic power. By partition India would become again what it was at the time of the British annexation. How the British won the battle of Arcot in the Deccan and Plassey in Bengal would serve as an eye-opener to those who are dreaming of partitioning India on religious lines. Hyder Ali and Tippu Sultan were crushed with Mahratta help and the Mahratta were crushed with the help of the Muslims and some of the Mahrattas themselves. Are we in the name of self-determination—just as was done in Europe after the last war—to Balkanize India, to create nothing but a jumble of weak states which will be a prey to outside forces? The separation of Burma and its consequences in spite of the fact that Burma was receiving the fullest help of the British Empire are too obvious to need comment. By separation instead of creating a strong Asiatic power we shall be creating a breeding ground for fresh wars. The complexities of the relations between Pakistan and 'Hindustan' concerning delimitations of boundaries, defence, financial adjustments, intercommerce and communications would afford ample scope for perpetual warfare. The realities of the security question call for only one answer—Unity of India.

“The primary cause of the unrest and discontent among the Indian intelligentsia has long been diagnosed. It is their sense of humiliation and resentment at the subjection of their great and ancient country to alien rule, at the inferior

footing it was thus compelled to occupy beside other countries, at the denial of its natural right to equality. "It is a great deal more than a personal feeling", said the authors of the Simon Report in 1930 ; "it is the claim of the East for due recognition of status." But there is still more in it than that. A constitutional settlement, whether it be based on Union or Partition, would free all India from British control. The Draft Declaration of 1942 offered to non-adhering Provinces the same Dominion status as it offered to an Indian Union. Whether as one State, therefore, or as a group of States, the people of India would obtain their independence and with it an equal status with that of any other people in the world. But status is not everything. Equality before the law is only one kind of equality. And that psychological complex, that sense of degradation, cannot wholly be removed from Indian minds by freedom. Indians must also be given the opportunity through their freedom to redress their past. If India could recover the position she once held in the world, if she could become again a great Asiatic Power, not only taking the lead in political and economic strength but setting new standards of social life and culture, then indeed the memories of her period of subjection might fade out and her historians might ultimately come to regard the era of British rule in the same sort of light as British historians regard the era of the Norman conquest.

"Such a prospect is by no means fanciful. A United States of India might reasonably expect to take rank in years to come among the great political units of the world. If greatness is still to be judged in the last resort by military power, she has the potential strength and wealth required to achieve it. Geography has given her a safer strategic position than any other country of comparable size. Her soldiers have proved themselves second to none. Her natural resources would enable her to attain at need a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. She possesses an inexhaustible labour force, and her industrial output for

the purposes of the present war shows how easily she could develop an 'industrial potential' capable of arming her own forces with modern weapons. Even in her present relatively backward state, the strategic and military strength of India would enable her to play a leading part in building the new order of the post-war age. And if, in a freer, more coherent, more co-operative world, India could turn her great resources to the needs of social progress and the arts of peace, she would bid fair to regain the place she occupied in the history of civilisation in the days of Asoka or of Akbar, a place worthy of the ancient homeland of more than one-sixth of mankind.

"But all that is such stuff as dreams are made of if the Indian homeland is fated to be split up into several independent 'national homes'. India cannot be 'Balkanized' without reducing its component 'nations' to the Balkan level. The severance of the Moslem areas alone would gravely impair the strength and wealth of what was left, and reasons have been given for supposing that the residual Hindu India would remain united. In such a disrupted India the Indians could never achieve their natural destiny. Their States would rank not with the Great Powers of the world but with Egypt or Iraq, with Burma or Siam."¹

The main contention of the Communist Party of India in support of the present policy of the All-India Muslim League is that it is today an urgent and pressing necessity to solve the present national crisis, to win national Government from the hands of the British imperialist bureaucracy and to defend India against the fascist aggressor.² The first step towards this is the formation of a joint Congress-League front, which can only be brought about either by the League giving up its present demand for Pakistan or by the acceptance of this demand by the Congress. The Congress should accept this just demand because the principle of self-determination is a sound principle which has always been accepted by the U.S.S.R. and has recently been extended in its scope.

¹ *The Future of India*, R. Coupland, 1944 ; pages 108-109.

² *Pakistan and National Unity*, G. Adhikari 1944 ; page 14.

The Hindu-Muslim problem is a problem of oppressed nationalities (such as Pathan, Kashmiri, and Sikh National Movements). Yearning for freedom and autonomy within the framework of the anti-imperialist freedom movement. The Muslims are a nation separate and distinct from Hindus. The Communist Party believe in the Marxist theory of nationalities on the basis of which alone, they assert, can a joint Congress-League front be forged to break the deadlock and "to build a broad national patriotic front which is essential for passing over to the next phase of the national democratic revolution in our country." Otherwise, they say, "the imperialists would be able to impose upon us in the coming post-war period an imperialist communal solution *a la* Cripps and Coupland which would mean continued slavery and disunity for our country for another period." Every section of the Indian people which has a contiguous territory as its homeland, common historical traditions, common language, culture, psychological make-up and common economic life should be recognized as a distinct nationality with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free Indian Union and should have the right to secede from it if they so desire. The communists also support the League on the ground that communism is preceded by some sort of a liberal revolution. The League is beginning to be an organization of the masses, a fact which is notable in that political consciousness among the masses is essential for bringing about communism. Once the masses are awakened political leadership is bound to pass from the middle classes to the real representatives of the masses.

The immediate objects which the communists have set before themselves are unexceptionable but the means of achieving them are misconceived. The Congress is being asked to agree to Pakistan in order to secure the co-operation of the League. In the first place it is presumed that Indian Muslims are a nation distinct from Hindus without making the least attempt to investigate whether this is so or not. Their application of the Marxist theory of nationalities

depends on this fact which is taken for granted. Further, it is presumed that it is easier to persuade Hindus and Sikhs, who are 43% of the population of the Punjab, and non-Muslims who are 75% of the population of India, to agree to Pakistan than to convince Muslims of the North-West regions (if they need to be convinced at all) that the partition of India would not be to their interest or in the interest of the whole of India. The reason adduced in favour of persuading the Congress to accept Pakistan is that the principle of self-determination for separate nationalities requires the acceptance of this demand. The fact is that the principle of self-determination and the theory of nationalities as enunciated by U.S.S.R. and applied to the Constituent Republics of the Union have not been correctly understood by the Communists in India and cannot be applied to conditions in India or pleaded as a precedent. Even assuming the Communist premise that the Muslims are a nation the concessions to various communities and national minorities in U. S. S. R. have been so granted that they do not impair the unity and the strength of the Union as a whole.

One has only to study the Soviet Constitution to realise that the Indian Communist view is entirely fallacious. The Constitution of 1936 reserves for the Soviet Union the power to conduct international relations, questions of war and peace, the establishment of national economic plans, foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly, administration of transport and communications, direction of monetary and credit system, organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R. and the direction of all the armed forces, administration of banks, industrial and agricultural establishment, changes of boundaries between constituent republics, etc. The changes in the constitution introduced in February 1944 no doubt give the Republics the authority to have their own armies, but these armies are to remain under the general control and orders of the Central Authority. Similarly, the Republics have been permitted to enter into foreign relations direct with foreign powers and also to exchange

diplomatic and consular representatives with them, but it must be realised that the exercise of these powers is not obligatory ; the provisions are only permissive, and the Republics are not encouraged to have their own foreign relations.* In fact, M. Molotov speaking on February 1st 1944, emphasised that these powers referred only to certain cultural and economic problems, such as the U.N.R.R.A. and the War Crimes Commission. All matters concerning high politics are reserved by the Central Authority. As observed by the Webbs : " The state as a whole maintains its unity unimpaired and has, even like other federal states, increased its centralization of authority."

Further, in India there is no territorial unit which contains a homogeneous population which could be permitted to exercise the right of self-determination. According to Stalin himself " a nation is a historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a community of culture." It cannot be disputed that in the Muslim majority provinces, Hindus and Muslims have a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make up. They differ no doubt in their religious beliefs and certain social customs, but that by itself cannot give them the right of self-determination. If, however, self-determination is to be exercised by Muslims, then other communities such as Hindus and Sikhs should be able to demand the exercise of a similar right. Secondly, U.S.S.R. could afford to concede the right of secession to their constituent units because :

(a) there is no strong separatist feeling in most of the Republics and elsewhere every expression of it is ruthlessly suppressed. During the Purge of 1937-38, there were several references in the Press to men who were accused of plotting to bring about secession of some territory from the Union. Such activities have been invariably interpreted by Soviet Courts as treasonable and counter-revolutionary. The ex-

ercise of the right of secession, therefore, is effectively prevented by the structure of the Soviet State and the communist Doctrine that governs it ; speaking of the right to secede enjoyed by the eleven Primary Republics, Stalin said in his speech on the new Constitution made on November 14, 1936 that "there is not a single Republic in the U. S. S. R. that wants to secede from the U. S. S. R.," and further that "none of our Republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the U. S. S. R." He also pointed out that certain fundamental geographical conditions rendered the right to secede completely inoperative. For instance, where particular areas "are surrounded on all sides by Soviet Republics and Regions, they have nowhere to go if they secede from the U. S. S. R." Besides, the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet Republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within that Republic "to be able to assert the right to secede." Then again, "the Republic must not have too small a population because it would be wrong to assume that a small Republic with a very small population and a small army could hope to maintain an independent state existence. There can hardly be any doubt that the Imperialist beasts of prey would soon grab it."

(b) every republic has a socialistic economy and would find it almost impossible to exist outside among capitalist countries without a radical change of its economic system ;

(c) the Communist party is the key organization of the U.S.S.R. and it controls every sphere of political activity in the Republics and would never permit the secession of any part of the existing Soviet territories. In 1917 Stalin stated : "When we recognize the right of oppressed peoples to secede, the right to determine their political liberty, we do not thereby settle the question whether particular nations should secede from the Russian State at a given moment... Thus we are at liberty to agitate for or against the secession according to the interests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution."

Needless to say that no such conditions exist in India and

the talk of self-determination in terms of the recent Soviet declaration shows an extraordinary lack of political realities. Most political pronouncements from Soviet Russia have no application to other countries because of the vital differences of a capitalist and socialistic economy. Unless and until India adopts the same economy and the politics of the country is controlled by a well organized Communist Party, we must talk of cultural autonomy rather than of self-determination. A still more important objection to the Communist view is that while advising the Congress to accept Pakistan they do not answer two questions, namely, whether after the acceptance of the Pakistan demand Hindus and Muslims would be able to live together amicably, and also whether the partition of India is from a purely economic and financial point of view desirable and in the interests of the Muslims or the Hindus or the Muslims and the Hindus together. They are allegedly interested in promoting the economic interests of the masses yet they do not enquire if the partition of India would be conducive to the achievement of such an object and would not hamper the industrial development of India. In other words, Communists advocate Pakistan without deciding whether it is something desirable in itself and whether it has any justification beyond that of a sentimental slogan.

Next, Pakistan is approved of as a short-cut to political awakening of the masses. It is not considered what effect this type of political awakening would have on the masses, nor is it considered what repercussions this awakening would have on the future of the country. To awaken religious bigotry is the surest way of confusing social issues, and the continuance of the economic and the political *status quo*. The Indian nationalist movement would suffer and the country prepared for civil war. Separatism and religious fanaticism among the Muslim masses would bring about further division, bitterness and conflict. To appeal to the masses in the name of religion is easy enough and can produce quick results, but to direct such energy once released

into useful and productive channels in the tangled social atmosphere of India would be almost impossible. The forces of aggressive religious frenzy can lead nowhere except to religious strife. The leadership would indeed pass from the middle classes and the landed gentry, but it would pass to religious fanatics and demagogues who flourish in times of stress and strain of religious wars. To avowedly make a religious appeal for political purposes is not only morally indefensible, but otherwise inexpedient and full of the gravest dangers.

In short, Pakistan offers no solution of the Indian problem. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is a psychological escape from the stern realities of the situation. It is a milestone on the separatist road to security. It is a confession of failure of all devices hitherto adopted to solve the problem. In the logical sequence, it is only a half-way house ; if persisted in, it cannot escape the corollaries of exchange of populations and finally a desire towards the complete domination either of the Hindus by the Muslims or of the Muslims by the Hindus. These implications are not mere abstractions ; they inhere in the idea and cannot be overlooked. As the sky clears and the implications of partition are perceived, the good sense of both the communities as well as the pressure of events is likely to give a new direction to politics. But so long as the idea endures, whether as a bargaining counter or a serious proposition, the danger of it is in the estrangement that it may create. Every political idea evokes an appropriate technique of propaganda and often a corresponding mutation in the whole programme. The idea of separation propagates itself naturally by seizing on existing differences and magnifying them into fundamentals. It grates on the patriotic sentiments of millions and drives the iron into the soul. All this weakens the will to agreement. That indeed is the most alarming difference between the present situation and that in 1916 or even in 1930. There is another risk in using separatist pleas as political feelers or leavers. They may inflame the imagination of an extensive and immature public

and make retreat awkward. That the idea should have been adopted even temporarily by a great political organization cannot but disturb the complacency of the others and prepare the country for chaos and civil war.¹

To summarise :

(1) India is physically, naturally and geographically one country and throughout its long and chequered history it has been treated as such, and the common interests of the people—economic, political and defence—demand that India should remain undivided.

(2) Since the collapse of the Moghul Empire India has acquired a more vigorous kind of unity, and its diversity cannot be compared with that of Europe. There is also the unity among its inhabitants inspired by their common enemy British Imperialism.

(3) The problem of the preservation of Muslim culture, if it needs protection, concerns only a microscopic minority of the Muslim population. Muslim culture can be preserved not by partitioning India but by strengthening Muslims through education and economic rehabilitation.

(4) The Pakistan demand has not been put forward by the majority of the Muslims and the All-India Muslim League is not the only authoritative and representative political organization of the Muslims of India. Older Muslim organizations have persisted and new ones have grown, and the League is weakest where the Muslims are in a majority and where Pakistan is to be established.

(5) The Pakistan demand is not the demand of the Muslim masses. The League is making this demand in the interests of the landlords and the middle classes who will have better chances for exploitation and class aggrandizement in a Muslim State.

(6) The acceptance of Pakistan as its goal destroys the basis of the League, namely, the common interests of the Muslims of India, and provides for different aims and objects for the

¹ *The Hindu-Muslim Questions*, Beni Prashad, 1941, pages 86-87

Muslims of Pakistan and the Muslims of the rest of India.

(7) The proposed constituent units of Pakistan do not desire a union and are opposed to it.

(8) Pakistan is being demanded from the British who will not be guided by the interests of the Muslims but by their own, namely, the continued domination of India. Their support is tactical and has varied according to imperial requirements. Indeed, recent events have shown that they are opposed to it.

(9) Even if Pakistan is something desirable it is inopportune to raise the demand at this stage because it is opposed both by the British and the Hindus. It should, if at all, be raised after both the communities have turned out the British from India and Muslims have only the Hindus to contend with.

(10) If the British ever concede Pakistan it would be with a view to dominate Pakistan like Egypt and to retain an indirect hold on the rest of India. It is unrealistic to expect help from adjoining Muslim countries because accent has shifted from religion to territorial nationalism and Pan-Islamism is dead.

(11) The Pakistan scheme does not solve the communal problem and will reproduce on a slightly smaller scale the same problem which it claims to set out to solve.

(12) The Sikh problem in the Punjab is almost impossible to solve and if Sikh areas are excluded, the most fertile tract of the Central Punjab will have to be excluded to which the Muslims would never agree. The Sikhs are emphatically opposed to an independent Muslim State and coercion would mean civil war.

(13) Just as the Sikhs are the crux of Pakistan, so Calcutta, predominantly Hindu, is the crux of North-East India, and its exclusion from either one or the other part of Bengal would be a great loss and its exclusion from both would mean the creation of another Danzig.

(14) In order to make populations more homogeneous territorial adjustments have been suggested, *i.e.*, exclusion of

Ambala Division from the Punjab. It is arguable if the increase of Muslim majority is the best way of dealing with the communal problem.

(15) Muslim minorities in Hindu India will have to endure the brunt of separation. The supporters of Pakistan rely on the hostage principle which will either not work and if it does, it would shift the basis of politics from civilization to barbarism.

(16) Exchange of populations has been suggested but Indian conditions render it economically and otherwise impracticable. All communities of all provinces are opposed to it.

(17) On a large scale non-Muslim elements cannot be excluded from Pakistan. These would hamper the evolution of an Islamic polity and in view of this it does not seem worth while partitioning India.

(18) Pakistan is undefined in geographical, constitutional, political, social, economic, etc., terms which makes it impossible to judge its merits, if any. Pakistan has been left undefined for propaganda purposes.

(19) Social stagnation is not the result of communal friction as much as it is the outcome of the reactionary policy followed by the British Government and the fear of denationalization on account of an alien Government.

(20) The distribution of India's mineral wealth is such that economically both the States will be worse off because of separation and particularly the Muslim States. Pakistan would not be able to develop industries essential for solving the problem of poverty of the masses.

(21) The economic interests of Hindus and Muslims are not different from each other. Muslim capitalists support Pakistan in order to diminish competition of Hindu capitalists and to have freedom to exploit the masses. The economic improvement of Muslims is possible not by separation but by a vigorous programme of a socialistic economy throughout India.

(22) Financially, the position of Pakistan and Eastern Bengal would be absolutely untenable and it would not be

possible to meet the expenditure for defence.

(23) A large number of points of dispute, *i.e.*, economic and political, would keep Hindu India and Pakistan at war with each other. Pakistan will find it difficult to exist without worsening the economic position of the Muslims.

(24) Partition will make India tread the path of economic nationalism and periodic wars as in Europe. Insecurity, militarism and war within India would damage the cause of democracy and international unity in the world.

(25) From a military and strategic point of view the creation of separate States in the North-West and the North-East would prove fatal to the security of the Muslim States as well as to the rest of India.

(26) A united India can be the most important Power in South-East Asia while a divided India would have to play a subservient role.

Muslims need to recall the advice which Abraham Lincoln gave his countrymen when the North and the South were at war with each other. "Physically speaking," he said, "we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you."¹

¹ *Speeches and Letters of Abraham Lincoln* (Everyman's Library), p. 172.

VI CONCLUSION

It is amply clear that inasmuch as Mr. Jinnah insists that the Pakistan States should remain in isolation and should have no constitutional relations geographical, economic or political with the rest of India, his attitude is suicidal from every point of view. It would mean sacrificing economics and wider strategic considerations to politics—the politics of pride and fear. Considerations of safety would be disregarded in the same way as was done by Belgium (Catholics) against the Dutch (Protestants) on the morrow of the Napoleonic war with fatal results to both. The European Settlement of 1919 considered national independence and not economics with the result that in the end national independence itself was lost and brought the agonies of another world war. Besides, partition would make the economic development of India as a whole difficult, and thereby postpone the solution of the poverty of the masses in Hindustan, and throw the Muslims of Pakistan into the throes of hunger and destitution. Dr. Latif, one of the staunchest supporters of Muslim culture and the two-nation theory, wrote to Mr. Jinnah: "I may repeat that the Pakistan Scheme in its latest form will neither establish Muslim States properly so-called; not get rid of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh problem; nor afford any security to the Muslim minorities in the proposed independent Hindu India, unless a wholesale exchange of populations is effected which no one favours."¹

The need of some sort of a Centre is essential, if for nothing at least for such matters as Defence, External Affairs, Currency, Communications and Customs. The

¹*The Pakistan Issue*, Nawab Wazir Yar Jung, 1943; page 108.

schemes proposed by Dr. Latif, Sir Sikander Hyat, Sir Firoz Khan Noon, "A Punjabi" and Syed Rizwannullah of Lucknow all envisage some form of union against an All-India background. There is no reason why Muslims should not develop the vision of a future which should secure for them autonomous zones where they would live a life of their own and follow their own culture and yet work for the good of the country as a whole. Indeed the future economic development of India, both industrial and agricultural, cannot be envisaged except on an All-India basis. This could be achieved in a loose federation or a confederation in which the units possess the largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and the right of secession, all three demands which the Congress has already conceded.¹ The Centre could deal with a minimum of subjects indispensably common to the whole of India as mutually delegated to it by the different units, so that no community or combination of units dominate the rest. General safeguards could be provided for minorities in a Declaration of Rights in the same way as in the Polish Treaty of 1919, the Greek Treaty of 1920 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. These could be supplemented by political safeguards. In the constitution of legislatures reservation of seats, weightage in provinces where Muslims are in a minor-

¹The advocates of Pakistan as well as the advocates of a unitary Central Government contend that the safeguards of 'a loose federation', 'largest measure of autonomy' and 'residuary powers' are all illusory because in practice under the stress of modern economic and political forces it is not possible to avoid in the long run a growing measure of central control. If this is so—though it remains to be seen in practise—then the good of the country should not be obstructed by partition. As regards the 'right of secession' it is a perpetual threat and a genuine safeguard against oppression by the majority community. So much so that even those who accept it as a necessary safeguard for Muslims suggest that this right should not be exercisable before a period of fifteen years during which time the Central Government should be able to demonstrate its bonafides by introducing economic schemes for the good of the country as a whole. This may be regarded as a matter of negotiation between the two communities.

ity, and separate electorates (or joint electorates with adult suffrage or differential franchise if the Muslims so wish)¹ could be included, and to prevent domination by the majority, it could be laid down that if three-fourths of the Muslim or of the Hindu delegates (as the case may be) objected in the legislature, no subject involving communal issues could be carried or discussed. Communal representation in services could be maintained as long as Muslims are unable to compete with Hindus in the educational and economic field. Cultural safeguards such as the "Millat" system practised under the old Ottoman Turkish Empire could be evolved with useful lessons from the constitution of the U.S.S.R. which has conceded the largest measure of cultural autonomy to its minorities. In addition to the protection of minorities a share in the exercise of power, and the administration of the country could be provided by introducing a system of coalition Governments and partially independent executives. The enforcement of all the safeguards could be ensured by 'Minorities Courts' one in each province and one at the Centre, it being further provided that such courts should be constituted so as to have a majority of the members of the minority communities. In short, if Muslims recognise that partition of India is harmful to them as well as to the whole of India, there is no reason why it should not be

¹In provinces where Muslims are in a majority it is definitely advantageous to them to have joint electorates provided there is adult suffrage or differential franchise for Muslims. For example, in the Punjab while Muslim are 57% of the total population they are in a minority of 43% in the electoral roll. If adult suffrage or differential franchise at present granted to women and depressed classes (adjusted so as to reflect the Muslim population strength in the electoral roll) were to be introduced the Punjabi Muslims would definitely be placed in a more advantageous position than they occupy at present under separate electorates with no more than 51% seats in the Provincial Legislature. In other words, in provinces where Muslims are in a majority their population strength is their best safeguard provided it is allowed to express itself at the time of voting.

possible to devise measures whereby Muslims not only enjoy the largest measure of cultural autonomy, but also have a legitimate share in the governance of the country as a whole and a predominant share wherever they are in a majority; so that they share power and authority without the evils of partition.

So much for the future general political structure of India. Even more important than political guarantees is a demand which should be made by Muslims; that is the enforcement by the Central as well as Provincial Governments of an economic programme which guarantees a minimum adequate subsistence level to every Indian national irrespective of race, caste or creed, and at the same time ensures that those at present placed in an economically advantageous position would not on that account acquire further wealth and power to the detriment of their fellow beings. The fight for freedom will never be successful and the British will continue to exploit Hindu-Muslim differences unless and until there is an agreement between them on this. Those who believe that the Indian Muslims can make some contribution to the progress and the strength of future India, and also wish to preserve the individuality of Muslims as an important element in the national life of India, they should devote themselves to the improvement of the economic position of the Muslim masses. The improvement of the economic condition of the Muslim masses is not an isolated measure, it concerns Hindu masses as well as Muslim masses, and calls for a reorientation of the entire economic policy of future India. Rehabilitation of Muslims will come not by foolish appeals to the wealthy or the vague appeal of Pakistan but by vigorous measures of a socialistic economy, by making the State pay for it through taxation of the upper and middle classes. So much the worse for them if they are brought to a lower level for that is what is happening in highly civilized countries, otherwise there is no hope for the masses of the people. Only radical economic reorganisation can reduce the gulf

between different sections of the people and eliminate extreme poverty, hunger and nakedness.

It is time for Muslim leaders to realize that the Pakistan slogan has served its purpose. It has made the League powerful and strong and roused the necessary political consciousness among the Muslims. But that consciousness now needs to run into practical channels, and the League stopped from persisting in an overstatement of its case any longer. This would not be possible if a discussion of the Pakistan demand is taboo and instead of being treated as a political demand it is looked upon with religious sanctitude. Mr. Jinnah is reported to have said: "My demand is for Pakistan and before I can discuss that or any other matter with anybody that demand must be met. No discussion about that, no arbitration either." Mr. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, speaking at Bangalore on the 24th January 1944, and disapproving of this attitude of Mr. Jinnah rightly said: "All that I am asking for is not that Mr. Jinnah should give up his demand for Pakistan, but that he should agree to argue it out with the Hindus, Sikhs and other communities. This question is not beyond agreement. Why should discussion be barred about Pakistan when even God comes within the pale of discussion? This seems to me a very unfortunate position taken up in our politics. I mention it now as a signal instance of the evil spirit of Hitler and Mussolini who would not come to discuss matters, but would settle everything on the field of battle. This is not proper and this is the kind of feeling which we want to end."

The Pakistan demand is a political demand but its appeal is religious. To exploit religion for political purposes is fundamentally dishonest and vicious and has no justification whatsoever. In such matters an appeal to religion is not an appeal to its higher objects, but to the lowest forms of religious obscurantism. Ends cannot justify means. To arouse religious fanaticism among the ignorant masses is the surest way of preparing the country for civil war, which no Indian, Hindu, Muslim or Sikh, can look

upon with equanimity. Some pessimists argue that civil war is almost a necessary incident in the process of achieving a single nationhood. A settlement attained by force cannot be a valid or a durable settlement, and is the surest means of perpetuating strife and bitterness among generations of Hindus and Muslims.

The proposals for a Hindu-Muslim settlement in the form of the 'C. R. Formula' were based on the acceptance of the principle of partition, thereby clearly showing that the Congress though convinced of the evils of partition is willing to concede the principle of Pakistan for the sake of attaining freedom for India. There may have been irreconcilable differences about the mode of partition and interim arrangements for the duration of the war, but there is no doubt about the principle underlying the proposed settlement. It is evident, as explained in the last chapter, that partition will be infinitely more harmful to the Muslims than to the Hindus, and that is perhaps why Hindus have not hesitated overmuch to concede it. This should make responsible and thinking Muslims seriously ponder over the wisdom of pressing the demand for partition. Hitherto, since the Pakistan slogan has served to popularize the League, and for lack of definition has given unity of purpose to the Muslims, the slogan instead of being regarded as a means towards an end has become an end in itself and is being considered synonymous with the League itself. It is not the purpose of this pamphlet to belittle the League, the intention in the main is to convince the Muslims of India of the grave dangers of partition. While rejecting partition as harmful to those whom the League represents, the League can still fulfil a most vital role by striving for the protection and legitimate rights of the Muslims of India. The League has never been stronger than it is now to achieve this end, and it would be most unfortunate if the League in the pursuit of a harmful though more spectacular aim fails to achieve for the Muslims rights of a more lasting value.

POSTSCRIPT

Three events of outstanding importance have taken place since the first edition of this book was published. The first of these was the Gandhi-Jinnah Talks, the second was the Report of the Conciliation Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, and the third—the most recent of all—is the Simla Conference. I shall deal with all three inasmuch as they are relevant to 'Pakistan'. The much awaited event of Gandhi-Jinnah talks took place in September 1944. Ever since the out-break of the war, the Congress and the League had been addressing their demands to the British Government, which had been showing them the door. At last both for a moment seemed to realize that British Imperialism would not relent except against a united front and decided to negotiate. The C. R. Formula, the text of which may be seen in Appendix II, formed the basis of negotiations. During the course of the protracted negotiations, which lasted for eighteen days, Mahatma Gandhi also put forward a formula of his own.¹ Mr Jinnah rejected both, and, while ostensibly asking for the acceptance of the Lahore Resolution,² put forward fresh demands. What in effect he asked for was Pakistan which should, according to him, include not Muslim regions only—not only those districts in which Muslims are in a clear majority—but Muslim majority provinces as a whole such as the Punjab, Baluchistan, Sind, N.-W. F. P., Bengal and Assam, subject "to territorial adjustments that may be agreed upon." Further, that this was to be done without any plebiscite for the simple reason that no plebiscite was necessary because the Muslim League had made the demand. The Muslims claimed Pakistan as a nation and a nation could not be asked whether they wanted separation or not. It did not matter that this Pakistan held areas occupied by non-Muslim majorities just as it did not matter whether the claim for separation was for the good or otherwise of the inhabitants of those regions. Finally, that there should be no connecting link between Hindustan and Pakistan for common purposes indicated by Mahatma Gandhi. This was a departure from the Lahore Resolution and the policy of the League

¹ Appendix II.

² Appendix II.

throughout the Cripps negotiations when in the President's speeches and in resolutions objections were raised on behalf of the Muslim League to the delimitation of the areas on the basis of the existing provinces.¹ Now, however, the existing provincial boundaries become sacrosanct. So much so that after the breakdown of the negotiations Mr. Jinnah even dropped the necessary qualification—"territorial adjustments that may be agreed upon"—and asked for undamaged six provinces.² Also, while the inclusion of non-Muslims in the plebiscite was objected to, no objection was raised to a plebiscite itself³ as was done now. Mr. Jinnah based his plea on a Muslim majority and yet asked for the retention of the British made boundaries of six provinces and the handing over of them to him without consulting the wishes of the people, not only Muslims but also non-Muslims. How can he in fairness object to a British united India being retained with its Hindu majority? If Pakistan is the freedom demand for the so-called Muslim homelands then how can non-Muslim homelands be included in it? In the name of Muslim freedom, Sikh and Hindu homelands (13 out of 29) districts cannot be claimed. In the name of Muslim freedom, Bengali Hindu homelands (12 out of 28 districts) cannot be claimed. If western Punjab cannot live without central Punjab, if eastern Bengal is weak without western Bengal, then Mr.

¹ "The right of non-accession to the Union as contemplated in the Draft Declaration has been conceded presumably in response to the insistent demand by the Mussalmans for the partition of India, but the method and procedure laid down are such as to negative the professed object, for the right of non-accession has been given to the existing provinces which have been formed from time to time for administrative convenience and on no logical basis."—Muslim League Working Committee's resolution of April 1942 on the Cripps Plan.

² *Peoples' War*—15th October 1944.

³ "The Muslim League therefore calls upon the British Government to come forward without any further delay with an unequivocal declaration guaranteeing to the Mussalmans the right of self-determination and they pledge themselves that they would abide by the verdict of the plebiscite of Mussalmans and give effect to the Pakistan scheme in consonance with the basic principles laid down by the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League passed in 1940."—Muslim League Working Committee's resolution of August 1942.

Jinnah's Pakistan becomes a demand based on need and not on the alleged right of self-determination. Equally surprising was the claim to the whole of Assam where the Muslims are only 33 per cent and the tribals 36 per cent. Historically and numerically if Assam is the homeland of any, it is of the Assam tribals. Sylhet (the only district in Assam having a Muslim majority) is Bengali Muslim and if it goes to Bengal, the Muslim percentage gets still further reduced. The Assamese have a common language, common culture and a common economy, entirely different from that of Bengal. It seems that it is now believed that if a separate state is to be the real solution of the difficulties of the Muslims, then it must be equal in size and power to a state over which the Congress and the Hindus will have power. In order to achieve this the only criterion for asking for six provinces is that the boundaries should be fixed over as large an area as possible so long as the Muslim population is over 50 per cent. This does not take into consideration the fact that by demanding these boundaries Muslims lay themselves open to the same charge of domination of which they accuse the Congress on an All-India scale. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Mr. Jinnah did not take advantage of the willingness of the Congress to concede the substance of Pakistan, and is still looking towards the British to obtain *his* brand of Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah has not realized that if the British do not wish to hand over power to the Congress they are equally unwilling to hand over power to the League even though that may be over a part rather than the whole of India. Again, Mr. Jinnah has not realized that if Pakistan has to be obtained, the choice is not between obtaining Pakistan from the Congress or the British Government but that it can only be wrung from the hands of the British by Hindus and Muslims both and not by Muslims alone. By failing to secure the substance of Pakistan *now* Mr. Jinnah is paving the way for the British Imperialists to impose a new constitution on India, which may even formally partition India to sabotage for good the danger of a vast united India-wide movement against their rule, but the Pakistan they will establish will not be sovereign, but will be under their own suzerainty. Already, it is well-known that the Cripps and Coupland scheme "is

both a mockery of Pakistan and a hoax of independence." In it there will be Pakistan but not of Mr. Jinnah's conception. It will not be a Pakistan which will be friendly to Hindustan and in joint front with it for winning democracy for the whole of India. It will be a Pakistan which will have a hundred unsolved problems and will be looked up on with bitterness by the separated Hindustan. The princely states kept up by the power of British Imperialism would be a halter round the neck of both Pakistan and Hindustan. Thus there would be a permanent and double vivisection of India in which there will be neither free Pakistan nor free India but the continuation of slavery and disunity in the worst form under the continued spell of British Imperialist rule. Muslim resources, whatever little they are, are undeveloped; British business will dominate them. Muslims, already backward, will be mercilessly suppressed. Mr. Jinnah, therefore has compromised not only India and Indian freedom, but also Pakistan and Muslim freedom. Thinking Muslims must see that their future is not jeopardised by such politics; they must realize the dangers of partition, they must see that the substance of Pakistan offered by the Congress is not refused without consulting the Muslim League and the Muslims of India. Mr. Jinnah refused the suggestion of arbitration and the suggestion that Mahatma Gandhi should address the League Council or the open Session of the League. If he was convinced that he was voicing the wishes of the Muslims in rejecting the C. R. or Gandhi Formula, he should not have hesitated to have Mahatma Gandhi address the League and to let the League give its verdict. The fact is that the initial confidence of Mr. Jinnah has now been undermined by the failure of the League in Punjab and he is unwilling to submit to the test of an appeal to the people inhabiting the so-called Pakistan areas. Such politics spell danger of the gravest import to the Muslims of India, and it is time that the Millat awakened to the gravity of the situation and took measures to ensure for themselves an honourable position in a free India rather than a subservient role in a part of impoverished India.

The failure of Gandhi-Jinnah talks caused profound disappointment among both Muslims and Hindus all over India.

It made people feel that if the partition of India is not to be based on the principle of self-determination in Muslim majority areas so demarcated as to exclude parts in which non-Muslims are in a majority, then partition must be rejected altogether. This feeling is well expressed in the deliberations and the report of the Conciliation Committee which sat under the chairmanship of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and reported in April 1945. The Committee recommended that "having considered carefully the resolution of the Muslim League passed at Lahore in 1940, the various other resolutions of the League and the published version of the talks between Mr. Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi and having also considered the C. R. and Gandhi proposals, is emphatically of opinion that any division of India into two or more separate independent Sovereign States is unjustified and will endanger the peace and orderly progress of the whole country without any compensating advantage to any community, and that the political unity of India should, therefore, be maintained."¹

One aspect of Sapru Committee's Report deserves special attention. Dr. John Matthai and Sir Homi Mody wrote a memorandum on the economic and financial aspect of Pakistan. The conclusion of the memorandum is as follows:—

- "(a) On the pre-war basis of provincial and central expenditure (excluding defence) the two zones of Pakistan appear to be workable from a purely budgetary point of view as separate sovereign states whether they are formed province-wise or districtwise.
- (b) On the pre war basis of food production industrial employment and trade, the standard of living in Pakistan formed province-wise compares favourably with the rest of India. The position of Pakistan constituted on a district basis is perhaps equally favourable in respect of food production but in other respects it seems to be less favourable.
- (c) The possibilities of further economic development in Pakistan formed on either basis will depend on the provision of facilities for free movements of trade within India as a whole and for close co-operation in economic matters between Pakistan

and the rest of India.

- (d) Similarly, the ability of Pakistan to shoulder the responsibility of defence on an adequate scale, being largely a matter of developing its economic and financial resources to a suitable extent will also depend on the degree to which co-operation between Pakistan and the rest of India can be effectively organized.

“From the point of view of defence and economic development, with which defence is closely bound up under modern conditions, it is therefore inevitable, if the division of India into separate states is found necessary for political reasons, that Pakistan and the rest of India should continue to act in close co-operation in these essential matters. What method of co-operation will in the long run be found feasible will necessarily depend on political considerations. But it is clear that unless some effective and continuous form of co-operation in matters relating to defence and economic development is accepted as an indispensable pre-requisite to any scheme of separation and as an organic part of it, the division of India into separate sovereignties would spell stagnation and probable disaster.”

As assumed by the authors of the memorandum it is not correct to say that the economic position of Pakistan formed district-wise would be the same as Pakistan formed province-wise. The Punjab is not economically homogeneous. A major portion of the areas proposed to be excluded are the mainstay of its agricultural production. The presumption of economic homogeneity has led to the unwarranted conclusion that, apart from the incident of non-Muslims being included in Pakistan, there would be no difference in the economic self-sufficiency of district-wise and province-wise partition. District-wise partition both in the North-West and in North-East would make it difficult to meet provincial and regional expenditure even on a pre-war basis. Had it been otherwise Mr. Jinnah may have accepted the C. R. Formula. The fact is that Mr. Jinnah has now come to realize that district-wise partition means starvation for Pakistan, and the only way to make Pakistan self-supporting is to have the existing provincial boundaries, and hence objection to the

principle of plebiscite. During the Simla Conference when a journalist asked Mr. Jinnah his conception of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah clearly stated that the boundaries of Pakistan would be determined not by the fact of the community inhabiting the border areas but for strategic defence reasons and for reasons of making Pakistan economically self-sufficient.¹ Thus the original idea of Muslim homelands has been abandoned, and non-Muslim populations are not considered an evil as long as they bring with them economic advantages. Be that as it may, it needs to be emphasized that even Sir Homi Mody and Dr. John Matthai could not help saying that "any scheme of political separation which may be contemplated should, as a necessary pre-requisite, provide for means of affection and continuous co-operation between the separate states in matters affecting the safety of the country and its economic development." If the need for all this is admitted, is partition of Mr. Jinnah's conception worth pursuing?

On June 14, 1945, Lord Wavell announced a plan for the formation of an interim Government "more representative of organized public opinion", and "designed to ease the present political situation and to advance India towards her goal of full self-Government." It proceeded on the assumption that the concession of parity between Caste Hindus and Muslims was a generous gesture to the Muslims and that the so-called Desai-Liaquat Formula² was acceptable both to the Congress and the League. Congress leaders judged the Wavell Plan against the background of the Cripps offer and

¹ It would perhaps not be long before the Muslim League pursues the ideas expounded by C. Rahmat Ali in his pamphlet *The Millat and The Mission*. According to him the Muslims of India should adopt the Pak Plan which includes Pakistan, Bangistan, Osmanistan Siddiqistan, Muinistan, Maplistan, Safistan, Nasaristan, Haideristan, and Faruquistan. Apart from the first three territories it means the carving out of territories for Muslims in Hindu majority regions according to their population strength, the independence of these units and the fraternal co-operation and international co-operation of these countries under a Pak Commonwealth of nations, the conversion of the sub-continent of "India" into the continent of 'Dinia', the organization into the orbit of Pakasia—of "Dinia" and its Dependencies; Pakian Sea, Maplian Sea, Alam Islands, Amean Islands, Safistan, Safian Sea, Ceylon, Nasaristan, Nasarian Sea, Osmanian Sea, Bangian Sea, Asher Islands and Balus Islands.

² Appendix V.

felt that it was better, because it gave a concrete shape to the idea of an interim Government and at the same time while completely Indianizing the Executive Council transferred the portfolio of External Affairs to an Indian Member of the Council. The Congress, therefore, keenly desired the success of the Conference and despite strong opposition from the Mahasabha against Caste-Hindu-Muslim parity agreed to co-operate provided the settlement in no way impaired the national character of the Congress by explicitly identifying it with one particular community, namely, the Hindu Community.

There was a wave of optimism unknown in the recent political history of India. The Cripps offer was made at a time when defeat stared Britain in the face. The new plan was proposed at a time when victory was already more than half achieved and, therefore, looked more genuine whatever the amount of pressure of American opinion and the degree of the fear of Russia. Almost all sections of Indian opinion including the Congress saw in the new offer a welcome opening to end the deepening national frustration and an opportunity to end acute economic distress—scarcity, inflation and hunger that had gripped the nation. It also saw in the interim plan the possibility of finally breaking the accumulating ice of the communal deadlock.

The Conference called by Lord Wavell met at Simla. The Viceroy asked the Conference to agree upon the strength and composition of the Executive Council whereafter the parties should send lists of names to enable the Viceroy to form on paper an Executive Council which might be acceptable to His Majesty's Government. This meant in effect an agreement between the League and the Congress. Pt. G. B. Pant saw Mr Jinnah three times but no agreement was reached with the result that the Viceroy "undertook with the approval of the Conference to endeavour to produce a solution not based on any formula agreed to in advance", and for this purpose asked all the parties to submit lists of names. Lists from all parties including the Congress, except the Muslim League, were received by the Viceroy. Mr. Jinnah refused to submit names unless the Viceroy guaranteed "that all the Muslim members of the proposed Executive Council

would be chosen from the Muslim League", and the Viceroy's veto would be exercised in favour of the League if a League representative differed from other members of the Executive Council. While the question of veto was not discussed the Viceroy refused to give the guarantee about the selection of the Muslim members as he had not given a similar guarantee to any other party. This in effect meant that the Viceroy was not prepared to accept Mr. Jinnah's claim that the League represented all the Muslims in India. In reply to this Mr. Jinnah refused to submit the names to the Viceroy. The Viceroy was, however, determined to bring the Conference to a successful ending, and therefore, made a provisional selection including four Muslim League names out of the five seats allotted to Muslims and secured His Majesty's Government's approval for this list. Lord Wavell has explained subsequent developments as follows: "My selections would, I think, have given a balanced and efficient Executive Council, whose composition would have been reasonably fair to all the parties. I did not find it possible, however, to accept the claims of any party in full. When I explained my selection to Mr. Jinnah he told me that it was not acceptable to the Muslim League, and he was so decided that I felt it would be useless to continue the discussions. In the circumstances I did not show my selections as a whole to Mr. Jinnah and there was no object in showing them to other leaders. The Conference has, therefore, failed". Thereafter, Mr. Jinnah declared that the Wavell Plan "was a snare", and since it did not guarantee "the establishment of Pakistan having regard to the basic principles laid down in the Lahore Resolution", and did not give an "equal number in the proposed executive", which it was the right of the Muslims to demand because they were not a minority but a nation, the League could not accept the Wavell Plan.

Mr. Jinnah claimed that the Muslim League was the sole representative body of Indian Muslims, and that no Muslim opinion existed outside the League which could claim representation. This claim is exaggerated and must have so appeared to Lord Wavell because of the existence of the following:

- (1) All-India Shia Conference,

- (2) All-India Momin Conference,
- (3) Muslim Members of the All-India Congress,
- (4) The Khaksars,
- (5) The Ahrars,
- (6) Jamiat-ul-Ulema,
- (7) All-India Majlis,
- (8) The Red Shirts who have defeated the Muslim League and are now in power in N.-W. F. P.,
- (9) The Punjab Unionist Party who have been in power in the Punjab since 1937 and have defeated the Muslim League,
- (10) The Krishnak Projā Party who have defeated the Muslim League in Bengal and the Muslim League Ministry has ceased to be in power,
- (11) The Muslim opponents of the so-called League Ministries of Sind and Assam which are kept in power by Congress support,
- (12) and the 180 non-League members out of the 600 Muslim Members of all the provincial legislatures which showed that there were at least 30 per cent Muslims outside the League.

There was, therefore, a fair justification for the allotment of one seat to nationalist Muslims (the Congress was reasonable and moderate enough not to press for a Congress Muslim), and one to the party in power in the Punjab, the majority of seats, namely three seats, going to the Muslim League. As it was the Viceroy was prepared to give four seats to the Muslim League, but Mr. Jinnah insisted on his totalitarian party claims and refused to co-operate. Even the dictators in the authoritarian states would hesitate to make such a categorical declaration about their representative character and undivided allegiance to themselves as does the Muslim League. Stalin does not make a claim that there are no other Russians except the Communists. But to Mr. Jinnah, all who are not in the League or do not show him implicit obedience are Hindus or Congressmen or Quislings.

While the reason for the failure of the Simla Conference was obviously Mr. Jinnah's exaggerated party claims—not claims for the Muslims—for Muslims were being offered representation far in excess of their population strength. Some people

have come to doubt Lord Wavell's and British Government's sincerity in making the offer for an interim Government. It is said that during his informal talks with the Congress leaders the Viceroy was reported to have made anxious enquiries whether the Congress would be ready to work the plan without the League if the League proved intransigent, but later on he refused to form a national Government without the League which clearly shows that all he intended was to demonstrate once again to the world strictly according to the traditional British Policy that the Hindus and the Muslims cannot be made to come to a settlement. Dr. Pattabhai Sitaramayya has pointed out that the Viceroy behaved exactly like Sir Stafford Cripps who first gave spacious pledges of a "Cabinet Government" and later wriggled out of them. It is added that the offer was merely a Conservative Party election stunt, and an excuse adduced against growing world opinion against British policy in India. It is difficult to say at this stage if these allegations—made in the throes of a grave national disappointment—are legitimate, but the obvious and immediate responsibility for the absence of a national Government and the continued suffering of the Indian people—Hindu and Muslim—is manifest, and provides food for thought for all thinking Muslims.

APPENDIX I
ACCORDING TO 1941 CENSUS REPORT
DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIM POPULATION IN
BRITISH INDIA

		Total Area In sq. Miles	Total Population (in lakhs)	Total Muslims	Percentage of Muslims
Madras	...	126,166	493·42	38·96	7·90
Bombay	...	76,443	208·50	19·20	9·21
Bengal	...	77,442	603·06	330·05	54·73
U. P.	...	106,247	550·21	84·16	15·30
Punjab	...	99,089	284·19	162·17	57·07
Bihar	...	69,745	363·40	47·16	12·98
C. P. and Berar	...	98,575	168·14	7·84	4·66
Assam	...	54,951	102·05	34·42	33·73
N. W. F. P.	...	14,263	30·38	27·89	91·79
Sind	...	48,136	45·35	32·08	70·75
Orissa	...	32,198	87·29	1·46	1·68
Ajmer-Merwara	...	2,400	5·84	·90	15·40
Andaman & Nicobar		3,143	·34	·08	23·70
Baluchistan	...	54,456	5·02	4·39	87·50
Coorg	...	1,593	1·69	·14	6·73
Delhi	...	574	9·18	3·05	33·22
Total	...	865,421	2958·06	793·95	26·84

DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIM POPULATION IN

INDIAN STATES

Indian States and Agencies	Total Population	Muslim Population	Percentage of Muslims to Total
Assam States ...	625,606	24,600	3.3
Baluchistan States ...	405,109	392,782	97.5
Baroda ...	2,443,007	182,630	7.2
Bengal States ...	973,336	312,476	32.1
Behar and Orissa States ...	4,652,007	19,516	4.1
Bombay ...	4,468,396	414,931	9.0
Central India Agency ...	6,632,790	376,637	4.6
Central Provinces Agency ...	2,483,214	23,254	9.4
Gwalior ...	3,523,070	204,297	5.9
Hyderabad ...	14,436,148	1,534,666	10.4
Jammu and Kashmir ...	3,646,243	2,817,636	77.7
Madras States Agency ...	6,754,484	467,396	6.0
Cochin ...	1,205,016	87,902	6.8
Travancore ...	5,095,973	353,274	6.0
Other Madras States ...	453,495	26,220	4.5
Mysore ...	6,557,302	398,628	6.1
N.-W. F. Agencies ...	46,451	23,086	50.0
Punjab States ...	437,787	40,845	9.1
Punjab States Agency ...	4,472,218	1,556,591	35.2
Rajputana Agency ...	11,225,712	1,069,325	9.7
Sikkim ...	109,808	104	0.1
United Provinces States ...	1,206,070	352,131	25.0
Western India States Agency ...	3,999,250	545,569	13.0
Total ...	79,098,008	10,657,102	12.7

PUNJAB

Districts	Total Population (in lakhs)	Percentage of Total Population		
		Hindus	Muslims	Sikhs
Hissar ...	10·06	64·85	28·33	6·03
Rohtak ...	9·56	81·60	17·22	·15
Gurgaon ...	8·51	77·42	32·49	·7
Karnal ...	9·94	66·93	30·58	2·00
Ambala ...	8·47	48·41	31·64	18·44
Simla ...	·38	76·38	4·73	2·67
Jullundur ...	11·27	17·57	45·17	26·44
Ludhiana ...	8·18	20·36	36·92	41·69
Ferozepur ...	14·23	19·62	45·08	33·68
Kangra ...	8·99	93·23	5·09	·57
Hoshiarpur ...	11·7	40·00	36·64	16·92
Lahore ...	16·95	16·81	60·69	18·29
Amritsar ...	14·13	15·35	46·50	36·14
Gurdaspur ...	11·53	24·55	50·23	19·18
Sialkot ...	11·90	19·41	62·10	11·70
Gujranwala ...	9·12	11·84	70·39	10·87 ✓
Sheikhupura ...	8·52	9·11	63·62	18·85
Gujrat ...	11·04	7·61	85·60	6·35
Jhelum ...	6·29	6·48	89·51	3·12
Rawalpindi ...	7·85	10·50	80·00	8·16
Attock ...	6·75	6·39	90·52	2·97
Shahpur ...	9·98	10·02	83·87	4·81
Mianwali ...	5·03	12·23	86·17	1·37
Montgomery ...	13·29	14·36	69·07	13·91
Lyallpur ...	13·96	11·61	62·82	18·81
Jhang ...	8·21	15·71	82·58	1·49
Multan ...	14·84	16·31	77·98	4·15
Muzaffargarh ...	7·12	12·69	86·52	·83
Dera Ghazi Khan ...	5·81	10·86	88·90	·17
Baloch Trans-Frontier Tract ...	·40	·8	99·2	...
Total ...	284·00	28·00	57·00	13·00

BENGAL

Districts	Total Population (in lakhs)	Percentage of Total Population	
		Hindus	Muslims
Burdwan ...	18·9	81·44	18·56
Birbhum ...	10·5	73·31	26·69
Bankura ...	12·9	95·41	4·59
Midnapore ..	31·2	92·41	7·59
Hooghly ...	13·8	83·83	16·17
Howrah ...	14·5	78·73	21·27
24 Parganas ...	35·3	66·35	33·65
Calcutta ...	21·1	74·00	26·00
Nadia ...	17·6	38·33	61·67
Murshidabad ...	16·4	44·44	55·56
Jessore ...	18·3	38·84	61·16
Khulna ...	19·4	51·50	49·50
Rajshahi ...	15·7	24·21	75·79
Dinajpur ...	19·3	49·43	50·57
Jalpaiguri ...	10·9	76·01	23·99
Darjeeling ...	3·8	97·37	2·63
Rangpur ...	28·8	29·21	70·79
Bogra ...	12·6	16·64	83·36
Pabna ...	17·1	23·10	76·90
Malda ...	12·3	45·72	54·28
Dacca ...	42·2	33·19	66·81
Mymensingh ...	60·2	23·44	76·56
Faridpur ...	28·9	36·20	63·80
Bakargunj ...	35·5	29·37	71·63
Tippera ...	38·6	24·22	75·78
Noakhali ...	22·2	21·54	78·46
Chittagong ...	21·5	36·20	73·80
Chittagong Hill Tracts ...	2·5	96·5	3·5
Total ...	603·0	45·27	54·73

ASSAM

Districts	Total Population (in lakhs)	Percentage of Total Population	
		Hindus (including tribes)	Muslims
Cachar	6.5	61.49	38.51
Sylhet	31.2	39.29	60.71
Khasi and Jainta Hills	1.2	98.69	1.31
Naga Hills	1.9	99.72	.28
Lushai Hills	1.5	99.93	.07
Goalpara	10.1	53.77	46.23
Kamrup	12.6	71.00	29.00
Darrang	7.4	83.58	16.42
Nowgong	7.1	64.81	35.19
Sibsagar	10.7	95.18	4.82
Lakhimpur	8.9	95.02	4.98
Garo Hills	2.2	95.35	4.65
Sadya Frontier Tract	.6	98.56	1.44
Balipara Frontier Tract	.01	99.06	.94
Total	102.00	66.28	33.27

**TABLE GIVING POPULATION OF MUSLIMS AND
NON-MUSLIMS IN PAKISTAN AREA ACCORDING
TO C. R. FORMULA**

Area	Total Population	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs
N. W. Pakistan				
Punjab—17 North- Western districts ...	169	124	28	17
Sind ...	45	32	13	...
N.-W. F. P. ...	30	28	2	...
Baluchistan ...	6	5	1	...
Total ...	250	189	44	17
Percentage of Total Population	76	17	7
N. E. Pakistan				
Bengal—16 districts ...	401	287	114	...
Assam—Sylhet ...	31	19	12	...
Total ...	432	306	126	...
Percentage of Total Population	71	29	...
TOTAL PAKISTAN				
N. W. Pakistan ...	250	189	44	...
N. E. Pakistan ...	432	306	126	...
Total ...	682	495	170	...
Percentage of Total Population	73	24	...

APPENDIX II

'C. R.' FORMULA

The following is the 'C. R.' formula which provided the basis for discussions between Ghandhiji and Mr. Jinnah :

" The basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League to which Ghandhiji and Mr. Jinnah agree and which they will endeavour respectively to get the Congress and the League to approve :

(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence, and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period.

(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either State,

(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.

(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes:

(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.

(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India."

GANDHI FORMULA

The following is the text of Mahatma Gandhi's terms of separation proposed in his letter dated September 24, 1944, to Mr. Jinnah :—

"The areas should be demarcated by a commission approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method.

If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate state as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can, therefore, be constituted into two sovereign independent states.

There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communications, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties.

The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights of minorities in the two states.

Immediately on the acceptance of this agreement by the Congress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course of action for the attainment of independence of India.

The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League may not be willing to participate."

LAHORE RESOLUTION

The following is the relevant portion of the All-India Muslim League resolution (popularly known as the Pakistan resolution), passed at the Muslim League's annual session at Lahore in March 1940 :—

“Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, *viz.*, that geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments, as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are in a majority as in the north-west and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘independent States’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”

A SUGGESTION

1. In every district of the present provinces of North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, Assam, and Bengal, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants (on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise) shall be held, as soon as feasible, to determine whether the inhabitants of that district prefer to live in Hindustan or Pakistan.

2. All contiguous districts in which more than 50% of all the inhabitants vote at this plebiscite in favour of living in Pakistan, shall be grouped together to form one or more independent sovereign States. All other districts, together with the other five provinces of what is now British India, shall form the independent sovereign State of Hindustan.

3. The States of Pakistan and Hindustan thus constituted shall, on the basis of equal sovereignty, enter into mutual treaty relations on the matter of safeguarding the rights of minorities in the respective States, and on as many or as few other matters of common interest as they may mutually decide.

4. Immediately on the acceptance of the agreement by the Congress and the League, those two bodies shall together decide upon a joint course of action for the independence of what is now India from foreign control,

APPENDIX III

The following Articles of the Constitution of 1936 describe the powers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as of its constituent units :—

Article 13. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state, formed on the basis of the voluntary union of the following Soviet Socialist Republics equal in rights :

- The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic ;
- The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic ;
- The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic.

Article 14. Within the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its highest organs of power and organs of state administration, shall lie :—

- (a) Representation of the Union in international relations ; conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states ;
- (b) Questions of war and peace ;
- (c) Admission of new republics into the USSR ;
- (d) Supervision of the observance of the constitution of the USSR and ensurance of the conformity of the constitutions of the constituent republics with the constitution of the USSR ;
- (e) Confirmation of changes of boundaries between constituent republics ;

- (f) Confirmation of the formation of new territories and provinces as well as new autonomous republics within the constituent republics ;
- (g) Organization of the defence of the USSR and the direction of all the armed forces of the USSR ;
- (h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly ;
- (i) Protection of the security of the state ;
- (j) Establishment of national economic plans of the USSR ;
- (k) Confirmation of the unified state budget of the USSR as well as of the taxes and revenues which go to form the All-Union, the republic and the local budgets ;
- (l) Administration of banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and enterprises and also of trading enterprises of All-Union importance ;
- (m) Administration of transport and communications ;
- (n) Direction of the monetary and credit system ;
- (o) Organization of state insurance ;
- (p) Contracting and granting of loans ;
- (q) Establishment of the fundamental principles for the use of land as well as for the exploitation of its deposits, forests and waters ;
- (r) Establishment of the fundamental principles in the domain of education and public health ;
- (s) Organization of a single system of national economic accounting ;
- (t) Establishment of the principles of labour legislation ;
- (u) Legislation governing the organization of courts and judicial procedure ; criminal and civil codes ;
- (v) Laws regarding citizenship of the Union ; laws concerning the rights of foreigners ;
- (w) Passing All-Union acts of amnesty.

Article 15. The sovereignty of the constituent republics shall be restricted only within the limits set forth in Article 14 of the constitution of the USSR. Outside of these limits, each constituent republic shall exercise state power indepen-

dently. The USSR shall protect the sovereign rights of the constituent republics.

Article 16. Each constituent republic shall have its own constitution, which shall take into account the peculiarities of the republic and be drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the USSR.

Article 17. The right freely to secede from the USSR is reserved to each constituent republic.

Article 18. The territory of the constituent republics may not be altered without their consent.

Article 19. The laws of the USSR shall have like force in the territories of all constituent republics.

Article 20. In case of conflict between a law of a constituent republic and a law of the Union, the All-Union law shall prevail.

Article 21. A single Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the USSR. Every citizen of a constituent republic is a citizen of the USSR.

The changes in this constitution, announced on 2nd February 1944, amended Article 14(g) to read : "organization of the defence of the USSR, the direction of all the armed forces of the USSR, and the establishment of the directive principles of military formations in the Republics of the Union." A new Article, 8(b), required "Each Republic of the Union to have its own Republican Military formations," and the new sub-section 60(c) gave the Supreme Soviet of a Constituent Republic the right of establishing the procedure for the creation of such military formations. As a result while every Republic was to have its own army, all armed forces were to remain under the general control and orders of the General Authority.

As regards foreign relations an addition to Article 14(a) provides : "Representation of the Union in international relations ; conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states, and the establishment of general directives concerning the relations of the Republics of the Union and foreign states." A new Article 18(a), provided that "Each Republic

of the Union is authorized to enter into foreign relations direct with foreign states and to exchange with these states diplomatic and consular representatives." It also transformed the Peoples' Commissars of Foreign Affairs for the entire Union into a Commissars of the Republics of the Union.

("France Orient," July 1944, pp. 61—64.)

APPENDIX IV

Memorandum to Conciliation Committee

from

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim Majlis.

On the 6th, 7th and 8th of May, 1944, Nationalist Muslims held a conference at Delhi and passed many resolutions, copy of which is attached herewith. One of the resolutions ran as follows :—

Resolution No. 7—This meeting of the Nationalist Muslims considers, in the best interests of the country, that a Hindu-Muslim settlement should be brought about without any delay. It appeals to both Hindus and Muslims that, having regard to the urgent need of such a settlement, they should take necessary steps towards this end, and considers that the release of Gandhiji offers an excellent opportunity of which advantage should be taken. In the opinion of this meeting a solution of the communal problems satisfactory to all parties concerned can be secured on the following fundamental considerations, and such a settlement will satisfy the needs and aspirations of Indian Muslims :—

- (1) India should continue to remain a united country.
- (2) The constitution of India should be framed by its own people.
- (3) There should be an All-India Federation.
- (4) The Units of Federation should be completely autonomous, and all residuary powers should be vested in them.
- (5) Every Unit of the Federation should be free to secede from it as a result of a plebiscite of all its adult inhabitants.
- (6) The religious, economic and cultural rights of minorities should be fully and effectively safeguarded by reciprocal arrangements.

The All-India Muslim Majlis firmly stands for complete independence of India and her unity. It recognises that the

attainment of this all-important object demands complete accord and unity between and joint action by all the elements in the vast population of this country. It also recognises that today the communal question, which is mainly Hindu-Muslim, obstructs the path of progress towards the realisation of whole-hearted co-operation among the people of India. It is the continuance of the Hindu Muslim distrust that has culminated in the present demand for Pakistan in isolation. The Muslim League wants it for the Muslims, while the Hindus, in opposition to it, raise the cry of Akhand Hindustan. The Majlis considers Pakistan in isolation or the partition of India to be detrimental to the interests of Muslims themselves, but at the same time it feels that the cry of Akhand Hindustan intensifies the desire for the achievement of Pakistan among the Muslims. The causes which can be said to have created this desire among the Muslims are briefly summarised in the following paragraph :—

The Muslims feel that in spite of the great efforts of the Hindu social reformers in general and of Mahatma Gandhi in particular, social exclusiveness still remains the dominating feature of the Hindu society, and the cast system amongst them and its numerous bans and taboos not only prevent social intercourse between Hindus and Muslims but also, on many occasions, make the latter feel insulted and humiliated. To this is added the exclusiveness of the Hindus in the economic field. On the other hand, the tendency among the Hindus to monopolise the advantage of economic development has become very much marked recently, and as in the country as a whole the Hindus are much more advanced in business and industry, the Muslims find that they are gradually driven to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water. In fact the growing suspicion and bitterness on the part of the Muslims is due to the glaring disparity in the social, educational and industrial walks of life and the comparative backwardness of the Muslim regions as a whole when compared to the rest of India. The Muslims feel that no amount of assurance of legal

safeguards of the minorities can secure the actual equality between the two communities. It is, therefore, incumbent on the future government of India and the patriotic parties to formulate a definite plan with a view to eliminate the industrial, social and educational backwardness of the Muslim areas within a definite period. Again, the cultural unity which had been evolved during centuries of close, sympathetic association of Hindus and Muslims is being sapped by the efforts that are being made to revive an exclusively Hindu culture and impose it on the country. Some of the most prominent Hindu leaders are heading the movement against Urdu or Hindustani and are agitating about it in season and out of season. Communal prejudice is allowed to prevail upon justice and efficiency in appointments of public interests. In villages where the majority of residents are Hindus, Muslims are not allowed to perform their religious observances often within their own properties. Justice is obstructed by communal combinations of official and non-official Hindus. Last, but not the least, the so-called Hindu nationalist Press and news agencies which are in the hands of the Hindus, deny the Muslim publicmen the ordinary courtesy of publishing their views or protests. All these factors have helped Mr. Jinnah to rally the Muslims round him in his cry for Pakistan and the Muslims, being unable to withstand humiliating conditions, now feel that they would rather live in the hell of Pakistan than serve in the heaven of Hindustan with its degrading social and unfair economic treatment.

This situation is undoubtedly lamentable and has to be remedied and remedied soon. In an atmosphere, such as the present, a solution of the constitutional question, however good, however just, would be a cry in the wilderness, unless the Conciliation Committee can erect first a platform of unity and good-will to build thereon a palace of freedom upon which may be hoisted the flag of United India.

In the opinion of the Muslim Majlis the present lamentable situation can be remedied by conceding the right of self-determination to the territories predominantly Muslim

in their population. The members of the Muslim Majlis put complete independence of India first and every thing afterwards, and at the same time hold that, in order to achieve concerted action of Hindus and Muslims for the liberation of the country from the domination of the third party, no sacrifice can be too great, and consider that the speediest and most effective way of doing away with the present atmosphere of distrust, bitterness and fear among the Muslims would be to concede this right of self-determination on territorial basis. Hindus should leave the task of bringing home to the Muslims the evils of the claimed for Pakistan in isolation to their own co-religionists, who sincerely and strongly believe that partition is a remedy worse than the disease.

Briefly, the members of the Muslim Majlis while ardently subscribing to the goal of unity of India, are equally anxious that necessary conditions should be created to secure that unity. It is our considered view that the acceptance of the right of self-determination together with efforts to eliminate the existing social economic and educational disparities in the predominantly Muslim areas will go a long way in creating that spirit of trust and confidence which is the foundation of an abiding unity.

With the above as the preamble necessitated by circumstances, we should suggest as follows :—

1. The fundamental rights should be declared unequivocally, and so far as these rights are concerned, all Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Parsees, whatever their sub-divisions, should each constitute one religious community, and the others be classified according to the fundamental distinction of the first article of their faith or belief.

2. The fundamental rights should be declared to include the following :—

- (1) Freedom of association and combination.

- (2) Freedom of expression of opinion.

- (3) Freedom of conscience and free profession of and practice of religion.

(4) Protection of the *personal laws*, culture, language, education, scripts, places of worship and burial, Aukaf, and charitable institutions of various religious communities.

(5) Equal rights and obligations of all citizens without any distinction of sex.

(6) No disability shall attach to any citizen by reason of his or her religion, caste or creed or sex, in regard to public employment, office of power or honour, and in the exercise of any trade or calling.

(7) Equal rights of every citizen in regard to public roads, wells, schools, places of public resort and all other public institutions.

(8) Right to keep and bear arms subject to general regulations applicable to all alike.

(9) No person shall be deprived of his liberty, nor his or her property or dwelling be entered, sequestered or confiscated, save in accordance with law.

(10) Universal suffrage.

(11) Free Primary education.

(12) A minimum living wage for all kinds of labourers, limited hours, healthy conditions of work, protection against the economic consequences of old age, sickness and unemployment.

(13) The state shall guarantee that no citizen shall remain unemployed and shall receive a minimum allowance from the State in case of involuntary unemployment.

(14) Neither the country as a whole, nor any part of it, nor the resources thereof, shall be claimed by any particular community, group or party as their exclusive domain, and the Constitutional structure of the country as a whole shall be Federal, non-unitary and the Provinces or Federal units shall be fully autonomous in all respects, the Federal Centre exercising only such and as many powers on behalf of the several Federal Units as may relate to matters of common interest only according to an *agreed list* of Federal subjects, such, for instance, as External Affairs, Defence, Communications, Customs, Harbours, Territorial Water, Lighthouses,

Federal or Supreme Courts, etc.

(15) Every unit of the Federation should be free to secede from it as a result of a plebiscite of all its inhabitants.

(16) There shall be no *State religion*, nor shall the Government either the Federal or Provincial, give grants-in-aid, nor endow any institutions or movements out of the revenues of the State ; but if any religious community, by a majority of 75 per cent of its representatives, desires to levy a special tax or cess from the community for the endowment or maintenance of a denominational institution, the Federal or the Provincial State shall enact a measure to create a statutory trust of the community concerned, and shall assist the trust to realise the tax.

(17) In the matter of faith, religious belief and observances, personal laws, language, scripts, culture and the right to preach to others, all religious groups shall be free and fully autonomous provided that individuals shall have the freedom to change and declare their faith, and change of faith shall involve no punishment nor shall any one be coerced to conform any particular social behaviour or religious observance.

(18) Neither the Federal nor the Provincial State, nor any local or Statutory body shall change the nature of any religious institution or place of worship, burial or cremation, statutorily or voluntarily maintained. The State shall ensure the uninterrupted enjoyment of all lawful rights and religious practices.

(19) No Wakf property or property dedicated to God or gods shall under any circumstances, notwithstanding the law of transfer, limitation, prescription, confiscation, or otherwise, be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was intended, provided that this provision shall have no retrospective effects.

(20) No person shall be debarred by legislation, executive action or social pressure from any kind of food allowed by his belief, nor shall any person be obstructed by legislation, executive action, the action of any statutory or

local body or by coercion in the pursuit of any trade profession or calling.

(21) No citizen shall be debarred from any public service (which shall include service under any government or local or statutory body or anybody corporate or any Government aided or subsidised concern) merely on account of any disability based on sex, religion or creed.

(22) No provision of the constitution which relates to the exclusive rights and interests of the various religious groups shall be valid unless it is agreed to by the representatives of the group concerned, provided provisions validly formulated by the groups concerned shall be incorporated in the constitution. No such constitutional provision shall be added to amended or modified without the approval of a two-thirds majority of the group concerned.

(23) No legislative measure adversely affecting any of the fundamental rights of a religious group shall be introduced into the legislature unless the group concerned agrees to it by a majority of not less than two-thirds of its total number.

(24) Every social or religious measure relating to the personal law of a religious group, which does not affect any other religious group, if desired by a two-thirds majority of the entire representative of that group concerned shall be passed by the appropriate legislature.

(25) No restriction shall be placed on the movement of any citizen from one part of India to another and all shall enjoy equal rights of citizenship throughout the country.

(26) There shall be no discriminatory legislation.

(27) All grievances based on the contravention of any of the fundamental rights or of any provision of the constitution shall be cognizable by a Bench of the appropriate Provincial High Court, and an appeal shall lie to the Supreme or the Federal Court, as the case may be.

(28) Every province shall have the right to develop its own language, provided that Hindustani shall be the official language of every province. Hindustani shall be written in both, i.e. Persian and Sanskrit scripts.

(29) Neither the Federal nor any provincial legislature shall have the right to interfere with the personal laws of any community or attempt to make any changes therein, except in accordance with the canons of that community.

(30) All elections, whether to any legislature or board, should be on the basis of joint electorates, provided that the minorities shall have the minimum of their seats reserved according to their number and shall be entitled to contest other seats also.

APPENDIX V

The following is the Desai Liaquat pact :

"The Congress and the League agree that they will join forming an interim Government at the Centre. The composition of such Government will be on the following lines :

- (a) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and the Muslim League in the Central Legislature. (Persons nominated need not be members of the Central Legislature.)
- (b) Representatives of minorities (in particular Scheduled Castes and the Sikhs.)
- (c) The Commander-in-Chief.

"The Government will be formed and function within the framework of the existing Government of India Act. It is, however, understood that if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure passed by the Legislative Assembly ; they will not enforce the same by resort to any of the reserve powers of the Governor-General or the Viceroy. (This will make them sufficiently independent of the Governor-General).

"It is agreed between the Congress and the League that if such interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release the members of the Congress Working Committee.

"The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end are at present indicated to take the following course :

"On the basis of the above understanding some way should be found to get the Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires an interim Government to be formed at the Centre on the agreement between the Congress and the League and when the Governor-General invites Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Bullabhai Desai either jointly or separately, the above proposals would be made desiring that they are prepared to join in forming the Government.

"The next step would be to get the withdrawal of Section 93 in the Provinces and to form as soon as possible provincial Governments on the lines of a coalition."

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